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PREFACE
To tell You the truth, I would love to borrow the ﬂying whip of words of Ralph
Waldo Emerson, playfulness of scientiﬁc text from Carl Sagan, and from the ancient
stoics their powerful touch in textual matter. It is generally considered a mark of
inexperience to write if a book begins with a few lines about ancient Rome. Never-
theless, as an inexperienced writer, I am delighted to do my mistake by referring to
emperor Marcus Aurelius, who ruled Rome from 161 to 180 AD. He has a reputa-
tion for being the only wise philosopher king in the history of humans. Essentially
in his nightly diary, Meditations, he wrote that
”Nothing has such power to broaden the mind as the ability to investigate systemati-
cally and truly all that comes under thy observation in life.”
This is the real preface for a scientiﬁc inquiry. To me, during 2010, it meant that
I wanted to study what kind of websites there are on Tor. But there was no search
engine available for anonymous onion websites in the Tor network. What could I
do? I registered ahmia.ﬁ domain and started to create my own search engine for the
Tor network.
It was the starting point of my journey to understand how people use these
anonymous onion services. I guess we can see the path only afterwards and under-
stand that we were meant to walk it. It is time to summarise this research and thank
everyone on this path.
The dissertation was written with the help of Laboratory of Pervasive Comput-
ing at Tampere University of Technology. Information security company Cyber
Intelligence House greatly supported my work. Furthermore, people behind the
Tor Project supported me.
Professor Billy Bob Brumley served as the supervisor of this dissertation. I am
deeply grateful to Billy. When the student is ready, the wise supervisor will appear.
Feedback of pre-examiners assistant professor Diana Dolliver and assistant pro-
fessor Damon McCoy allowed me to take the precision and scientiﬁc quality of this
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dissertation to the next level.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Mikko Niemelä, Joona Kannisto,
Markku Vajaranta, professor Atte Oksanen, Teemu Kaskela and Jussi Perälä, who
all wrote the research papers with me.
Warm thanks to my few friends, for all the good times. Special thanks to my wife
who understands me better than anyone else.
Teamwork is essential for success. So I would like to take this opportunity to
thank my colleagues with whom I enjoyed working with in my path in different
organizations.
Feel free to send your feedback on these thesis and other aspects of this work
to juha.nurmi@ahmia.ﬁ. Furthermore, https://ahmia.fi/ - my very own search
engine - enables you to search onion websites.
Wishing You a safe journey inside the Tor anonymity network!
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ABSTRACT
Technology is the new host of life, and with each passing year, developments in
digitalization make it easier to destroy our understanding of authenticity. A man is
more than his distorted shadow on Facebook wall. Another essential shadow dwells
under anonymity.
The aim of this thesis is to understand the usage of onion services in the Tor
anonymity network. To be more precise the aim is to discover and measure human
activities on Tor and on anonymous onion websites. We establish novel facts in the
anonymous online environment. We solve technical problems, such as web-crawling
and scraping to gather data. We represent new ﬁndings on how onion services hide
illegal activities. The results are merged with wider range of anonymous onion ser-
vices usage.
We selected to cast light to the criminal dark side of the Tor network, mainly
black marketplaces and hacking. This is a somewhat factitious selection from the
wide range of Tor use. However, an archetype villain is found in nearly every story
so naturally, for the sake of being interesting, we selected criminal phenomenon to
study. To be clear, the Tor network is developed and utilised for legal online privacy
and several other essential ways.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that as the Tor network becomes more popular also illegal
activities become wide spread. Tor and virtual currencies are already transforming
drug trade. Anonymous high-classmarketplaces are difﬁcult for the law enforcement
to interrupt.
On the other hand, now illegal activities are paradoxically more public than ever:
everyone can access these onion sites and browse the product listings. The illegal
trade is transparent to be followed. For example, by the means of web-crawling and
scraping, we produced nearly real-time picture of the trade in Finland following one
of the marketplaces on Tor. As a result, statistics shed light on substance consump-
tion habits: the second study estimates that sales totalled over two million euros
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between Finnish buyers and sellers.
Due to the network’s anonymity and nature of illegal sales, reputation systems
have replaced the rule of law: a buyer trusts the seller’s reputation because the law
is not guaranteeing the delivery. The only available information is the seller’s repu-
tation and capacity which were both associated with drug sales as we prove.
Finally, we will identify the limits of online anonymity ranging from technical
limitations to operation security dangers. Technology is merely a communication
channel and major criminal activities still happen in the physical world. For in-
stance, a drug trade requires that the seller sends the products using post service to
the buyer’s address. Before that the seller has acquired enormous amounts of ille-
gal drugs. The buyer has to give away his address to the seller who could later be
placed under arrest with a list of customers addresses. Furthermore, we show case
by case how criminals reveal and leak their critical identity information. The law
enforcement agencies are experienced to investigate all of these aspects even if the
Tor network itself is secure.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet is growing exponentially: the number of connected devices, the amount
of shared data, the amount of saved personal data, and the amount of Internet trafﬁc
booms [6]. Thus, it is unsurprising that security problems grow at the same rate.
Internet services gather vast amount of personal data. It is the business model of the
largest online services to save data for commercial use. Unfortunately, data tends to
leak to wrong hands and it is easy to misuse private information.
The Internet is not designed to provide anonymity and privacy: the TCP/IP
protocol suite does not protect the privacy of Internet users [7, 8]. After the initial
start of the Internet, in 1969, it took two decades before the concrete development
of online privacy solutions began [9]. As the Internet grows exponentially the need
for online privacy solutions grows as well [10].
Indeed, there are a number of deep motivations for the development of an anony-
mous online applications. To fully understand further theoretical foundations of on-
line privacy and anonymity the author highlights and recommends ten high quality
Ph.D. thesis. The following theses were valuable references to this thesis.
1. A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet by Ian Gold-
berg. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley, December 2000. [11]
2. On the Anonymity of Anonymity Systems by Andrei Serjantov. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Cambridge, June 2004. [12]
3. Better Anonymous Communications by George Danezis. Ph.D. thesis, Univer-
sity of Cambridge, July 2004. [9]
4. Anonymity and Privacy in Electronic Services by Claudia Diaz. Ph.D. thesis,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, December 2005. [8]
5. Probabilistic and Information-Theoretic Approaches to Anonymity byKonstanti-
nos Chatzikokolakis. Ph.D. thesis, École Polytechnique, October 2007. [13]
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6. Covert channel vulnerabilities in anonymity systems by Steven J.Murdoch. Ph.D.
thesis, University of Cambridge, December 2007. [14]
7. A taxonomy for and analysis of anonymous communications networks by Dou-
glas Kelly. Ph.D. thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, March 2009. [15]
8. Privacy-enhancing Technologies for Private Services by Karsten Loesing. Ph.D.
thesis, University of Bamberg, May 2009. [16]
9. Improving Security and Performance in Low Latency Anonymity Networks by
Kevin Bauer. Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado, May 2011. [17]
10. Privacy Preserving Performance Enhancements for Anonymous Communication
Systems by Rob Jansen. Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, October 2012.
[18]
Unfortunately, Internet users need to take constant effort to prevail their privacy.
On the other hand, fortunately, there are practical privacy tools available.
In 1996, the design of Onion Routing was published to provide anonymity for
low-latency communication systems [19]. In 2004, the ﬁnal technical implementa-
tion of the routing network was ready: Syverson, Dingledine, and Mathewson pub-
lished their article Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router and the source code of
The Onion Routing (Tor) [20]. The Tor network started to provide anonymous
TCP/IP connections for everyone.
In addition, Tor enables anonymous Internet services. Onion services are Inter-
net services that are only available through the Tor network and conceal the real
IP address and location of the server [16, 17, 20]. Onion services have onion ad-
dresses and it is possible to deploy a TCP service on the address. For example,
msydqstlz2kzerdg.onion is a valid onion address and can be browsed using the
Tor Browser.
Information security tools which provide privacy and anonymity create tension:
people have a right to be secure in their information and a government’s duty is to
protect its citizens from harm. For example, in the EU law we have both protections
and limitations for the right to privacy [21]. In this dissertation we refer legal and
illegal as it is understood in the EU.
When the use of anonymous technology increases both legal and illegal activi-
ties become wide spread [21]. In 2011, the ﬁrst black marketplace, Silk Road, was
founded: it was an onion website providing a platform for selling and buying illegal
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products, mostly drugs [22]. Silk Road adapted Bitcoin as its payment method and
hid the location of the web servers behind the Tor network. It was the ﬁrst combina-
tion of these technologies to enable an enormous scale of online markets for illegal
products.
Illegal markets are anonymous but also the trade is transparent. Now everyone
can access these onion sites and browse the product listings. As a result, illegal activ-
ities are publicly available for research.
SilkRoadwas a very ideal place to study howonline communication technologies
transform crime [22]. Silk Road was the ﬁrst marketplace that made illegal trade
transparent and this trade can be studied with crawling and scraping. As a result,
several academic scholars published research regarding different aspects of Silk Road
marketplace [22, 23, 24, 25, 26].
In 2013, the marketplace known as Silkkitie was established in the Tor network
(Finnish word for Silk Road, also operates under name Valhalla) (publication I). Lan-
guage and country centric marketplace was unique and one of the ﬁrst marketplaces
on Tor.
Accordingly, in 2014, the author used web-scraping tools to study Finnish illegal
drug trade on Silkkitie and described the function of the marketplace. This started
the author’s investigations of onion services in the Tor network for this thesis.
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1.1 Objectives and contributions of the dissertation
This introduction is an overview of the topics of this thesis. A detailed map below is
for the reader to quickly visualise the structure of this thesis and logical connections.
Figure 1.1 A detailed map for the reader to quickly visualise the structure of the thesis and the areas
covered: connects the topic, objectives, publications, results and contributions.
Under the topic there are research questions, followed by background and related
16
research. This is actually our research playground where we carry out our research.
After that we represent investigations and results to answer our research questions.
The answers yield from our ﬁve publications. Finally, we summarise conclusions
and discuss wider understanding.
Background shows us how to deﬁne the anonymous online environment. Also,
we look at observations, what could be observed and how anonymous online behav-
ior has been measured previously. After deﬁning our real-world test laboratory, the
anonymous online environment in the Tor network, describing its background and
referring to the related research this research answers three novel objectives. These
individual three objectives of this thesis are summarised below.
Objective I Demonstrate how to carry out experiments in the Tor anonymity net-
work.
Objective II Represent our results and conclusions of criminal usage of onion web-
sites.
Objective III Merge this understanding with the wider scope of illicit onion service
usage.
This research makes novel contributions in three complementing levels. First
we carry out a series of investigations in the Tor anonymity network to explore it.
A concrete outcome of the ﬁrst contribution is the novel data about black markets,
hacking phenomenon and description of the security limitations of online anonymity
when using onions services. Finally, we contribute to the body of knowledge on the
domain of how people use onion websites.
The main three contributions of this research are as follows:
Contribution I TomeetObjective I, we contribute to the empirical body of knowl-
edge with our technical methods to follow Tor usage, with measurements on
anonymous onion services, and with abilities to monitor anonymous online
drug trade in real-time.
Contribution II To answer Objective II, our concrete outcome of the ﬁrst con-
tribution is the novel data about black markets, hacking phenomenon and
security limitations on anonymous onions services. We analyse these results
and highlight the fact that Bitcoin and Tor are transforming criminal activity,
including drug trade.
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Contribution III To satisfyObjective III, wemerge this understanding in thewider
context. First, why criminals as well ﬁnd these technical tools feasible? Then
we look at these parts as a whole and we answer what are the common reasons
to use Tor and how to detect these behavioral patterns.
The key result of this dissertation is the empirical process to study criminal ac-
tivities in the Tor network with the concrete research demonstrations.
In publication I we showed how Finnish illegal online drug trade concentrated to
Silkkitie marketplace and discussed the rise of drug marketplaces on Tor.
In publications I and III we carried out quantitative research to estimate the drug
trade on Silkkitie and explained the structure of the black marketplaces.
In publication III we calculated how seller’s reputation and capacity are both as-
sociated with drug sales.
In publications II and IV we went through the limitations of privacy in the Tor
network.
In publication V we investigated what motivates anonymous hacktivist groups
and how they coordinate their attacks and select their targets.
1.2 Structure of this thesis
The thesis is divided into six chapters and you are now reading the ﬁrst chapter. This
is an introduction chapter to the scope of the dissertation. The contents of the other
chapters are summarised below.
Chapter 2 represents the background of online anonymity and current state of
the research. Namely, how online privacy, online anonymity, digital services, digital
currencies and popular practical tools like The Onion Routing (Tor), onion websites
and Bitcoin create an environment where humans interact. Theoretical and practical
background is described.
Chapter 3 is our investigations of anonymous usage of onion services. We demon-
strate how we carry out research in this environment and gather data on various
phenomenon. These experiments are carried out in the real world laboratory and
we study how real usage of onion services manifests itself.
Chapter 4 Our publications give us a wide range of results to analyse. From the
data we can see human behavioral patterns and answer to our research questions. In
18
addition, we show how our contributions merge with wider range of illegal use of
online anonymity.
Chapter 5 tells us what we can learn from the research. We show the contribu-
tions and provide a synthesis of the key ﬁndings.
Finally, in chapter 6, we review the existing state and the future of online anonymity
and we represent our ﬁnal thoughts regarding the matter.
1.3 Research methods and restrictions
1.3.1 Tradition of methodology
After Aristotle (384-322 BC) it took two thousand years before new attempts to for-
mulate the scientiﬁcmethod [27, 28]. In 1543NicolausCopernicus publishedOn the
Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres [29]. His work with Galileo Galilei’s Discourses
and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences (1638) transformed
the views in astronomy and science [29]. Galileo used experiments as a research tool
and formulated his treatise. Sir Francis Bacon described his ’Baconian method’ in
book New Method (1620) [29]. Meanwhile, in 1619, René Descartes began writing
his Rules for the Direction of the Mind to draft guidelines for scientiﬁc research [29].
No work of science has drawn more attention than Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae Nat-
uralis Principia Mathematica (1687) where he formulated the laws of motion and uni-
versal gravitation [30]. The scientiﬁc Renaissance that lead to the scientiﬁc revolu-
tion in Europe began, and later transformed itself to the Enlightenment movement
[29]. It was seeking the principles of scientiﬁc reasoning and knowledge based on
experiments [30].
This thesis adapts these principles and knowledge based on scientiﬁc experiments.
Themodern formulation of the scientiﬁcmethod is roughly represented as six phases
below. It is based on the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy pub-
lished by Stanford University and can be regarded as the latest general methodology
of science [31].
1. Show a purpose and ask a question.
2. Perform the background research.
3. Construct a hypothesis that can be tested.
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4. Test the hypothesis with a repeatable controlled experiment.
5. Analyse the results and draw conclusions.
6. Report the results.
In this thesis this systematic approach is adapted to determine usage of onion
services. The structure of our research method follows these six steps in the speciﬁed
context of Tor and online anonymity.
1. Determine a signiﬁcant phenomenon enabled by anonymous onion services.
(a) Is it possible to study this phenomenon?
(b) How to formulate an exceptional research question?
2. Determine the background of the phenomenon, also outside of the Tor net-
work.
(a) What is the origin of the phenomenon and what is the role of technol-
ogy?
(b) Which economical, technical and societal parts and functions it consists
of?
3. Determine an experiment and tracking parameters inside the Tor network.
(a) Which functions of the phenomenon can be detected in theTor network?
(b) How to measure the most important functions of the phenomenon?
4. Create an experiment setup in the real world laboratory.
(a) What is an ethical way to measure this private human behavior?
(b) How to solve the technical details of the experiment setup?
5. Analyse the results and ﬁt them to the known background.
(a) Are the results supporting our hypothesis?
(b) Does the interpretation of the results ﬁt to known background?
6. Publish the results and conclusions in recognised peer-reviewed forums.
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1.3.2 Scope and restrictions
The research environment is the Tor network and this is the ﬁrst restrictions for this
study. We identify behavioral patterns which rely on Tor as underlining technology.
Especially, we determine interesting phenomenon enabled by anonymous onion ser-
vices. The Tor network is the most popular online anonymity system but there are
other anonymity systems and environments out there which we are not covering.
The second restriction is that we are interested in a speciﬁc category of behavior
over others. What is interesting human behavior? The author selected to cast light
to the criminal dark side of the Tor network, mainly black marketplaces and hack-
ing. However, human behavior could be scientiﬁcally categorised under endless cat-
egories. Yet, there is a certain fascination to categorise it under Jungian archetypes.
An archetype villain is found in nearly every story so naturally, for the sake of being
interesting, we selected criminal phenomenon to study. We did not research how
the Tor network is utilised for legal online privacy and several other essential ways.
The third restriction is that we only identify real detectable phenomenon that
happens between real Tor users. There are several publications covering theoretical
security ﬂaws, use cases, ideas and extensions on Tor. We research reality as it is
available at the moment. For instance, theoretical security threats are out of this
scope along with possible undetectable user behavior.
The fourth and ﬁnal restriction of this study is that we followed ethical guide-
lines. The author summarised and extended the ethical research principles of the
Tor Project [32].
• Appropriateness:
– The beneﬁts should outweigh the risks.
– Consider whether the user meant for the data to be private.
– Use existing public data sets whenever possible.
• Minimization:
– Only collect data that is safe to publish.
– Do not collect data that is not needed.
– Limit the granularity of data, for example, aggregate or add noise.
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• Safe experiment:
– Use a test Tor network whenever possible.
– It is safest to only attack yourself and your own trafﬁc.
– Take reasonable security precautions, for example, limit who has access
to the data sets or experimental systems.
• Lawfulness:
– Obey the law, for example, a privacy regulation in EU law has a global
reach.
This research obeys these ethical guidelines. Furthermore, in included publica-
tions we made sure that we only collected minimal amount of data that is safe to
make public, made trafﬁc analysis with our own Tor test network, and took reason-
able security precautions.
We comply with the law of Finland, and moreover with the regulation in Euro-
pean Union law on data protection known as the General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR). According to the author’s current knowledge, following the GDPR
regulation is relative straight forward in the scientiﬁc purposes. To help other re-
searchers the author summarised the compliance process to only ﬁve questions be-
low.
1. What are the data and does it contain personal data?
2. Where are the data stored?
3. Why are the data collected?
4. Who can access the data?
5. How are the data processed?
If a research is handling personal data of the individuals who live in the European
Union then, at least, answer to these questions and check the restrictions from the
regulation law text [33]. You have to know if you store personal data in your data set.
Even in this case, GDPR is ﬂexible: it is permitted to process the data for archiving
purposes in the public interest, scientiﬁc or historical research purposes or statistical
purposes [33]. Still, you have to document these motives.
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2 BACKGROUND OF ONLINE ANONYMITY
ENVIRONMENT AND RELATED RESEARCH
Let us now represent the real-world test laboratory, the anonymous online envi-
ronment in the Tor network. Also, let us look to the background and the related
research in this ﬁeld. An overview map below shows the research environment.
Figure 2.1 An overview map for the reader to quickly visualise the research environment.
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2.1 A brief history of the Internet and its revolutionary ethos
On the beginning of the 21st century we as a species reached the new age of digital-
ization: the Information Age [34]. This period in human history is characterised
by the rapid shift from traditional industry to information technology based econ-
omy. Technology is the new host of life: a modern city would collapse to chaos
without electricity within days. As the Industrial Revolution marked the onset of
the Industrial Age, the onset of the Information Age is the Digital Revolution [34].
Why we have this one global distributed, open, transparent, decentralised and
heterogeneous network? Let us brieﬂy examine the history and the revolutionary
ethos behind the Information Age. This is an incomplete short overview to show
a background for decentralization. As you know, the Internet operates without a
central governing body and there is this idea that everyone can attach their devices
to the network and share information.
Initial demonstrations in 1969 enabled operational Internet called ARPANET
[35]. It was a pioneering network for sharing digital resources among geographi-
cally separated computers developed by DARPA [35]. At ﬁrst, two computers were
communicating over Silicon Valley, California [36]. A computer in San Francisco
was connected via telephone lines to the second computer 50 kilometers away in
Menlo Park at Stanford Research Institute (SRI) [36].
The ARPANET was the ﬁrst network to implement the protocol suite Internet
Protocol (IP) address and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [37]. It was devel-
oped by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency within the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense [35]. It was the Cold War era: In the military point of view the net-
work was interesting because it was designed to survive subordinate-network losses
[38]. This means that the network can re-coordinate itself in the face of signiﬁcant
interruption by re-computing the routing tables. It took more than a decade before,
in 1983, the operational network MILNET (Military Network) and experimental
network ARPANET became separate networks [39].
The U.S. Department of Defense was not the only one interested in building a
communication network which operates without a central governing body. Distri-
bution of power and communication between peers and decentralization were wider
goals. The Cold War was one of the quite many parts of the zeitgeist.
The year 1969 is associated with several other events as well: Apollo 11 made
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the ﬁrst manned landing on the Moon, a music festival Woodstock was visited by
more than 400,000 young people, UNIX operating system development started,
the United States conducted lotteries to call men to military service in the Vietnam
War, the hippie counterculture took off in the mainstream and many young student
openly protested against the Vietnam War [40].
Later these students contributed to the development of network protocols. We
can compare the similarities in the hippie communalism, libertarian politics, and
DARPA’s research vision to create a fault tolerant distributed communication net-
work.
In 1972, Rand Corporation wrote about the vision that is the networks of com-
puters involves the interconnection of heterogeneous computing resources and this
trend may lead to a computer utility where computer resources will be available and
marketed the same as electric power and telephone services [37].
In 1980, ARPANET newsletter stated that the ultimate goal is to provide a net-
work that uses several different physical networks and commercial networks to pro-
vide interconnectivity between users while still maintaining network transparency
[41].
In 1985, JohnGilmore drafted theDynamicHostConﬁgurationProtocol (DHCP)
[42]. A few years later he stated that “The Net interprets censorship as damage and
routes around it” [38]. Accordingly, in 1990, Gilmore, John Perry Barlow and Mitch
Kapor founded an international non-proﬁt digital civil liberty group called the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in San Francisco, California [43]. Barlow, also a
former lyricist for the band The Grateful Dead, published A Declaration of the In-
dependence of Cyberspace [44, 45]. He demanded independence and sovereignty of
the Internet over government control and argued that the enlightened online com-
munity is seeking a common good by itself: “We are creating a world that all may
enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or
station of birth.” [45].
These and many other cultures formed the ethos and the roots of the Internet.
Today, in thewesternworld everyone can attach their devices to the Internet, publish
online content, access information and use or develop peer-to-peer systems with no
central coordination between the peers. The peer-to-peer systems include anonymity
network Tor and virtual currency Bitcoin.
At least the pathos and the rhetoric of the key persons behind a few popular
25
online services hints to counterculture, libertarian politics and technical search for
a fault tolerant distributed communication. In 2008, anonymous creator of Bitcoin,
Satoshi Nakamoto, wrote via the MetzDowd cryptography cypherpunk mailing list
the following statement regarding his Bitcoin project [46].
“Yes, but we can win a major battle in the arms race and gain a new terri-
tory of freedom for several years.
Governments are good at cutting off the heads of a centrally controlled net-
works like Napster, but pure P2P networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to
be holding their own.”
A few years later many founders of anonymous black marketplaces in the Tor
network wrote similar anarchistic statements. These marketplaces use Bitcoin as the
payment method.
2.2 Deﬁning online privacy
2.2.1 What is privacy?
Privacy is a useful concept, however, as with similar concepts, we do not have one
deﬁnition for privacy that explains its meaning [47]. Luckily, however, we can use
the word privacy without logical deﬁnition of the word [47]. Therefore, here we try
ostensive method to scope privacy by pointing out examples.
Each of us have quite a few examples of what privacy is and the operational deﬁni-
tion of privacy depends on the situation. Privacy is a part of security and motivates
the security research with anonymity systems. This is the ﬁeld of technical security
and privacy.
Aristotle deﬁned the division between two spheres of life: public (polis, city) and
private (oikos, home) [15]. This division is fundamental for understanding privacy.
Privacy is also covered in legal frameworks. The constitution of Finland does not
explicitly deﬁne privacy but implies that “The privacy of a letter, audio call and other
conﬁdential message is absolute” (author’s translation). However, there are limita-
tions to this absolute conﬁdentially in the other sections of the law. The Fourth
Amendment to theUnited States Constitution describes similar right to privacy stat-
ing that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
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effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”. Again,
however, this law adds limitations to this right.
TheMichigan SupremeCourt Justice deﬁned privacy as “the right to be let alone”
[15]. General Data Protection Regulation in European Union law sees it very simi-
larly and extends it by adding “the right to be forgotten” [33].
At an international level privacy is deﬁned in the 1948 United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in the article 12, and the article 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognise privacy as a basic human right [15].
In scientiﬁc texts there are several descriptions of privacy depending the ﬁeld of
science. For instance, in the ﬁeld of security research, Ian Avrum Goldberg repre-
sents in his dissertation a deﬁnition of privacy [11].
“Privacy refers to the ability of the individual to control the distribution of
information about himself. Note that this does not necessarily mean that
your personal information never gets revealed to anyone; rather, a system
that respects your privacy will allow you to select what information about
you is revealed, and to whom. This personal information may be any of
a large number of things, including your reading habits, your shopping
habits, your nationality, your email or IP address, your physical address,
or of course, your identity.”
The author would like to append that privacy is a part of security and liberty.
Furthermore, if something tries to trick or pressure people to give up their privacy
this cannot be considered liberty and respect of privacy.
Unfortunately, currently, many popular applications will suddenly show a mes-
sage like To continue to use our online services, you must now click OK to accept the
new Terms of Service. In several cases these new terms are painfully difﬁcult to read
and extremely long. Whatever this is, it is not respect of privacy.
2.2.2 Internet privacy
In the online context privacy is an enormous scale technical problem. By default,
transport and routing protocols are not providing privacy: the TCP/IP protocol
suite is not designed to protect the privacy of Internet users [7, 8]. As a result, a
service that the user is accessing discovers the IP address of the user and this IP address
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can be connected to the certain physical place, for instance, to the home address of
the user. Secondly, an attacker who spies the connection will learn what the user is
doing online.
Let us examine a basic situation where a user access a forum website over Hyper-
text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Accordingly, the website discovers the IP address of
the user and commonly this information is saved to server logs. Later with this infor-
mation it is possible to ﬁnd the real physical home address of the user. Furthermore,
because HTTP is not encrypted the content of the communication can be read in
the network between the user and the service. For example, it is possible to discover
both the writer and the content of the message to this forum website by monitoring
the connection.
Privacy of the content of the messages can be secured with encryption. In this
case, instead of sending the plain text version of the message, the text is re-written us-
ing an encryption algorithm and it can be decrypted and read only by the receiver.
For example, the forum website could offer HTTP Secure (HTTPS) which is en-
crypted with Transport Layer Security (TLS) between the user and the website [15].
However, still, the website knows the IP address of the user. Secondly, if an attacker
is monitoring the network connection then the attacker sees that the user is access-
ing the site. Although, the attacker cannot read the messages between the user and
the site, the attacker knows which website the user is browsing [15].
It is well known that online activities are monitored by several attackers, such
as cyber criminals, surveillance agencies and Internet service providers [11, 17, 18].
Also, multiple companies offer free online services to gather private data and sell
services based on the data to their paying customers [16].
In response to privacy threats, several online applications try to provide security
measures against online surveillance, add encryption layers, and increase the conﬁ-
dentiality of the communication. The ﬁeld of security research supports this effort
[8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
Repeatedly web services accidentally leak their logs which include personal data.
This is common although services are demanded to gather minimal amount of per-
sonal data and make sure that the data cannot be accessed without permission. In
the law of European Union personal data is globally protected under GDPR and
this protection covers information that could be utilised to identify any aspect of an
individual’s life [33]. Commonly IP address itself is personal data. Other examples
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include name, online user name, email address, home address and phone number.
Next we will look at how to have Internet privacy and why one has to use en-
ergy and special solutions. In this dissertation we recognise the background fact that
online activities tend to produce data logs and these data logs tend to leak [13, 48].
Unfortunately, this irreversible process yields from the second law of thermodynam-
ics that states that the entropy of an isolated system never decreases [13, 48]. As a
result, Internet privacy and information security is a constant process to use energy
to minimise sprawling of data [13].
2.3 Characterization of online anonymity
Anonymity and pseudonymity are two forms of privacy of identity frequently both
referred to as simply anonymity [11]. Under anonymity the user controls who can
learn his identity [11]. Anonymity system offers this functionality and thus an ad-
versary cannot discover the user’s identity against his wishes [11]. Pseudonymity
means that the user maintains anonymous identity, for instance, a nickname. Other
users can interactwith this nickname that is persistent. Without pseudonymity there
is no persistent identiﬁer and, as a result, anonymous users cannot be recognised
from each other.
2.3.1 Evolution of anonymity systems
2.3.1.1 Type 0: remailing system
In 1993, in Finland, Johan Helsingius (also known as under pseudonym Julf) began
to operate an email service, anon.penet.ﬁ, providing anonymous email accounts [9].
The email relay kept a table of correspondences between real email addresses and
pseudonymous addresses [9]. As a result, an email to a pseudonym would be for-
warded to the real user email address and an email from a pseudonym was forwarded
to the recipient without identifying information [9].
The anon.penet.ﬁ remailer was one of the ﬁrst examples of online anonymity
systems.
Technically, this service provides anonymity against the users receiving or send-
ing emails to a pseudonym [9]. They are not able to ﬁnd the real email address of
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the pseudonym [9]. However, it is trivial for a passive attacker who can eavesdrop
on Internet trafﬁc, or the service itself to look which pseudonym email address and
real email address are connected [16].
The user was assigned a pseudonym at anon.penet.ﬁ and the remailer maintained
a secret identity table matching up the real email address with the pseudonym. It
provided weak anonymity by stripping identifying headers from outbound remailed
messages [11]. This system is referred as type 0 anonymity service [11, 16, 17]. The
service itself can reveal the identities. Eventually, this limitation was the reason why
Helsingius closed his remailer service [9, 11, 16].
The anon.penet.ﬁ remailer was the most popular remailer and the most famous
one [11]. The court case of the service was noted by anonymity research community
[9, 11, 16].
The judge ruled the privacy rights in the constitution of Finland provide no
means not to serve as a witness [9]. If the service owner, in this case Helsingius,
is called as a witness to reveal the connection between a certain anonymous address
and corresponding real email address then he must reveal this information [9]. As
a result, Helsingius closed his service in 1996 because he could no longer guarantee
the anonymity of its users [9].
While writing this chapter the author noticed that Johan “Julf” Helsingius joined
the conversation on Internet Relay Chat (IRC) on #efﬁ channel. The author asked if
Mr. Helsingius could provide his thoughts on anonymity to this thesis. Julf kindly
replied.
“These days there are enormous amounts of information about us being
automatically collected, combined and processed. I ofter hear ‘But I have
nothing to hide’, but I am pretty sure all of us have things we wouldn’t
like other people – relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues or employers - to
know. What worries me even more is that a lot of that data is being stored
and handled rather haphazardly. It might very easily end up in the wrong
hands. As an almost overly dramatic example of this, nobody in 1935 could
foresee that the excellent population register of the city of Amsterdam, that
held not only home addresses, but also the religious afﬁliation of every in-
habitant, would lead to the Jewish population ending up in concentration
camps.”
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2.3.1.2 Type I: the Cypherpunk remailer
The simple design of type 0 pseudonymous remailers resulted in two problems: the
ﬁrst is vulnerability to trafﬁc analysis and the second is that the connection between
pseudonyms and real addresses is kept on the remailing server [9, 16].
Problem 1. Type 0 remailer cannot protect anonymity against trafﬁc analysis be-
tween incoming and outgoing messages. An adversary with the ability to monitor
trafﬁc can efﬁciently correlate the messages because outgoing messages have similar
sizes as incoming messages and both messages travel within a short time frame [9,
16].
Problem 2. Type 0 remailer can be hacked or forced to disclose the connection be-
tween pseudonyms and real addresses for legal reasons. Whoever operates the most
sensitive part of the system can uncover pseudonymity of all recipients in the system.
Users need to trust the remailer operator in keeping this table secret and protecting
it against hacker attacks. [9, 16]
To solve these two problems type I remailing system, the Cyperpunk remailer,
was developed. The security of the design of Cyperpunk remailer is represented by
Goldberg (2000) [11], Danezis (2004) [9], Loesing (2009) [16] and Bauer (2011) [17].
To address the problem 1, to prevent that the adversary trivially matches up in-
coming and outgoing messages, the Cyperpunk remailer accepts encrypted email
and after decrypting it the remailer sends the resulting message. To address problem
2, type I remailer does not support pseudonyms.
Multiple remailers can be chained together combined with encryption to add
security. The sender encrypts the message with the public keys of each remailer
in the chain. The original message and destination address are encrypted with the
public key of the last remailer in the chain. Therefore only the last remailer will
see the destination address. The multilayer encrypted message is sent to the ﬁrst
remailer which decrypts the address of the next remailer and forwards the message.
For example, if we chain three remailers together the ﬁrst remailer sees the origi-
nal address but not the address of the ﬁnal destination; the second remailer sees only
the address of the ﬁrst remailer and third remailer; ﬁnally the third remailer sees the
address of second remailer and ﬁnal destination address. Now a single server cannot
learn which original email address is in contact with the destination address.
An attacker must compromise each the remailers in the chain to trace messages.
31
Only one non-compromised remailer is needed in the chain and the attacker cannot
follow messages. Moreover, type I remailers randomly reorder outgoing messages
to address the problem 1 with the trafﬁc analysis between incoming and outgoing
messages.
2.3.1.3 Type II and III: Mixmaster remailer
In the mid-nineties, next development of the remailer technology is so called type II
and III Mixmaster remailer. It extends the techniques utilised in a type I remailer to
provide enhanced protection against trafﬁc analysis [9, 11, 17].
Mixmaster remailer sendsmessages in ﬁxed-size packets through a Chaumianmix
network [17]. It does not support reply messages [17].
The type II Mixmaster remailer extends type I remailer following four methods
[11]:
1. A Type II remailer is always chaining multiple remailers and adding encryp-
tion between chains.
2. Messages have constant-lengths to prevent matching incoming and outgoing
messages by size with passive trafﬁc monitoring.
3. A type II remailer is a stateful remailer and does not resendmessages to prevent
replay attacks. Otherwise an adversary could intercept a message and resend
it multiple times to correlate where these emails are heading to.
4. A type II remailer is reorderingmessages to add security against eavesdropping.
After development of type II remailers the next generation system is called type
III Mixminion anonymous remailer. It offers anonymous reply addresses, TLS en-
crypted Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) with unique encryption keys for
eachmessage, exit policies to enablemixminion node operators to ﬁlter abusive email
messages [17]. Dummy noise trafﬁc is added to mitigate trafﬁc analysis vulnerabili-
ties [17].
Email remailers cannot solve the problem that TCP/IP stack does not provide
privacy features by default. However, most of these protection methods will be seen
again in the next section where we show how Tor software implements full support
for anonymous TCP/IP.
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2.4 Tor enabling strong practical anonymity
In 1996, the design of Onion Routing was published: it is the heir of mix remailing
systems and implements a general low-latency communication system [19]. It took
a few years before the ﬁnal technical implementation of the routing network was
ready. In 2004, Syverson, Dingledine, and Mathewson published their article Tor:
The Second-Generation Onion Router and the source code of The Onion Routing
(Tor) [20]. The Tor network started to provide anonymous TCP/IP connections
for everyone.
In the previous section there were the design principles of anonymous remailers.
Each remailer in the chain decrypts, delays, and re-orders messages before sending
them to the next remailer [20]. These high-latency networks resist strong global
adversaries but have long latency and because of this lag this design is not suitable
for interactive tasks like web browsing or Secure Shell (SSH) connections [8, 20].
Tor uses these protection methods but extends the system to support TCP trafﬁc,
not only sending emails [8, 49]. As such, Tor is a low-latency anonymity network
[20]. As a result, it is possible to use multiple Internet applications anonymously be-
hindTor. Everything that communicates over TCP;UserDatagramProtocol (UDP)
protocol is not supported [20].
Tor hides the original IP address of the user. At the moment, Tor is the most
widely used anonymity tool and can be used for both legal and illegal purposes [21].
It is utilised by ordinary citizens concerned regarding their privacy, corporations
whowant to hide information from their competitors, and law enforcement agencies
who need to carry out their workwithout being noticed. Furthermore, human right
activists and journalist use Tor for safe communication.
To provide online privacy and anonymity Tor combines the following main tech-
niques [20].
1. The user is not directly connected to the destination. Instead, the user con-
nects to the Tor network and through the network his connection reaches the
destination.
2. The ﬁnal destination does not see the original IP address of the user; instead,
the destination sees a Tor relay’s IP address.
3. There are three relays chained and this is called a Tor circuit: the ﬁrst relay
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knows the IP address of the user, but does not learn the destination. The sec-
ond relay only sees incoming trafﬁc from the ﬁrst relay to the third relay. The
third relay knows the destination but does not know the original IP address
of the user.
4. The user encrypts the trafﬁc with each of the three relays. There are sepa-
rate encryption layers and every relay decrypts one layer off. It is analogous
to layers of an onion and this is the reason why the protocol is called onion
routing.
5. The Tor network is open and free for everyone: this attracts a lot of users and
relays. As a result, it is difﬁcult to introduce global trafﬁc and timing analysis
against the Tor network.
The three relay circuit includes end-to-end encryption (the 128-bit Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) cipher in countermode) and checksums for integrity check-
ing: the relay cell payload and header are encrypted and decrypted as the relay cell
moves along the circuit [20].
Moreover, Tor is a lively development project and new security features have been
added over the years. To prevent trafﬁc and timing correlation attacks, a padding
mechanism was introduced to the latest version of Tor [14, 50].
Still, a low-latency anonymity network is vulnerable to trafﬁc correlation attacks
by an attacker that eavesdrops on both ends. This limitation cannot be completely
removed from a low-latency anonymity network [12]. However, the Tor network
is huge and an adversary must perform global enormous scale monitoring [14, 20,
50].
Tor software is developed by the Tor Project, Inc. and it is a Massachusetts-based
501 research-education nonproﬁt organization, see https://www.torproject.org/.
Tor is free software and the Tor network is the network of computers that commu-
nicate using Tor software [20].
In the Tor network there are different roles for these computers. Voluntary
people have installed Tor software in a routing mode and permit their computers
to receive trafﬁc on the Tor network and pass it along. These computer servers
are commonly called Tor routers, relays or nodes. In 2018, according to https:
//metrics.torproject.org/, therewere around 7000Tor relays all over the Earth.
Normally, without modiﬁcations, Tor is a client software that connects to the Tor
network and opens socks proxy. Tor users are not transferring trafﬁc by default.
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In addition, because some countries try to block connections to the Tor network
by ﬁltering IP addresses of all publicly known Tor relays there are Tor relays which
are not publicly listed as part of the Tor network. These Tor relays are called Tor
bridge relays. Bridges are not listed in the main Tor directory so nobody has a com-
plete list of the IP addresses of these relays. As a result, it is impossible to completely
block Tor connections by ﬁltering connections to known Tor relay IP addresses.
In 2018, according to https://metrics.torproject.org/, there were around two
thousand Tor bridges.
Tor bridges provide several sophisticated pluggable transport protocols to obfus-
cate the connection [51]. In this case, the trafﬁc between the client and the bridge
is not identiﬁable as a Tor connection [51]. It is laborious and complex to build a
censor system like this: the system needs to apply deep packet inspection (DPI) data
processing to inspects in detail all the trafﬁc to detect these connections [51]. Still it
might be difﬁcult to decide if the connection is a Tor connection.
In 2018, according to https://metrics.torproject.org/, everymoment there
were over two million users connected to the Tor network (see Figure 2.2 below).
How safe is Tor and what are the limitations? We will answer to these questions
in the upcoming chapter and in our publication IV.
Tor enables TCP-based applications to obtain online anonymity without modiﬁ-
cation: it offers the standard and near-ubiquitous socks proxy interface [20]. We list
here multiple technical examples how one can use Tor.
Tor enables anonymous web browsing. Although it is possible to setup a web
browser to route trafﬁc through Tor’s socks proxy this is not recommended because
complex modern web browser can leak identifying information so many ways. To
offer a safe anonymous web browser the Tor Project develops Tor Browser, their
main privacy-aware application [52]. The latest information and the browser is avail-
able on https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en. This Tor
Browser is as easy to use as a common web browser: it is a modiﬁed Mozilla Fire-
fox Extended Support Release (ESR) with best-practice default settings and exten-
sions, such as NoScript and HTTPS Everywhere. Most importantly Tor Browser
starts Tor background process and routes all web browsing trafﬁc through the Tor
network. In addition, this browser removes all possible ﬁngerprinting methods, in-
cluding faking the information about operating system and hardware. Tor Browser
removes local privacy-sensitive data, such as the browsing history, cache and cookies.
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Figure 2.2 In 2018 every moment there were more than two million Tor users connected to the Tor
network. The number of simultaneously connected users even peaked over four million.
Tor enables anonymous web publishing. Similar to anonymous web brows-
ing, deploying an anonymous website is simple. Tor offers a censorship-resistant
and distributed platform that provides easy-to-implement anonymity for server ap-
plications, includingwebsites. Thismeans that a web server is only available through
the Tor network and hides its real IP address and its physical location. These web
sites can be accessed using Tor browser. In this case, both the user and the website
have anonymity.
Tor enables anonymous online communication. Tor offers socks proxy for a
TCP application. As a result, communication applications like SSH and IRC can
connect through the Tor network. In practice, the Tor Project offers torsocks wrap-
per application which forces DNS requests and TCP trafﬁc of an application to use
this socks proxy. It rejects other trafﬁc than TCP of the application, such as possible
UDP. For example, to use SSH or IRC anonymously one can launch the application
with torsocks on commandline:
SSH connection: torsocks ssh user@example.com
IRC with irssi application: torsocks irssi
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All in all, Tor is a general software to obtain privacy, it enables a TCP-based ap-
plication to route trafﬁc anonymously, and the Tor network has a huge user space.
The enormous number of various users creates a signiﬁcant anonymity set against
Internet surveillance.
2.5 Onion websites on Tor
Tor hidden services are Internet services that are only available through the Tor net-
work and conceal the real IP address and location of the server [16, 17, 20]. In this
thesis we call these services onion services because this is the current ofﬁcial naming
practice of the Tor Project. Onion services have onion addresses and it is possible to
deploy a TCP service on the address.
Location-hidden services use a virtual top level domain called x.onion and the
ﬁrst part x is a 16 character hash of the public key of the onion service. For example,
msydqstlz2kzerdg.onion is one valid onion address. This onion service is a web-
site (actually identical to ahmia.fi) and can be browsed using the Tor Browser (see
Figure 2.3).
Onion services do not use the regular Domain Name System (DNS). Instead, Tor
keeps a decentralised distributed hash table (DHT) between onion relays [20]. This
is a key-value list of onion addresses and introduction points of the onion services
[20]. Introduction points are onion relays which an onion service has selected as
contact points and it keeps three hop Tor relay circuit open to these points.
When a Tor user connects to an onion service the user ﬁrst queries the introduc-
tion points from the DHT [20]. Then the user connects to one of the introduction
points and informs the onion service what is the rendezvous point [20]. A ren-
dezvous point means a relay which a user has selected as a meeting point between the
user and an onion service. After the onion service receives the information regard-
ing the rendezvous point through introduction point it connects to the rendezvous
point [20]. Now they both have three hop Tor relay circuit to this point and they
can communicate anonymously [20].
This is how onion service protocol enables Tor users to connect to onion ad-
dresses. Let us summarise these steps [20].
1. An onion service randomly selects three relays, builds three hop circuits to
them, tells them its public key, and these relays act as introduction points.
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Figure 2.3 The Tor Browser is a special web browser which routes all its trafﬁc through the Tor network.
The address msydqstlz2kzerdg.onion is an onion address and a fraction of these
addresses publish web content. Websites inside the Tor network are location-hidden. These
anonymous onion websites can be viewed, crawled and indexed to provide a search engine.
.
2. The onion service creates an onion service descriptor. This descriptor contains
the public key and list of the introduction points, and it is signed with the
private key of the onion service. The onion service uploads this descriptor to
the DHT.
3. A Tor client can request the descriptor by querying the x.onion address of the
service. The client downloads the descriptor from the DHT and veriﬁes that
the descriptor is signed by the onion service x.onion. Now the client knows
the list of introduction points and the public key of the onion service.
4. The client randomly selects one relay, builds three hop circuits to it and asks
it to act as a rendezvous point by telling it a one-time secret.
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5. Next the client assembles an introduce message which is encrypted with the
public key of the onion service. The message consist of the rendezvous point
information and the one-time secret. The client sends themessage to one of the
introduction points. This introduction point delivers the introduce message
to the onion service.
6. The onion service decrypts the introduce message and knows now the ren-
dezvous point and the one-time secret. It connects through a circuit to the
rendezvous point and sends rendezvous message with the one-time secret.
7. Finally, both the client and the onion service have their circuits to the ren-
dezvous point. The user and the onion service communicate end-to-end en-
crypted messages between each other. There are ﬁve relays between the user
and the onion service passing the messages.
Onion addresses are not usingDNS and rather than revealing the real IP addresses
onion services can only be accessed through the Tor network. Because of this it
is impossible to censor these services. Moreover, because every connection from
the onion service is behind a three hop circuit it is extremely difﬁcult to locate the
actual server. It is even possible to host onion services behind ﬁrewalls or network
address translators (NAT) without modiﬁcations. If the owner of the service does
not reveal oneself the operator is able to maintain censorship resistant and location-
hidden Internet service, for instance, a website that is publishing news anonymously.
Onion services and users encrypt their communication from end-to-end soHTTPS
is not necessary for websites. Furthermore, the onion address itself is a hash check-
sum from the public key of the onion service. As a result the encryption and veriﬁ-
cation between the user and the onion service prevents Man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack.
According to the Tor Project’s measurements https://metrics.torproject.
org/ there are over 100 000 active onion addresses (see statistics in the Figure 2.4
below). However, only a fraction of these onion services are web services. Search
engine ahmia.fi estimates that there are around 15 000 active onion websites in a
given moment and multiple of these websites have only a lifespan of weeks.
Onion services enable anonymous web publishing. As a result, the published
content is diverse. Undoubtedly, some onion websites share pictures of child abuse
or operate as illegal marketplaces for drugs. These few services are controversial
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Figure 2.4 The Tor Project is measuring the number of onion addresses. These addresses can provide
Internet services over TCP, including web sites, BitTorrent trackers, IRC servers and other
chat protocols.
and frequently pointed out by critics of Tor and anonymity. Still, onion websites
are sharing legal content and multiple of them are even devoted to human rights,
journalism and publishing content that is censored by oppressive governments.
The Tor Browser is easy to use and, similarly, deploying an anonymous onion
website is simple. Tor offers a censorship-resistant and distributed platform that
provides easy-to-implement anonymity to web users, onion websites, and other In-
ternet services.
2.6 Decentralised digital currency revolution
The illegal marketplaces in the Tor network need more than leverage of onion ser-
vices to operate. A payment method is needed and normal bank transfers or credit
card payments are not suitable for illegal trade. Pseudonymous unregulated elec-
tronic money arrived in 2009 and two years after that the ﬁrst marketplaces were
created. These marketplaces combined the anonymous website publishing capabili-
ties of the Tor network and the unregulated new currency as their payment system.
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Bitcoin is the ﬁrst decentralised digital currency. Anonymous entity known as
SatoshiNakamoto created the peer-to-peer software in 2009 [53]. It forms a blockchain
based currency that works without central organizations [53]. Bitcoin is a digital as-
set created without a central bank [53].
Bitcoins can be transferred on the peer-to-peer Bitcoin network directly between
the users of the system [53]. These transactions are written to the shared Bitcoin
blockchain [53]. With hash checksums and proof-of-work cryptography the net-
work veriﬁes these transactions and it is not feasible to spoof transactions [53]. The
proof-of-work solves the problem of determining representation in majority deci-
sion making: as long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not
cooperating to attack the network an attacker cannot counterfeit transactions [53].
The price of bitcoins is determined by traders who exchange bitcoins for other
currencies [54]. The Bitcoin network creates new bitcoins to nodes verifying trans-
actions and eventually the network reaches the hard limit of 21 million bitcoins [53].
As a result, the price is based on the continuous demand to buy and sell this limited
number of bitcoins.
Bitcoin is pseudonymous and the identiﬁer is the user’s bitcoin address. Although
owners of the bitcoin addresses are not explicitly combined together every transac-
tion between users is permanently saved to the public blockchain [54]. As a result,
the anonymity is very limited: when the user exchanges his bitcoins to traditional
currencies the trading market will commonly require personal details and a bank
account. In 2018, one study estimated that 25 percent of users (approximately 24
million) and 44 percent of transactions are associated with illegal drug trade [55].
Even though the Bitcoin system does not offer technical anonymity, however,
bitcoins are widely utilised in illegal trade in the Tor network. Furthermore, the
Bitcoin system is the ﬁrst of so called cryptocurrencies but not the only one: in 2018
popular trading places recognised several popular electronic peer-to-peer currencies.
You can check out the currentmarket prices of the popular currencies here https://
coinmarketcap.com/coins/. Obviously there is an enormous support for legal use
of blockchain based electronic payment systems, however, criminals have adapted
Bitcoin and these other cryptocurrencies as well.
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2.7 Earlier research on Tor usage
Let us take a look at the related research on Tor usage. Especially, how this research
sheds lights on how people use Tor and onion services. Moreover, we created a
categorization of the research methods: we can see eight technical data collection
methodologies and ﬁt the previous research to our categorization.
1. Tor exit relay trafﬁc monitoring [56, 57, 58]. It is important to note that the
exit relay can observe the decrypted payload before it sends it to the ﬁnal destination.
Moreover, obviously, the exit relay learnswhat is the ﬁnal destination of theTor user.
If the user does not use encryption, for instance, HTTPS, then the exit relay could
(illegally and unethically) wiretap the actual content of the user’s communication.
2. Exploiting unﬁxed Tor protocol weaknesses and thus revealing usage infor-
mation [50, 59].
3. Passive trafﬁc and timing correlation attacks where an attacker correlates
connections between endpoints and reveals Tor user’s identity [60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65,
66].
4. Active trafﬁc and timing correlation attacks where an attacker injects trafﬁc
or delays trafﬁc passing through the Tor network and this way shapes the trafﬁc
pattern [67, 68, 69, 70].
5. Port scanning onion services to probe for open ports and services [59, 71,
72]. This method reveals what Internet services onion addresses are providing.
6. Ofﬁcial Tor metrics provided by the Tor Project. The Tor Project gathers
non-sensitive data for metrics [73]. The goal is to provide data for monitoring, re-
search, and developing the Tor network. Also, the data can be utilised to detect cen-
sorship events or attacks against the Tor network. Technically, Tor relays estimate
the number of users per country, number of different types of relays, number of
Tor applications downloads, censorship events, amount of Tor trafﬁc, performance
of the network, and number of active onion addresses.
7. Research honeypots in the Tor network reveal, for instance, how attackers
are spying information: honeypots can send trafﬁc through exit nodes containing
decoy credentials [74], or onion service honeypots can be installed to detect misuse
of the Tor network as our publication II demonstrates.
8. Gathering data by crawling onion websites as our publications I and III
show along with earlier research [22, 23, 26, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79].
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In addition, non-technical methods such as surveys could be utilised as well, how-
ever, in this thesis we only cover technicalmethodology. Also, although each of these
technical methods could be utilised to determine how people use the Tor network
many of them are illegal and unethical. For instance, in the EU, Tor exit node oper-
ators are generally protected from liability for the content passing through the exit
node, and, furthermore, it is illegal to wiretap and spy on Tor network trafﬁc [21].
Also, in the EU, national laws protect Tor exit relay trafﬁc [21]. Table 1 shows what
these eight technical methods could reveal regarding the usage of the Tor network.
In the EU, anonymity is an integral part of established human rights, and there-
fore indiscriminate monitoring of is not allowed: this means that the Tor network
is subject to the same requirements as the interception of other Internet trafﬁc and
using Tor is not labeled as a sign of criminality [21].
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Technical methodology What the resulting data could reveal regard-
ing the usage of the Tor network?
1. Monitor exit relay Analysis of Tor exit relay trafﬁc can show which
Internet services Tor users access, for example,
which websites are browsed anonymously.
2. Exploit protocol weakness Unﬁxed protocol weaknesses have leaked infor-
mation of how people use Tor, for instance,
which onion services are the most popular.
3. Passive trafﬁc correlation An attacker correlates connections between end-
points and reveals, for instance, what the Tor
users from a certain country are accessing.
4. Active trafﬁc correlation An attacker shapes the trafﬁc pattern and, for
example, shows who is accessing certain onion
services.
5. Port scan onion services Results from port scanning onion services reveal
wide range of Internet services in the Tor net-
work and we know that only a minor fraction
of the onion services are websites.
6. Ofﬁcial Tor metrics From the public statistics we can learn num-
ber of users per country, number of relays,
how much trafﬁc the Tor network handles, how
quick and reliable it is, number of onion ser-
vices, and howmany times Tor browser is down-
loaded and updated.
7. Research honeypots Honeypots detect how attackers try to exploit
services and spy Tor users.
8. Crawl onion websites Finally, using leverages of web crawling and
scraping techniques, research shows what kind
of web content there is available on onion web-
sites.
Table 1. Earlier research sheds lights on how people use Tor and onion services.
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We created a categorization of the research methods: we can categorise the research
according to technical data collection methodologies.
In this thesis we investigate empirically how theTor network is usedwith research
honeypots (method 7) and by web crawling and scraping onion websites (method 8)
and ﬁt our results to earlier research.
Before explaining our investigation let us take a look at inspiration that earlier
research on illegal marketplaces on Tor gave us. Paradoxically illegal activities are
more transparent in the Tor network because anyone can access these onion sites
and look at the product listings. As a result, the illegal trade can be studied by the
means of web-crawling and scraping (method 8).
2.8 Earlier research on marketplaces operated on Tor
In 2011, the ﬁrst black marketplace, Silk Road, was founded: it was an onion website
providing a platform for selling and buying illegal products, mostly drugs [22]. Silk
Road adapted Bitcoin as its payment system and hid the location of the web servers
behind the Tor network. This was the ﬁrst combination of the technologies and
enabled an enormous scale of online markets for illegal products.
Silk Road captured worldwide media attention and alarm from law enforcement
agencies already not making progress with the drug prohibition policies [24]. Ac-
cording to the U.S. Congress Silk Road is the most brazen attempt to peddle drugs
online we have ever seen [24].
In Silk Road, vendors and buyers have their Bitcoin wallets for payments [23]. It
is mandated by the site to use the escrow system [23]. This system takes a commission
fee to the site and locks the payments between a buyer and a vendor [23]. When the
buyer receives the product the buyer frees the payment to the vendor. In most cases
the buyer receives desirable product and the Bitcoin payment is transferred to the
seller. This is because the reputation of the seller is very crucial and the research
shows that the sellers fulﬁll their promises [79]. If the buyer is not happy with the
product the buyer can make a dispute claim and the site creates a resolution between
the seller and the buyer [23]. The buyer gives a public feedback to the seller, and
other buyers see the reputation of the seller.
SilkRoadwas a very ideal place to study howonline communication technologies
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transform crime [22]. Silk Road was the ﬁrst marketplace that made illegal trade
transparent and this trade can be studied with crawling and scraping. As a result,
several academic scholars published research regarding different aspects of Silk Road
marketplace [22, 23, 24, 25, 26].
For example, one study scraped data on cannabis listings from November 2013
to October 2014 and showed that the reputation acts as a sufﬁcient self-enforcement
mechanism for themarketplace [79]. Another study showed that the Silk Roadwas a
proﬁtablemarketplace with a growing and loyal consumer base and the trade volume
of illegal drugs was millions of USD per month [75].
Researchers noted revolutionary libertarian ethos of this new online culture [76].
Reputation system replaced the rule of law and customers were satisﬁed with high
quality products [79]. In the economy point of view these marketplaces have no
troubles [79]. Also, notably the law enforcement has signiﬁcant troubles to shut
down these marketplaces [76]. Still, it was noted that the greatest threats to Silk
Road and other marketplaces are difﬁcult technical security details to operate these
online services [76].
Eventually Silk Road was shut down in October 2013 by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) [80]. The FBI arrested Ross William Ulbricht, a 29-year-old soft-
ware engineer and outspoken libertarian, who created the Silk Road marketplace
[80]. Ulbricht did several technical and operation security mistakes which lead the
FBI to ﬁnally locate him and where his onion website was hosted [80]. In the up-
coming chapter 3 and in our publication IV we will carefully explain the details and
what are the typical technical and operation security mistakes.
Immediately a month after the original Silk Road was shut down Silk Road 2.0
was launched to ﬁll the void [75]. Again this marketplace was studied using crawling
and scraping and the results showed that the trade was shifting to Silk Road 2.0 and
growing [75].
There is a customer base and economical drive for these marketplaces. As a re-
sult, currently, there are around 20 different very popular black marketplaces in the
Tor network and there is competition between the marketplaces. In short, these
marketplaces operate like the Ebay online service but for illegal products. Each of
these popular marketplaces implement internal Bitcoin wallet systems, escrow sys-
tems, and reputation systems. Take a look at the screen capture of the Silk Road 2.0
website when it was launched in 2013 (Figure 2.5).
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Figure 2.5 New marketplaces were founded after the FBI shut down the original Silk Road. “Just
a month after shutdown, Silk Road 2.0 emerges - another anonymous person on-
line has taken up the persona of Dread Pirate Roberts and created The Silk Road
2.0”, source https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/11/
just-a-month-after-shutdown-silk-road-2-0-emerges/
Some academic researches pointed out that these black marketplaces may have
positive impacts to the society. In the consumer point of view the price and quality
of illegal drugs are excellent because the reputation system works, the law enforce-
ment cannot efﬁciently trace down buyers or sellers, and actually these marketplaces
provide safer alternative for regular drug deals. In the publication Responsible ven-
dors, intelligent consumers: Silk Road, the online revolution in drug trading (2014) [76]
Van Hout and Bingham wrote:
“Given Silk Road’s potential built in quality mechanisms for safer drug use,
previous commentaries have suggested the need for a shift in drug policy fo-
cus toward reducing consumer demand for web retailed drugs and optimis-
ing on the site’s capacity for encouraging safer forms of drug taking amongst
a very hard to reach and informed drug using population.”
The digitalization of the drug trade is difﬁcult to tackle and it is a growing trend.
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The law enforcement is unable to prevent this shift. More research is needed and we
can use novel technical means to carefully study how people use these marketplaces.
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3 INVESTIGATING USAGE OF ONION
SERVICES
Now we carry out our experiments in the Tor network and we study how real usage
of onion services manifests itself. An overview map below shows the anonymous
online environment where we perform our investigations.
Figure 3.1 The aim of this thesis is to determine the usage of onion services in the Tor anonymity net-
work. To be more precise the aim is to discover and measure human activities on Tor and on
anonymous onion websites.
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Objective I We demonstrate how to carry out experiments in the Tor anonymity
network. Objective IIWe represent our data of criminal usage of onionwebsites. To
understand the context, we categorise the security limitations of the Tor network.
3.1 Limits of anonymity
How safe is Tor and what are the limitations? We cover this topic in our publica-
tion IV, where we cover what are the real Tor de-anonymization techniques which
have been applied in the real-world. If you like, instead of reading the publica-
tion, you can also watch the author’s one hour lecture regarding the topic https:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjp3wvX3Rqc.
Earlier we mentioned surveillance agencies and global adversaries which are spy-
ing Internet trafﬁc. Fortunately, we know a little bit regarding their technical capa-
bilities and their attacks against Tor.
In 2013, ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the United States
National Security Agency (NSA) has been spying both U.S. citizens and foreign-
ers all over the world [81]. During the same year, a federal judge in Washington,
Judge Richard Leon, ruled that these Orwellian programs probably violate the fourth
amendment in the U.S. constitution [81]. We gain interesting insight to the security
of Tor by reading the actual top-secret NSA documents. The NSA has tried without
achievements to attack Tor users according to their own presentations on Tor [82,
83].
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Remember that Tor is designed to support free journalism. An interesting detail
is that Snowden actually used Tor to obtain anonymity while contacting journalists.
Famously, the ﬁrst news photo of Snowden with his laptop shows two stickers, a
Tor sticker and an EFF sticker (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2 Ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the United States National Security
Agency (NSA) has been spying both U.S. citizens and foreigners all over the world, and
tried to track Tor users. He used Tor himself to anonymously contact journalists. His laptop
has a Tor sticker and an EFF sticker. Photo: Barton Gellman for The Washington Post.
The NSA documentation Tor Stinks (see Figure 3.3) states that “We will never be
able to de-anonymise all Tor users all the time” but “with manual analysis we can
de-anonymise a very small fraction of Tor users” [83].
Figure 3.3 The NSA’s top-secret document states that “We will never be able to de-anonymise all Tor
users all the time” but “with manual analysis we can de-anonymise a very small fraction of
Tor users”.
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Another document (see Figure 3.4) writes that Tor is the king of high-secure, low-
latency anonymity and there are no contenders to the throne in waiting [82].
Figure 3.4 Tor is the king of high-secure, low-latency anonymity according to the NSA.
This reveals that Tor provides high-level online anonymity and is safe even against
global adversaries like the NSA. However, throughout the years a few users have
lost their anonymity. In publication IV we researched challenges that Tor users will
encounter andwhat are the real world caseswhere someone has lost their anonymity.
We noticed that these cases fall under four categories.
1. Operation security (OPSEC) is difﬁcult.
2. End user devices may still be vulnerable to conventional cyberattacks.
3. Onion services may be attacked by exploiting unintentional features of server
software that is not designed to be installed on Tor.
4. Under special conditions it is possible to carry out trafﬁc and timing correla-
tion attacks.
3.1.1 Operation security is difﬁcult
First, OPSEC seems to be very difﬁcult even for technically clever people who un-
derstand these limitations, for instance, the founder of the ﬁrst Silk Road, Ross
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William Ulbricht, also known under pseudonyms Dread Pirate Roberts, frosty and
altoid, leaked pieces of information over time.
In 2011, a user called altoid posted publicly on the Bitcoin Talk forum a mes-
sage titled “a venture backed Bitcoin startup company” with his recognisable email
address rossulbricht@gmail.com [84]. After that altoid advertised Silk Road. Further-
more, simultaneously, altoid advertised Silk Road on a magic mushroom discussion
board on shroomery.org.
Ulbricht’s Google Plus page and his YouTube proﬁle both make multiple refer-
ences to the Austrian economic theory. At the same time on the Silk Road forums,
Dread Pirate Roberts shared these same links and cited same theories. Figure 3.5
demonstrates an example of Ulbricht’s behaviour pattern on YouTube.
Figure 3.5 Ulbricht and Dread Pirate Roberts shared distinguishable interest to similar Austrian eco-
nomics videos.
Furthermore, later Dread Pirate Roberts mentioned that he is in the Paciﬁc time
zone.
According to the FBI’s criminal complaint Ulbricht posted the question “How
can I connect to a Tor hidden service using curl in php?” on stackoverﬂow.com1 under
his own real name and later changed his username to frosty [85].
On top of everything else, Ulbricht purchased nine counterfeit identiﬁcation doc-
uments with his face but with different names from Canada. U.S. border customs
intercepted these counterfeit identiﬁcation documents, which were addressed to Ul-
bricht’s San Francisco apartment. The law enforcement suspected that he is using
1https://stackoverﬂow.com/questions/15445285/how-can-i-connect-to-a-tor-hidden-service-
using-curl-in-php
53
these counterfeit documents for illegal activities.
We combined this cumulative data trail in publication IV and created timeline in
Table 2.
Date OPSEC: Leak of critical information
01/2011 Silk Road onion service http://tydgccykixpbu6uz.onion is cre-
ated.
01/2011 Silk Road portal silkroad420.wordpress.com is created.
01/2011 Silk Road portal starts to advertise Silk Road onion service.
01/2011 altoid advertises Silk Road on shroomery.org forum.
01/2011 altoid advertises Silk Road on Bitcointalk forum.
10/2011 altoid posts a job offer on Bitcointalk, rossulbricht email.
03/2013 Question about Tor and PHP is posted on stackoverﬂow.com.
03/2013 Ulbricht changes his real name on Stack Overﬂow to frosty.
07/2013 A routine border search intercepts a package of fake IDs.
Table 2. The main OPSEC-related events that linked Ulbricht to Silk Road
through the pseudonyms altoid, frosty, and Dread Pirate Roberts.
Eventually, the FBI closed in on the suspect Ross Ulbricht with warrants, techni-
cal investigation and by following him. In 2013 he was arrested. The FBI seised his
open laptop in a public library and this laptop provided the ﬁnal evidence to convict
Ulbricht as the founder of Silk Road marketplace.
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Another similar case happened in 2017. Alexandre Cazes, the 25-year-old Cana-
dian and founder of theAlphaBaymarketplace, used same email address in his Linkedin
proﬁle and on Alphabay website (Figure 3.6) [86]! The email address was visible to
every new user in a welcome email when they signed up to the world’s largest online
drug marketplace. The identical email address was visible in the Linkedin proﬁle of
Alexandre Cazes.
Figure 3.6 AlphaBay Market was the largest online black marketplace when it was shut down in 2017.
According to the complaint afﬁdavit the FBI investigated an email address found from the
site: the founder Alexandre Cazes used the same email address in his Linkedin proﬁle and
on Alphabay website [86]. Underlining added by the author.
It is easy to conclude that anonymous Tor users should follow a strict OPSEC
process, however, as several cases like these indicate, it is extremely difﬁcult even for
security focused software developers.
“The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not
coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his
not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unas-
sailable.” 2
It is easy to give away the advantage of the perfect technical anonymity by a cer-
2The Annotated Art of War, Parts 8.3-11: Advantages, written originally by Sun Tzu around 500
BC
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tain behavioral pattern or a combination of identifying information. An adversary
can follow this cumulative data trail over time and learn the real identity of the Tor
user.
3.1.2 Weak security of the end user device
Secondly, the end user devices may still be vulnerable to conventional cyberattacks.
Applications which are installed behind the Tor network have been exploited even
if the Tor network itself is safe. In publication IV we studied these cases.
In 2013, the FBI seised Freedom Hosting service provider which was hosting sev-
eral onion services. Instead of closing these services the FBI spread a special malware
software through quite a few of them. The malware was a memory-management ex-
ploit against the (Firefox) Tor Browser [87]. Freedom Hosting was facilitating child
abuse onion websites and the FBI injected their malicious JavaScript exploit code to
these sites. Before Firefox developerMozilla patched the vulnerability, the JavaScript
exploit was able to identify the MAC address and hostname of the user and sent it as
HTTP requests to the FBI. The HTTP request exﬁltrated the user’s real IP address
and exposed this to the FBI.
In 2015 the FBI carried out a similar operation and took over a child abuse onion
website called Playpen and operated it two weeks before closing it down; the FBI
continued to distribute child abuse media material with a special piece of malware
included [88]. This malware revealed the real IP addresses of the visitors [88].
Then as well, in 2016, an anonymous warning was sent to the popular tor-talk
mailing list. This email published a previously unknown exploit that was injected to
an onion website that was sharing child abuse material [89]. Again, a piece of mali-
cious JavaScript codewas exploiting the (Firefox) Tor Browser and exposed the user’s
real IP address. Identically to the one found in 2013, this memory-management ex-
ploit was able to call kernel32.dll on Windows operating systems and executed the
attacker’s commands. Again, Mozilla quickly ﬁxed this Firefox vulnerability.
Most software applications are not designed for anonymity. Repeatedly they leak
information regarding the end user device. Modern web browsers are not able to
open all types of ﬁles and malicious ﬁles can be shared to the user. Although the
Tor Browser clearly warns that opening these ﬁles outside of the browser is not safe,
because applications could connect to the Internet without Tor, still it is very easy
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to make the mistake.
The only known secure way to mitigate these risks is to create a separate envi-
ronment which only permits trafﬁc through the Tor network and prevents other
connections to the Internet. This way every application operates behind the Tor
network. There are two Linux distributions that provide this anonymous environ-
ment for every application, Tails and Whonix [90, 91].
Actually, the adversary does not need to ﬁnd novel exploits against software; in-
stead, it is feasible to exploit existing features of applications that are not designed to
protect anonymity. For example, popular document viewers fetch online resources,
such as images and style sheets. This will cause the applications to leak the real IP
address of the user to the attacker when these kind of ﬁles are opened.
It is difﬁcult to perceive which ﬁle types are safe to open without side effects.
Modern applications are so complex that it is impossible to determine what kind of
side effects for privacy they are causing. We studied the most simple examples to
demonstrate this danger for anonymity.
For example, an mp3 music ﬁle format and mp3 player applications are rather
simple. Still, a simple mp3 ﬁle with a popular m3u ﬁle is a dangerous combination
for privacy. Popular media players look up the album image cover, which is in the
m3u ﬁle, from the online source. The attacker can share this kind of mp3 and m3u
ﬁles together and detect the incoming connections from the user’s real IP address.
It is important to conclude that in the point of view of the media player devel-
opers this is not even an important security feature because they are not intending
their player to provide anonymity. When the author tested very popular free me-
dia players many of these fetched the album cover image without asking permission
to do this. Even worse, the most popular media player on Linux, VLC player, had
a user interface bug: the player actually asks permissions but when you select the
option not to download from the online sources the player downloaded the image
cover anyway [92]!
3.1.3 Unintentional features of server software behind Tor
Now, thirdly, we examine a few common mistakes and ﬂaws that may reveal critical
information regarding the location of an onion service. Again, it is important to
notice that although a TCP based server software can be installed as an onion service
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these applications are not designed to provide anonymity by default. Instead, there
are several unintentional ways server applications reveal critical information when
installed behind the Tor network.
Let us examine a typical SSH service that is installed to operate through an onion
address. The SSH shows a unique ﬁngerprint of the service before login. The feature
is intended for validating the SSH server’s identity againstman-in-the-middle attacks.
However, repeatedly people install the same SSH service on a public IP address and
through an onion address. Unfortunately, this reveals the IP address of the onion
service. The following demonstration tests SSH connections to the onion address
and to the public IP address.
# torsocks ssh root@msydqstlz2kzerdg.onion
RSA key fingerprint a7:93:84:a6:97:fa:25:65:77:c9:58:bb:fe:8e:e2:2f
# ssh root@ahmia.fi
RSA key fingerprint a7:93:84:a6:97:fa:25:65:77:c9:58:bb:fe:8e:e2:2f
As a result, we see that ahmia.fi and msydqstlz2kzerdg.onion SSH servers
have the same ﬁngerprint. We revealed the real address of the onion service.
Tor software cannot warn against this unintentional conﬁguration. It is easy to
share the same Internet service simultaneously through a public IP address and an
onion address and reveal the location of the service.
Another Achilles’ heel is an aftereffect from the fact that server applications use
Tor through SOCKS. In the point of view of the server software the connections are
coming from localhost. This causes a new danger for anonymity: major web frame-
works treat localhost as a safe zone and offer special features to the users coming from
the localhost. In this case, every onion website visitor can access these features.
A very popularApacheHTTPServer has theApache Server Statusmodulewhich
provides a statistical information view to localhost connections http://127.0.0.
1/server-status/. Normally users coming from localhost have already login ac-
cess to the server computer itself and it is natural to consider a localhost as a safe
zone.
However, when Apache is connected to Tor through localhost SOCKS connec-
tion the onion website displays the page http://address.onion/server-status/
publicly. The information page shows a lot of information regarding the server itself,
including uptime, number of connections and even rare cases the real IP address of
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the server. National Bureau of Investigation (Finland) seised one of the Finnish dis-
cussion boards and pointed its trafﬁc to their server which was leaking server status
information (Figure 3.7). For anonymity, even one of these pieces of information
could be critical and lead to de-anonymisation of the onion service.
Figure 3.7 National Bureau of Investigation (Finland) seised one of the Finnish discussion boards and
when they directed its onion address to their Apache server they were leaking their server’s
information.
In addition, because popular web frameworks that are not designed to be installed
onTor and are not designed to provide anonymity for the server, popular web frame-
works frequently leak error messages that include critical server information. This
happened to the notorious Silk Road marketplace: it showed for some time an error
message which contained the IP address of the server, see screen capture image 3.8
from Reddit.com discussion website.
Unfortunately, Tor adds an extra layer of complexity to already complex web
framework security. In addition, it only requires to leak once a tiny piece of infor-
mation to completely compromise anonymity.
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Figure 3.8 According to Reddit.com conversation the original Silk Road marketplace website showed
this error message which contained the public IP address of the server.
3.1.4 Special conditions enable trafﬁc and timing correlation attack
As the background shows Tor trafﬁc could be de-anonymised using end-to-end traf-
ﬁc and timing correlation attack. When the attacker is observing trafﬁc of the ﬁrst
relay (entry guard) and trafﬁc of the destination (onion service, exit relay) statistical
analysis to discover the real IP address of the user can be applied. Through correla-
tion attacks it is possible to attack against anonymity by passive trafﬁc monitoring
without actually having the access to the relays themselves. It is enough that the
attacker observes the trafﬁc.
According to the leaked NSA documents, intelligence agencies and other large
attackers can catch only a fraction of the Tor trafﬁc so, in general, it is not feasible
to carry out this attack [83, 93]. However, having said that, occasionally the correla-
tion attack does not require enormous trafﬁcmonitoring and sophisticated statistical
analysis. There are known cases where the adversary effectively de-anonymises a Tor
user with trafﬁc and timing correlation. In publication IV we studied these cases.
For instance, in 2013, a 20-year-old Harvard University student sent hoax bomb
threats using Tor to get out of a ﬁnal exam [94]. According to the FBI afﬁdavit, the
FBI noted that these emails came from a free email service that creates temporary
email addresses [94]. The service embedded the IP address in outgoing email which
pointed to Tor exit node. The investigators suspected that a student used Tor to
send these emails. They found out that there has been only one student connected
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to the Tor network from the university wireless network while these emails were
sent. This correlation led the investigators to interrogate the student. The student
confessed and was arrested.
When the number of clients is tiny in the anonymity system, the degree of anonymity
is not sufﬁcient [95, 96]. If the context or the content of the anonymous communi-
cation contains information which narrows the anonymity set then it is possible to
investigate every suspect. In previous case there was a reason to assume that the Tor
use came from the university network. In this case there was only one Tor user so
it was easy to interrogate him. Still, note that he had plausible deniability until he
confessed.
Let us test more sophisticated trafﬁc and timing correlation attacks against onion
services and Tor users. We demonstrate an example of a trafﬁc correlation attack
against a ﬂeet of our onion websites which are serving HTTP content. We selected
our own relays as the entry guards for these onionwebsites. We sent a distinguishable
HTTP trafﬁc pattern to our onion websites and simultaneously observed the trafﬁc
through their entry guard relays. As a result, from this correlation, we are able to
reveal the real IP address of the onion websites. Figure 3.9 shows this test and the
trafﬁc pattern between the onion websites and the entry guard. In theory, a similar
passive trafﬁc analysis could be carried out against the Tor network in wider range.
Figure 3.9 A distinguishable trafﬁc pattern all the way to the guard relay of the onion service. As a result,
it is possible to locate the onion service. We tested this with our onion services and relays: on
right there is a script that connects to the onion websites and sends a shaped trafﬁc pattern,
and on left there is a monitoring view of the guard relay trafﬁc.
Another possible way to execute a correlation attack and reveal Tor user’s ac-
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tivities is to learn what kind of trafﬁc ﬁngerprints services have. Again, this kind
of correlation is a known problem for an anonymity network that provides TCP
connectivity. This type of attack can be weaponised against web browsing without
decrypting the actual trafﬁc; only the trafﬁc pattern of a web site is relevant.
Similarly, the trafﬁc pattern can be detected when a same website is visited several
times (see Figure 3.10). Even between completely different Tor circuits the ﬁnger-
print remains the same for the samewebsite; and differentwebsites have recognizable
ﬁngerprints.
Figure 3.10 We see that a distinguishable trafﬁc pattern is repeated when opening a website seven
times. Every time there was a different Tor Browser session with completely new circuit. It
is possible to gather these website ﬁngerprints and reveal signiﬁcant information regarding
the possible website a user is opening without decrypting the trafﬁc. These two different
websites leave recognizable trafﬁc ﬁngerprints.
The limitation of this attack is that there are hundreds of millions of websites in
the world and similar websites leave identical trafﬁc ﬁngerprints. It is not feasible to
gather ﬁngerprints of every website, and certain trafﬁc ﬁngerprints are not unique
and shared between multiple websites.
It is known that the NSA and the British Government Communications Head-
quarters (GCHQ) already audit connections to the Tor network [93]. According to
classiﬁed documents leaked by Snowden, the GCHQ gathers data from major ﬁbre-
optic cables, saves it and later searches patterns from there. However, intelligence
agencies can only watch a tiny fraction of the Tor trafﬁc but they could occasionally
de-anonymise an onion service.
Tor is safe because there are over two million Tor users every moment, around
ten thousand onion services, and seven thousand relays all over the world. The enor-
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mous anonymity set makes it extremely difﬁcult to target a certain Tor client or
onion service.
3.2 Watching incoming trafﬁc to onion honeypots
In publication II we watched incoming trafﬁc to our honeypot onion services in
order to study if unknown attackers spy the DHT onion address directory in the
Tor network. In general, a honeypot is a decoy service which attracts the attacker.
Connections to the honeypot can be analysed in order to proﬁle the attacker. We
saw incoming trafﬁc so the answer is yes: unknown attackers were spying onion
addresses from the DHT. When publishing the article it was possible to discover
this way which onion addresses exists. Later, the Tor Project has developed a recent
version of the protocol to mitigate the problem.
The Tor network has a global hidden service directory (HSDir). This is a dis-
tributed hash table of onion addresses and their descriptors. Every HSDir relay has
a subset of the descriptors created by onion services. An onion service’s description
contains a list of its introduction points. When connecting to an onion address the
client sends an introduction message to one of the introduction points of the onion
address.
Onion addresses publish their descriptors to a set of six responsible HSDirs once
per hour. The HSDirs are actually regular Tor relays which have been online longer
than 92 hours and received the HSDir ﬂag from the Tor directory authorities. Ev-
ery HSDir has certain onion addresses according to its position in the DHT. Re-
lay’s ﬁngerprint orders their position in the DHT. Based on their position they have
description-onion list of certain onion address.
HSDirs could spy their piece of the DHT and reveal unknown onion addresses
accordingly. Due to the possibility of this spying method, we decided to study the
following questions:
1. Are unknown attackers spying the DHT onion address directory?
2. How huge scale is the monitoring?
3. What is the level of automation?
4. Which Internet services are targeted?
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To answer these questions we installed one hundred onion honeypots for the
experiment. The addresses were randomly generated so they distributed all over the
DHT. We did not share the onion addresses publicly. Each honeypot listened three
popular service ports: port 21 (FTP), port 22 (SSH) and port 80 (HTTP). After
installation we ran them for 42 days and logged every connection.
When setting up an onion address there is a certain expectation that the HSDir is
not unethically harvesting addresses and after that scanning onion services. Even so,
we proved that this is the case: the onion honeypots experiment reveals us that there
are unknown separated entities especially examining onion websites. Of course, at-
tribution of the anonymous attackers is impossible.
We believe that the fact that these onion addresses exist was only known by HS-
Dirs. Likelihood to expose these addresses by guessing is extremely low, and it would
take serious effort to penetrate our Linux servers to reveal the addresses.
Out of our 100 honeypot onions 30 received trafﬁc. As a result, our conclusion
is that a tiny fraction of the HSDirs were spying onion addresses. Surprisingly only
port 80 (HTTP) was connected and 82 percent of the HTTP requests came from
Mozilla browser (the Tor Browser) user agents. Although crawlers as well could
have faked their user agents.
The experiment gave us the answer that although a minor fraction of the HSDirs
are spying onion addresses they are not probably controlled by the same attacker.
The attackers are only interested in websites.
3.3 Following illegal trade on black markets
In publications I and III we followed illegal drug trade on anonymous black market-
place Silkkitie, also known as Valhalla.
In 2013 the Silkkitie was founded by Kapteeni (captain). It started as a local mar-
ketplace, the sellers were from Finland and the only available language was Finnish.
Later it opened its international English version, Valhalla.
3.3.1 The marketplace
Silkkitie followed the model developed by the original Silk Road: it uses Tor to
obtain anonymity, Bitcoin as the payment method, escrow system to prevent abuse,
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and vendor feedback system to show transparent reputation.
After Hansa Market, Dream Market and AlphaBay Market were closed in 2017
the Silkkitie marketplace is the oldest running marketplace. It is suspected to be
one of the largest marketplaces in the Tor network so far, however, it is difﬁcult to
conﬁrm that from a reliable source.
Silkkitie offered immediately an interesting view to Finnish online drug trade:
indeed, the marketplace was in Finnish, sellers and buyers were Finns, and the ship-
ments proceeded through domesticmail in Finland. We started to study the anatomy
of the function of the marketplace already in 2014. We found that an anonymous
marketplace needs four components to operate.
1. Anonymous and censor-resistant way to operate: for example, onion website.
2. Online (semi-)anonymous monetary system: for example, Bitcoin.
3. Escrow payment system: internal escrow accounting.
4. Reputation and feedback: transparent reputation metric.
When these four technologies are combined the market can operate. Without
one of these the market will cease its operation. Also, there is a Bitcoin mixer sys-
tem inside the Silkkitie marketplace: there are multiple mixed wallets and without
a distinct link in the Bitcoin blockchain between the input transaction to Silkkitie’s
wallet and payment from this wallet to the seller.
In addition, using web-scraping tools, the author revealed the amount of different
types of illegal substances traded on Silkkitie.
Using daily web-crawling and web-scraping we extracted information from the
Silkkitie onion website and gathered a database of transactions between 5 November
2014 and 23 September 2015. Our method is similar to earlier research where Silk
Road 1 and 2 was studied [22, 25, 75]. Our scraper software extracted the product
information from every product page on Silkkitie and collected the ﬁelds title, price,
number of items in stock, nickname of the seller, positive and negatived feedbacks,
country of the seller, which countries the seller is willing to send shipments, and the
unique URL address of the product page.
We executed the crawler software once a day over 11months. This gathers enough
data to study day-to-day drug trade. 36 days are missing from the data because the
Silkkitie website was not available. Half of these days took place in June and July
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2015 when the website was ofﬂine but came back after this break. There is no infor-
mation available why it was ofﬂine.
The key result is the drug trade data itself; we have now a day-to-day database
of drug trade on Silkkitie. Nearly a full year can be studied from the data. The
quantitative research showed the current estimations of the drug trade (see Figure
3.11).
Figure 3.11 Sales of different illegal substances on Silkkitie between 5 November 2014 and 26 Septem-
ber 2015 between Finnish buyers and sellers. From III.
We found that sales totaled over two million euros during the study. Measured
in euros, stimulants were most widely purchased, followed by cannabis, MDMA,
and psychedelics. Note that when compared to the fact that cannabis is cheaper per
dosage than other drug it is overwhelmingly most popular drug that was bought.
For this particular study we only calculated sales that took place within Finland
by removing products where the location of the seller was abroad or the seller was
willing to sell abroad.
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This database includes 93 878 observations where 260 sellers offered 3823 prod-
ucts. Drug sales were calculated using the change on available stock. When a seller
sells a product the capacity lowers so we can estimate the number of sales during the
speciﬁc day.
Furthermore, we can model the marketplace dynamics and trade. In publica-
tion III ﬁxed-effects regression models were applied to estimate the effects of repu-
tation and capacity. Our ﬁnding was that the reputation and the capacity of a seller
directly impact the sales positively.
The reputation of the seller is a combination of positive and negative feedbacks.
The total reputation ranged from -19 to 3418. Surprisingly, only few sellers have total
negative reputation. This means that the marketplace dynamics under reputation
system forces the seller to avoid negative feedback.
Due to the anonymity and nature of illegal sales, reputation systems and capacity
information have replaced the rule of law: a buyer must trust the seller’s reputation
because the law is not guaranteeing the delivery. The only available information is
the seller’s reputation and capacity and what the seller writes.
Within our data, we noticed that occasionally products were not sold at all and
that several sellers remained active for only a short period of time and risk-averse
online consumers avoid such sellers. At least in our data, consumers selected those
sellers who had higher reputations and capacity.
3.3.2 The insider with many names
In 2018 the author contacted a prisoner insideHelsinki prison to resolve unanswered
questions.
There are three popular views of this prisoner. Firstly, multiple online discussion
boards, especially on Tor, warmly describe him as an honest drug lord who deliv-
ered high quality laboratory tested drugs with clear dosage and usage instructions
through domestic mail in Finland. For those, he is like Prometheus.
Prometheus is a Titan in Greek mythology who deﬁes the gods by stealing ﬁre and
giving it to humanity enabling the progress of the civilization. Zeus sentenced immortal
Prometheus to be chained to a mountain where each day an eagle eats his liver and the
liver grows back overnight to be eaten again. The hero Hercules frees Prometheus from
the chains.[97]
67
Secondly, of course, the creator of the largest drug syndicate in Finland is com-
parable to Faust.
The story of Faust is a classic German legend, where a man, Faust, is bored and dis-
satisﬁed with his highly successful life. After his suicide attempt he calls on the Devil for
all the pleasure and knowledge of the world. The Devil’s representative, Mephistopheles,
appears and makes a deal with Faust. The deal is that Mephistopheles will serve Faust
with his magic powers and in the end the Devil will claim Faust’s soul. Faust takes the
deal.[98]
He coordinated multiple sellers under one brand name to sell tens of kilograms
of various substances through Silkkitie marketplace - using the full leverage of Tor’s
online anonymity, reputation system and Bitcoin payments.
Thirdly, for a few people he is closer to Mephistopheles than Faust. He visibly ad-
vertised illegal drugs and enabled wide scale delivery. In 2014, under his pseudonym
Douppikauppa, he sent free LSD samples around Finland.
Douppikauppa is the leader of the syndicate of multiple sellers who created a com-
mon brand in Silkkitie marketplace. In the open-source software world he is known
under pseudonym Tronic and was the former lead developer of a container format
speciﬁcation known as Multimedia Container Format, MCF. Also, he kept his daily
work as a software developer and simultaneously led the criminal organization. Fur-
thermore, in 2015, he was a candidate in Finnish parliamentary elections.
A year after this 32-year-old chief technology ofﬁcer and software developer Lasse
Kärkkäinen was arrested. Before his arrest he had planned to launch his own market-
place on Tor. The marketplace would have been named after Douppikauppa brand
name.
Lasse Kärkkäinen is chained for 10.5 years3 and suffering the consequences of the
deal.
Mr. Kärkkäinen is ready to clarify the author’s questions.
1. What kind of motives you had in mind when you began to sell drugs?
Mr. Kärkkäinen told that he was ﬁrst very interested in the Tor network as a
technological phenomenon. In addition, he followed how these marketplaces op-
erate inside the Tor network. Apparently, illegal drugs were widely available in the
Netherlands. Dutch dealers had a wider range of products and their prices were only
3This is practically close to maximum sentences in Finnish justice system, typically given to mur-
derers. The court noted that it is especially aggravating to sell drugs without knowledge of the buyer’s
age. Kärkkäinen will be probably released to parole after serving half of the sentence.
68
a fraction of the Finnish prices. He began to wonder how to import these drugs to
Finland.
Previously he had planned his road trip through Europe for other reason and saw
this as a perfect opportunity to try his skills importing drugs to Finland. He wanted
to show himself that he could be a perfect drug dealer.
While selling these drugs in Finland it became apparent to him that there was
a market for high quality drugs and for a high quality customer service. The ﬁrst
batch sold out rapidly despite the fact that his prices were above average.
2. Why were you planning to create your own market instead of using ex-
isting ones?
Mr. Kärkkäinen told that after Silkkitie marketplace was ofﬂine several weeks in
the end of 2014 and in the begin of 2015 he and the other members of the sales team
decided to search for better marketplaces. Eventually, due to the Silkkitie’s issues,
they migrated to the Evolution marketplace.
However, none of the existing marketplaces proved to be very usable. Further-
more, he pointed out that there were serious security issues in the marketplace soft-
ware. Because of this the plan to create their own marketplace was on the table.
It would have been closer to a tradition web shop with emphasis of usability than
open bazaar. Under well-known brand name of his Douppikauppa syndicate. A good
brand is important.
According to Mr. Kärkkäinen current marketplaces cause a lot of manual work
for any seller who sells several shipments per day. From the logistics point of view
they are not offering a good shipment list with addresses and quantities. Instead,
there might be a large list of separate messages. Even in the case when one buyer
buys multiple similar products the system showed these as separated orders.
3. How did you get caught before launching your own marketplace?
In 2014, the FBI located and seised Silk Road 2 marketplace. Now the FBI had
full access to the server of the marketplace and they researched internal messages
between buyers and sellers. Among many buyers there was Redword who seemed
to be buying large amounts of drugs and transferring them to Finland.
The FBI shared the information with the Finnish authorities. The Finnish au-
thorities concluded that there is a Finnish buyer who has bought signiﬁcant amounts
of drugs in the Netherlands. Even the area in the Netherlands was mentioned in the
messages. The Finnish authorities started to suspect that indeed these are the ship-
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ments that Douppikauppa is selling in Silkkitie.
With the help of the Dutch authorities Finnish investigators obtained a list of
Finns who had stayed in the area where the exchange took place in the Netherlands.
Only few Finns had stayed there at the time. After this they narrowed down their
investigations to Mr. Kärkkäinen.
In April 2016, he was arrested in his home by eight police ofﬁcers. Before that
criminal investigators wiretapped his phone and followed his car. In addition, a few
members of the syndicate were arrested.
However, Mr. Kärkkäinen had already stopped selling drugs himself. Neverthe-
less, criminal investigators were able to open his laptop. There they discovered his
old bookkeeping and seised a Bitcoin wallet containing a total of 1670 bitcoins.
3. Do you think that drug dealers should actively perform harm reduction?
Mr. Kärkkäinen thinks users are solely responsible of drug usage. A drug dealer
can provide facts about the products and this helps to build an honest brand name
in the marketplace.
Mr. Kärkkäinen stated that he performed reagent tests for the substances he was
selling. Also, he laboratory tested substances and told what is the real purity of his
products. In addition, he wrote clear descriptions of how certain substances affect
and added dosage information. He even pointed out possible harms and health issues
caused by highly addictive products, such as amphetamines.
3.1 If there would be an anonymous method to verify buyers age do you
think that you had demanded it?
Mr. Kärkkäinen would had demanded age veriﬁcation if there would had been
an anonymous age veriﬁcation method available.
3.3.3 Administration’s point of view to anonymous conversation
To gain deeper understanding of onion service usage the author interviewed another
senior technology professional who operated in the Tor network.
Kim Holviala is better known under his pseudonym which is simply Ylläpitäjä
(Administration). Thus, he is a system administrator and the creator of a large
anonymous discussion board known as Sipulikanava (Onion channel). He claimed
that his anonymous discussion forum was one of the most popular websites in Fin-
land before Finnish authorities seised it.
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In 2014, Mr. Holviala created Sipulikanava after a few previous Finnish discus-
sion boards closed down. This created a vacuum waiting to be ﬁlled. In his personal
life there was vacuum too: he wanted a new technical hobby and as a senior software
system consultant he knew exactly how to create and manage large web services. He
installed servers in his home and published his onion service.
The site was a discussion forum without a need for registration and without pre-
moderation of messages. As a result, the site soon contained plenty of legitimate
but controversial content. Moreover, however, there was a section to buy and sell
products. After a year this section of the site established itself as a popular place to
share contact information to trade illegal drugs in Finland.
Mr. Holviala told that he was arrested because he started to reveal information
about himself on purpose. He even made phone calls to prison and had several con-
versations with Mr. Kärkkäinen. These phone calls were wiretapped by authorities.
During these calls he gave out clear clues that he is behind one of the largest discus-
sion boards in the Tor network. Accordingly, he was soon arrested and the site was
seised by the Finnish authorities.
The site itself did not implement amarketplace. Instead, a buyer contacted a seller
directly with external technical communication methods, such as via anonymous
instant messengers and emails. Mr. Holviala’s site acted as a service which connected
buyers and sellers, thus he is charged with wittingly facilitating drug sales and drug
trafﬁcking. Prosecutors demand at least seven years behind bars to him.
In Febuary 2019, Finnish district court found that while the defendant had main-
tained thewebsite, hewas not directly involved in selling drugs, instead, hewas found
guilty of facilitating the sale of illegal drugs [99]. As a result, he received a three-year
and four month jail sentence [99]. But the court noted that this is the ﬁrst time a
website administrator was found guilty facilitating the sale of illegal drugs and did
not send him to prison: the higher court level will take the case and it is still unclear
what is the ﬁnal sentence [99].
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According toMr. Holviala therewere over two thousandmessages per day, unique
session cookies tracked over ten thousand users per day, and there were almost one
million page loads per week. All messages were in Finnish (Figure 3.12 demonstrates
an example conversation).
Figure 3.12 The largest Finnish discussion board, Sipulikanava, in the Tor network. The site was created
in 2014 by Kim Holviala and seised by Finnish authorities in 2017. The site contained het-
erogeneous conversations and a wide range of opinions ranging from well-written technical
information to death threats.
Mr. Holviala moderated messages after they were published. He tried to keep
the quality of the discussion as high as possible while allowing people to express
painfully controversial views, such as their self-destructive behavior.
He described that surprisingly drug users were sharing accurate health informa-
tion to each others and often honestly expressed harms too. Many of the conversa-
tions were about health issues and safety.
Various topic ranging from technical details to suicide were covered in his discus-
sion board. Anonymity was a key feature to produce this straight forward discus-
sion. Mr. Holviala told that he would like to see transparent conversation in our
society and sees online anonymity as a tool to enable it.
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4 UNDERSTANDING THE RESULTS
Let us take a ﬁnal look at the results and reach conclusions. As shown, the results
imply that there are signiﬁcant criminal activities in the Tor network. We contribute
to the body of knowledge on the domain of how people use onion websites and
demonstrated empirical experiments to study criminal activities in the Tor network,
including abilities to monitor anonymous online drug trade in real-time. Figure 4.1
organises the scope of this chapter.
Figure 4.1 Motivations of anonymity manifest themselves in the Tor network: criminal activity is concen-
trated to black marketplaces. Here a seller or a buyer is connected to a black marketplace.
Marketplaces have a certain general structure and common functional logic. We describe an
empirical and technical process to research these marketplaces.
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The main three contributions of this chapter to satisfy Objective III are as fol-
lows.
Firstly, we will merge the background knowledge and our results to examine the
online anonymity as a whole. How people use Tor and what we have discovered
from the usage? Why criminals as well ﬁnd these technical tools feasible? Moreover,
what are the real world security limitations of the Tor network?
Secondly, what is the technical structure of a marketplace, and what is the crimi-
nal logic behind it? How are Bitcoin and Tor transforming illegal drug trade?
Thirdly, the ﬁnal section will be an established empirical process to follow illegal
trade in the Tor network. What is the technical and empirical process of research
in this ﬁeld? The key result of this dissertation is the empirical process to study
criminal activities in the Tor network.
4.1 Motivations and limitations of anonymity
We combined the background knowledge and our results. There are, of course, a
broad range ofmotivations for online anonymity. The pressure for online anonymity
is an implication of the Digital Revolution: services are shifting to online world.
For example, there is pressure towards online electronic voting, but privacy and
auditability are open problems. A vote must be anonymous and not connected to a
voter.
Electronic payments are problematic due to an asymmetric demand for anonymity:
on the other hand governments demand tax accounting and audit for companies
and anonymous money transactions create a vacuum; still consumers want the abil-
ity to buy products anonymous without identiﬁcation, for instance, online adult
entertainment videos. As a result, software projects, such as GNU Taler https:
//www.taler.net/en/, seek solutions to the asymmetric demand for anonymity: a
seller’s revenue is transparent for tax collection authorities while a payer is anony-
mous and obtains a legally valid proof of a payment.
Online anonymity is related to journalism, protection of sources and freedom of
speech. For instance, global surveillance disclosures, in 2013, by Edward Snowden
have these dimensions: he contacted journalists under the shield of online anonymity
and revealed top-secret online surveillance programs; then journalists utilised exten-
sive measures to secure their ability to publish the information.
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Criminals have always tried to hide their identities. Currently, they adapt to
digitalization and utilise online anonymity networks. In the digital form, illegal
anonymous activities range from hacking to online drug trade.
We contributed to the current understanding ofmotivations by researching anony-
mous hacktivism attack motivations. In publication V we studied thirty-three hack-
tivism attack campaigns in manifesto level and then analysed the attacks and targets.
Accordingly, we categorised thesemotivations under political, economic, socio-cultural,
technological, environmental and legal reasons. The framework is known as PES-
TEL.
The PESTEL analysis framework is utilised to analyse and monitor the macro-
environmental factors to organisations. In addition, PESTEL has been applied to
investigate macro-economic and social trends from online data sources in order to
identify and monitor early indicators of security threats [100] and The United Na-
tions Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime The SOCTA Handbook - Guidance on the preparation
and use of serious and organised crime threat assessments recommends PESTEL analy-
sis for criminal activities [101].
The motivations behind hacktivism operations are categorised under PESTEL
(in Figure 4.2). The categories are political, economic, socio-cultural, technological,
environmental and legal.
Figure 4.2 Motivations of anonymous hacktivism. Hacktivist groups publish manifestos which declare the
intentions and motives of the their attacks. They call these attacks operations. We validated
the operations and the targets that were selected according to these motivations. Attacks
followed the stated motives: online services of industries, organization and governments
were attacked accordingly. From publication V.
Most of the attacks were executed by hacktivist group Anonymous. It is a de-
centralised international group and the members of the group are participating in
DDOS cyber attacks. This demonstrates how our digital world enables people with
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similar motivations to organise and coordinate their operations while still maintain-
ing their anonymity. Similarly, anonymous marketplaces enable people to coordi-
nate their motivations without the need to know each other.
The Tor Project provides means of online anonymity for everyone. The Tor net-
work enables a free open network to various motivations of anonymity. For many,
there is a critical demand for secure methods to communicate and access informa-
tion. The Tor network has limitations. Numerous cases demonstrate how Tor users
have lost their online anonymity and we analysed these realistic de-anonymisation
techniques.
The hands-on demonstrations of anonymity exposures can be classiﬁed into four
groups. The classes are 1. trafﬁc correlation attacks, 2. electronic ﬁngerprinting, 3.
operational security failures, and 4. remote code executions. Both users and the Tor
Project have separate responsibilities to mitigate these dangers.
I It is the responsibility of the Tor Project to deploy secure software.
II It is the responsibility of the Tor Project to publish clear tutorial material.
III It is the responsibility of the user to read and follow these guidelines.
IV It is the responsibility of the user to understand basic OPSEC principles.
We clariﬁed the responsibilities of users and the Tor Project and categorised se-
curity aspects between technical and non-technical (in Figure 4.3).
Providing free and user-friendly anonymity solutions on the Internet today is an
ongoing challenge for the Tor Project. Fortunately for Tor’s anonymity, the net-
work has a huge range of various users and according to current knowledge even the
largest intelligence services are unable to spy Tor users.
The Tor Project offers extensive tutorials how to deploy safe installations but
in every case it is hard to say what is safe and what is not safe. It is feasible to use
most of the Internet applications behind the Tor network, however, unintentional
conﬁgurations of the applications which are not designed to provide anonymity have
revealed IP addresses.
The weakest link of anonymity is the actor leaking unintended information. In
many cases, even technically talented users have failed to follow OPSEC principles
and directly leaked their real identities.
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Figure 4.3 In publication IV we investigated real world dangers to Tor user’s anonymity and analysed
responsibilities. The Tor Project must deploy secure software and publish clear tutorials; the
user must follow the guidelines and have a basic OPSEC understanding.
4.2 Anatomy of the marketplace
To shed light to drug trade and the structure of the marketplace we interviewed a
former drug lord, current prisoner, Lasse Kärkkäinen, who led a drug syndicate and
was planning his own black marketplace. We gained insight of the operations of
drug dealers who sell their products through anonymous online markets.
First, this knowledge, combined with the background information, implies that
the general components of a marketplace in the Tor network are the following: one
or more Tor client software providing onion service, possible proxy and ﬁrewall
solutions to sandbox the system, a web front-end server, a database server, a backup
service, a Bitcoin wallet system, a Bitcoin transaction mixer, an escrow system, a
user management system, a reputation and feedback system, a system that notiﬁes
the seller when a product is bought, and internal message system.
77
Not every marketplace implements every component; nay, for example, there
are even very minimal proof-of-concept open-source marketplace implementations
available, such as Python and Flask based Laffka https://github.com/eruina/
laffka. Laffka provides a minimal web shop functionality to sellers who want to
operate their own web shops.
The second part of illegal trade are the activities of sellers. We concluded that
although the seller’s operations are close to normal drug trade without digital aspects
there are new demands for sellers: an established brand name is needed, customers
demand a good reputation and expect a high quality customer service.
Thirdly, a buyer’s role is simple. A buyer buys bitcoins, creates an account to
the marketplace, transfers bitcoins to the wallet of the account, selects a product and
provides shipment information to the seller. The escrow system locks the sum of the
payment from the buyer’s wallet. Then the seller sends the product and the buyer
gives public feedback to the seller. After this step the escrow system transfers the
payment to the seller.
4.3 Technical research methods to understand
marketplaces
In Chapter 2 we created a categorization of the current technical research methods.
InTable 3we analysed how thesemethods could provide data regardingmarketplaces
in the Tor network.
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Technical methodology Data on marketplace in the Tor network
1. Monitor exit relay Exit relay trafﬁc does not reveal market data.
Only aggregated data can be legally collected.
2. Exploit protocol weakness Unﬁxed protocol weaknesses have revealed ac-
cess rate of onion services, including market-
places.
3. Passive trafﬁc correlation Correlation of trafﬁc patterns between end-
points may reveal limited data.
4. Active trafﬁc correlation A shaped trafﬁc pattern and trafﬁc monitoring
may reveal limited user information.
5. Port scan onion services Port scanning could reveal if marketplaces have
administration services through onion address.
6. Ofﬁcial Tor metrics Ofﬁcial statistics provide comparison data. For
instance, total number of Tor users per country.
7. Research honeypots Honeypot services could collect data regarding
marketplace users. For instance, an external link
in user proﬁle gathers activity information.
8. Crawl onion websites Web crawling and scraping techniques are pow-
erful tools to capture snapshots of the transpar-
ent trade on the marketplaces.
Table 3. We created a categorization of the earlier research methods and show
how these methods provide data regarding marketplaces in the Tor network.
The market website itself provides a transparent view to illegal trade. In addition,
most of the crypto currencies have a public blockchain that can be studied. In Figure
4.4 there is an overview of direct data sources which can be utilised to understand
illegal online trade.
Most of the known Tor usage investigation methods (in Table 3) are not very
effective to gather data on illegal markets in the Tor network. At the moment there
are a few straight forward technical methodologies to gather quantitative research
data. The main technical marketplace research methods are categorised here to ﬁve
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Figure 4.4 Available trading information and data collection process for anonymous marketplace inves-
tigations.
groups.
I Follow the money: scrape transactions from the public Bitcoin blockchain.
II Follow the reputation of the sellers: scrape feedbacks and calculate statistics.
III Follow products available and capacities: reveal metrics of the trade.
IV Connect the dots: combine public information to follow the seller’s opera-
tions.
V Setup honeypots: for instance, gather data by creating a fake seller account.
In leverage of these ﬁve methods it is practical to gather quantitative data. Bitcoin
provides unregulated transactions between buyers and sellers which are difﬁcult to
trace, however, in many cases, the amount of trade can be estimated [55]. The data
enables empirical research of criminal activities of the various marketplaces in the
Tor network.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrated how to investigate anonymous Tor usage. With the concrete case
studies we showed how to gather data and research criminal activities.
In publication I we showed how Finnish illegal online drug trade concentrated
to Silkkitie and discussed the rise of drug marketplaces on Tor. We predicted then
that online drug markets are growing and the law enforcement is unable to prevent
this shift. Now, four years later, Silkkitie is still operating and it is one of the several
large online marketplaces on Tor. In fact, Bitcoin and Tor are transforming criminal
activity, including drug trade. In the future societies need to resolve how to reduce
the harms of drug use using education, illness and injury prevention, effective treat-
ment, and by technical measures.
In addition, in publications I and III we carried out quantitative research to esti-
mate the drug trade on Silkkitie. In 2015, the sales totalled over two million euros
between Finnish buyers and sellers. In spite of anonymity, thesemethods reveal very
precise data on Tor usage and a new way to measure drug trade.
Publication III shows how seller’s reputation and capacity are both associated
with drug sales. This means that the feedback system of the marketplace forces seller
to maintain excellent reputation. Brand name is the most valuable asset of the seller.
A reputation system is an important part of the illegal anonymous trade.
Publications II and IV show the limitations of privacy in the Tor network. In
publication II, we used onion service honeypots to observe how onion name direc-
tories were spied by unknown adversaries. In publication IV we showed how it is an
ongoing challenge for Tor to provide practical online anonymity. Fortunately, two
million client users, 60 000 onion services, and 7000 voluntary Tor relays create a
massive degree of anonymity. Still, many criminals are arrested because operation
security is difﬁcult.
Another notable anonymous criminal phenomenon is hacktivism. In publica-
tion V we studied what motivates anonymous hacktivist groups. We showed how
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they carry out their attacks according to their public manifests which are widely mo-
tivated by political reasons. Clear patterns of their attacks indicate that the targets
could be predicted before the attacks.
Finally, we contribute to the body of knowledge by reviewing and categorising
research methodologies. In spite of the private and anonymous nature of the Tor
network there are several methods to gather data. We hope that the future research
of anonymous online behaviour ﬁnds these summaries and descriptions of method-
ologies valuable.
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6 DISCUSSION
The preface of this study came from Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius. In same
spirit, the ﬁnal words are coming from another gigantic Roman stoic philosopher,
Seneca. The richness and subtleness of Seneca’s satire of the human condition seems
to ﬁt inmultiple situations, even to scientiﬁc context. Hewrote in EpistulaeMorales
(65 AD) "It is easier to understand parts, than to understand the whole".
We grasped the surface of understanding the usage of onion services in the Tor
anonymity network. We explained how tomeasure and determine a fewphenomenon
in the Tor anonymity network. It is better to do a little with certainty and this is
only a tiny part of Tor usage and future research will explain and measure it more
precisely. There may be more unknown outside the boundaries of the current re-
search of anonymity.
Online anonymity is here to stay. Although, the Tor network is the most popu-
lar, it is not the only option and there will be online anonymity in the future with
or without the Tor network. Practical online anonymity can be obtained with lever-
age of several anonymity networks, such as I2P, Freenet, GNUNet, and a few more;
English Wikipedia’s category of Anonymous ﬁle sharing networks lists 24 different
anonymity networks [102].
The digitalization shift of the drug markets is very difﬁcult to tackle and it is a
growing trend in the future. All services in the society are digitalizing themselves,
including illegal activities, and law enforcement is unable to prevent this shift. Cer-
tainly there will be enormous problems with the Digital Revolution.
These enormous troubles will be discussed outside of the scope of technologies.
Obviously illegal drugs are harmful so how could we reduce harmful impacts of this
inevitable shift?
Anonymity causes special issues. Privacy is a part of security and this makes
anonymity a part of safety. Take a look at the following example of how we could
implement novel anonymous safety measures.
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For instance, how to verify the age of whom you communicate anonymously?
In several contexts this would be one of those useful technical features which could
be solved with cryptography. A seller could demand an anonymous age veriﬁcation.
A buyer could send an anonymous cryptographic age veriﬁcation. In addition, this
could be a useful mechanism for adult entertainment websites as well: a visitor could
prove the age without identiﬁcation.
This particular problem could be solved with cryptography. Similar technical
solutions could be studied and developed to mitigate problems in society during the
Digital Age.
6.1 Author’s ﬁnal words
After wide scale information manipulation in leverage of targeted content, includ-
ing fake news and advertising, and attempts to consume user’s attention and time
as commodity, new opportunities rise for online anonymity - extended to online
solitude (Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1 Online anonymity can be extended to online solitude. Internet user has full control over
receiving or not receiving information and what information he is sharing. During the digital
age a smart personal information ﬁrewall is needed to protect authenticity and values.
There is a demand for a smart personal information ﬁrewall that enables full con-
trol over outgoing and incoming information. People have a right to be forgot-
ten and a right to be left alone. They can select proﬁles from pseudonyms to full
anonymity and prevent targeted content and information manipulation according
to their values.
This kind of systemwould require explicit permission from the user, for example,
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“Receive election manipulation and fake news” or “Personalise the news to reﬂect
my views”. Not many would like to give the permission if online services would ask
them directly.
In addition, time is valuable. We do not want to waste our time because we are
eventually going to die. Neither we want to give away our privacy. Eventually econ-
omy itself is always a reﬂection of a certain value system. If we are not setting a cash
value to our valuable assets, such as our time or concentration, we will loose them.
When corporations try to monetise our privacy and time we notice the abysmal
feeling that life is slipping through our ﬁngers.
A smart system could give a transparent price for these valuable assets. A user
could set an exact price for a certain labor and information. For instance, a Face-
book user could demand hourly salary for using the service in exchange for private
information, labor time and attention. The author would be ready to create a Face-
book account if Facebook would be ready to pay him two thousand U.S. dollars per
hour for clicking labor.
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APPENDIX: ENGLISH SUMMARY OF THE
FIRST PUBLICATION
Nurmi, J., Kaskela, T. (2015). “Silkkitie. Päihteiden suomalaista nappikauppaa.”
Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, vol 80, no. 4, pp. 387–394.
This publication is in Finnish because it was written directly to the Finnish audi-
ence about early unique drug marketplace inside Finland. On 2014 Finnish online
drug trade largely shifted to one special black market on Tor. Indeed, this market-
place was in Finnish, sellers and buyers were Finns, shipments proceeded through
domestic mail.
At ﬁrst, since 2013, the marketplace was known as Silkkitie (Finnish word for
Silk Road) and on 2015 English version of it began to operate under the name Val-
halla. Since then Silkkitie/Valhalla has a veteran reputation of being one of the oldest
running marketplaces on Tor.
Language and country centric marketplace was unique and one of the ﬁrst mar-
ketplaces on Tor. Using web-scraping tools the author answered how much of dif-
ferent types of illegal drugs Finnish people are trading on Silkkitie and described the
function of the marketplace. The author understood that publishing this study as
soon as possible in Finnish will have a large impact.
Accordingly, author contacted FinnishA-Clinic Foundation’s researcher,Mr. Teemu
Kaskela, and they published a research paper regarding the rise of drug marketplaces
on Tor. This paper demonstrated web-scraping techniques to carry out quantitative
research and contains the current estimations of the drug trade on Silkkitie. Selected
Finnish journal Yhteiskuntapolitiikka is considered to be a top-level scientiﬁc jour-
nal.
As a result, this early publication has impact even beyond technical aspects and
quantitative data. The author concluded that the digitalization shift to online drug
markets is growing trend and any law enforcement is unable to prevent this shift.
Obviously illegal drugs are harmful so the real question is how to reduce harmful
impacts of this inevitable shift. A-Clinic Foundation began to prepare an urgent
project: The harms of drug use should be reduced using education, illness and in-
jury prevention, and effective treatment. Finally, Muunto project started in 2016 to
develop novel methods to respond to novel psychoactive substances and changing
drug cultures.
A separate English translation of the abstract of the article is written for this thesis
for the English speaking audience.
Silkkitie: Online drug marketplace in Finland
Abstract
Recent Internet service development has shifted major services to online. Cur-
rently, drugmarkets are also available on the Internet. Moreover, recent technologies
and the users of the Internet take a stand against mass surveillance, censorship and
other human rights violations. Leveraging same techniques illegal drug markets are
shifting towards recent encryption technologies. In Finland the central place to buy
illegal drugs is Silkkitie. It operates using the Tor network to hide its real location.
Especially during the year 2014 illegal drug online trade grew inside the Finnish
borders. In other words, sellers send the products using domestic post service and
there is no risk for custom check. Tor, Bitcoin and high-class online marketplace of-
fers seamless way to sell and buy illegal drugs. In practice, this makes it very difﬁcult
for the law enforcement to interfere with the illegal drug trade. On the other hand,
because there is now one public place for Finnish to buy illegal drugs we can auto-
matically construct statistics that describes the markets. We can gain understanding
how Finnish people use different types of substances.
Illegal online drug market is very difﬁcult to tackle and indicates signs of growing
in the future. However, we can follow the extent of trading and understand the tech-
nologies. We can also produce nearly real-time picture of the situation of how people
buy and sell illegal drugs. As a result, statistics shed light on substance consumption
habits in Finland. This is a novel approach. Furthermore, the technologies and how
people interact using them is very interesting to research. In this paper, we examine
how Finnish online marketplace Silkkitie operates and what we can learn form the
trade data. We study both technical and social aspects of this phenomenon.
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Taustaa
Vuodesta 2011 alkaen vakoilua vastaan perustet-
tuun turvallisen viestinnän Tor-verkkoon nousi 
muutamia englanninkielisiä laittomien päihteiden 
myyntiin keskittyviä kauppapaikkoja. Kuuluisin 
oli alkuperäinen Silk Road -niminen kauppapaik-
ka, joka suljettiin myöhemmin. Näissä kauppa-
paikoissa laittomien päihteiden myyjät ja ostajat 
kohtaavat yli valtioiden rajojen. (Barratt 2012;Van 
Hout & al. 2013.) Vuonna 2014 perustettiin suo-
malainen Silkkitie-kauppapaikka, joka lainasi ni-
mensä ja bisnesideansa alkuperäiseltä kauppapai-
kalta.
Palvelujen käyttäjistä tiedetään hyvin vähän. Se-
kä ostaminen että myyminen vaativat kuitenkin 
jonkinlaista teknistä osaamista. Etenkin itse palve-
lun toteuttaminen vaatii teknologioiden syvällistä 
ymmärtämistä. (Van Hout & al. 2014.) Esittelem-
me kolme tärkeintä salaukseen perustuvaa tekno-
logiaa, joihin Silkkitie-kauppapaikan toiminta no-
jautuu. Nämä ovat Tor-anonyymiverkko, PGP-sa-
laus ja bitcoin-virtuaalivaluutta.
Tässä kirjoituksessa 1) esitellään keskeisiä käsit-
teitä, 2) kuvataan suomalaisen Tor-verkossa toi-
mivan Silkkitie-palvelun toimintaperiaatteita, 3) 
kerrotaan alustavia tuloksia myynnistä ja myyty-
jen tuotteiden hinnoista, 4) pohditaan, mitä Silk-
kitiestä kauppapaikkana voidaan päätellä nykyi-
sen tiedon perusteella, ja 5) esitellään ajatuksia 
huumeiden verkkokauppaan liittyvistä jatkotut-
kimuksista.
Keskeisiä käsitteitä
Tor-verkko on tarkoitettu suojaamaan luottamuk-
sellista viestintää tietoliikennevalvontaa vastaan, 
kiertämään sensuuria, tarjoamaan anonymiteet-
tiä ja turvaamaan erilaisten palveluiden toiminta 
monenlaisia hyökkäyksiä vastaan (Dingledine & 
al. 2004). Tor on saanut paljon kiitosta ja huomi-
ota, koska se on auttanut kansalaisaktivisteja, sen-
suuria kiertäviä totalitarististen maiden asukkaita, 
tietovuotajia, journalisteja ja diktatuurien demo-
kratialiikkeitä turvaamaan toimintansa. Verkkoa 
käytetään myös arkipäiväisen verkon käytön suo-
jaamiseen valvonnalta. Laajat Tor-verkon turval-
lisuutta kartoittavat julkaisut pitävät Tor-verkkoa 
korkealaatuisena tietoturvatyökaluna, eikä edes 
Yhdysvaltain kansallinen turvallisuusvirasto NSA 
ole pystynyt murtamaan suojausta (The Guardian 
2013). Tor-verkossa voi ylläpitää piilopalveluina 
(hidden service) samoja palveluita kuin internetis-
sä (Dingledine & al. 2004). Tor-verkossa toimies-
saan laittomien päihteiden kauppaa on vaikea sul-
kea, sensuroida tai käyttäjiä paljastaa.
Perinteisten valuuttojen rinnalle ovat nousseet 
erilaiset verkossa toimivat virtuaalivaluutat, joista 
yleisemmin käytetty on bitcoin (Nakamoto 2008). 
Nämä valuutat ovat internetissä hajautetusti toi-
mivia maksuvälineitä. Niiden arvo määräytyy ku-
ten perinteisillä valuutoilla, kysynnän ja tarjon-
nan perusteella. Käteistä rahaa voi vaihtaa bitcoi-
neiksi esimerkiksi LocalBitcoins-palvelun (Local-
Bitcoins 2012) kautta tai fyysisillä bitcoin-auto-
maateilla, joita Suomestakin löytyy. Bitcoin-auto-
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maatista käteisellä ostettua virtuaalivaluuttaa on 
vaikea jäljittää. Erityisesti Tor-verkossa toimivat 
monenlaiset kauppapaikat ovat omaksuneet bit-
coinin maksuvälineeksi, koska maksutapahtu-
mia on käteisen rahan tavoin hyvin hankala seu-
rata verrattuna perinteisten pankkitilitapahtumi-
en seurantaan.
PGP, Pretty Good Privacy, on julkiseen ja yksi-
tyiseen avaimeen perustuva epäsymmetrinen sa-
lausjärjestelmä. Perusajatus on se, että on julkis-
ta avainta voi nimensä mukaisesti jakaa avoimes-
ti ja tällä avaimella voidaan salakirjoittaa vieste-
jä. Näiden viestien purkaminen onnistuu käytän-
nössä vain yksityisellä avaimella. PGP-salausjär-
jestelmän kehitti Philip Zimmermann, joka ha-
lusi luoda ilmaisen ja tehokkaan tavan ihmisille 
suojata viestintäänsä vakoilua vastaan. (Zimmer-
mann 1994.)
Yksinkertaistava analogia voisi olla, että on ole-
massa kuljetusarkku, jonka voi lukita kaikkien 
käytössä olevalla avainkopiolla, mutta avata vain 
yksityisen avaimen kanssa. Kuka tahansa voi luki-
ta kuljetuksen arkkuun, mutta vain vastaanottajal-
la on sellainen avain, jolla lippaan saa auki.
Riittävää avainten pituutta käyttävää PGP-sala-
usta pidetään yleisesti käytännössä murtumatto-
mana, kunhan käyttäjä pitää yksityisen avaimensa 
turvassa (Thomas 2003).
Silkkitie
Silkkitie-sivusto perustettiin kuudes tammikuu-
ta 2014. Se on julkinen verkkosivu, joka kertoo 
käyttäjälle osoitteen http://silkkitiehdg5mug.oni-
on/ olemassaolosta (Kapteeni 2014). Tälle sivus-
tolle pääsemiseksi vaaditaan Tor-ohjelmistoa käyt-
tävä yksityisyydensuojatyökaluksi kehitetty Tor-
selain (Tor Project).
Sivulla on kaupankäyntialusta, jonka kautta voi 
myydä ja ostaa tuotteita bitcoineilla. Suurin osa 
kauppatavarasta on laittomia päihteitä (kuvio 1). 
Palvelun perustajaksi on ilmoittautunut Kapteeni-
nimellä esittäytyvä henkilö tai ryhmä. Tor-verkko 
kätkee palvelun oikean olinpaikan, ja sen sulkemi-
nen tai sensurointi on hyvin hankalaa. On myös 
mahdoton valvoa, kuka sivustolla vierailee. Silkki-
tie-kauppapaikka ei myöskään näe sivustolla vie-
railevan henkilön IP-osoitetta. Sekä sivusto että si-
vustolla kävijä säilyttävät korkean anonymiteetin.
Silkkitie-verkkopalvelua käyttääkseen täytyy 
ensin tehdä käyttäjätunnus luomalla nimimerk-
ki ja salasana palveluun sekä erillinen maksusala-
sana tiliä varten, johon siirretään bitcoineja. Käyt-
täjätyyppejä on kahdenlaisia: myyjät ja käyttäjät 
(tässä ostajat). Vain myyjät voivat asettaa tuottei-
ta myyntiin. Myyjä kuvaa tuotteensa sekä asettaa 
sille hinnan, kertoo myynnissä olevien tuotteiden 
varastomäärän ja toimitusehdot. Myyjien maine 
kehittyy kauppojen myötä, kun ostajat kertovat 
tuotteen perilletulosta painamalla vihreää (tuote 
perillä) tai punaista (kauppa epäonnistui) ja kom-
mentoivat kirjallisesti saamiaan tuotteita. Toisaal-
ta myös myyjä voi arvioida ostajan luotettavuutta 
hänen tekemiensä kauppojen määrän, niiden ko-
konaisarvon ja ongelmitta onnistuneiden kauppo-
jen kokonaismäärän perusteella.
Myyjiltä vaaditaan toimiva PGP-salausjärjestel-
män julkinen avain, jolla voidaan tehokkaasti sa-
lata viestintää. Ostajan osoite välitetään tällä jul-
kisella avaimella salattuna myyjälle. Vain myyjäl-
lä on yksityinen avain, jolla viesti voidaan pur-
kaa. Näin vältetään tilanne, että Silkkitie-palve-
lusta vuotaisi ostajien osoitetietoja ulkopuolisten 
tietoon.
Silkkitie on kauppapaikkana selvästi suunni-
teltu laittomaan kaupankäyntiin. Tästä kertovat 
Silkkitien käyttöehdot seuraavasti:
Silkkitiellä kiellettyä on vain sivullisten vahingoittami-
nen. Kiellämme siis lapsipornon, luottokorttitiedot, 
väärennetyn rahan, väkivaltapalvelut ja räjähdysaineet. 
Sallittuja ovat muunmuassa kaikki nautintoaineet, aseet 
Kuvio 1. Silkkitie-kauppapaikka avattuna Tor-se-
laimessa. Palvelunäkymä kirjautumisen jälkeen. 
Ylhäällä oman bitcoin-tilin saldo, tehdyt ostok-
set ja viestintäjärjestelmä. Vasemmalla lista tar-
jolla olevista tuotteista.
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itsepuolustus- tai harrastustarkoitukseen, rahanpesupal-
velut ja reseptiväärennökset. Asiasta äänestettiin keskus-
telualueella. (Silkkitie 2015.)
Myyjän tilin luomiseksi täytyy maksaa 100 eu-
ron pantti. Pantin saa takaisin, kun myyjä on teh-
nyt vähintään kymmenen kauppaa 500 euron ko-
konaisarvosta. Kauppapaikan ansaintamalli on se, 
että Silkkitie ottaa jokaisesta kaupasta viiden pro-
sentin osuuden. Rahaliikenne kulkee Silkkitie- 
palvelun kautta, ja käytössä on niin sanottu välitili. 
Käytännössä se tarkoittaa, että oston jälkeen rahat 
siirtyvät kolmannen osapuolen eli Silkkitien väliti-
lille eikä suoraan myyjälle. Näin ostaja voi vapaut-
taa maksun myyjälle vasta sitten, kun on tyytyväi-
nen kaupan ehtojen mukaiseen tapahtumaan, esi-
merkiksi saadessaan tuotteen. Myyjä voi asettaa 
ostotapahtumalle ehtoja. Erityisesti uusilta ostajil-
ta myyjä usein vaatii maksun vapauttamista jo en-
nen tuotteen lähetystä. Sama koskee erityisen suu-
ria tilauksia. Mikäli ostaja ei saa tuotetta tai esiin-
tyy erimielisyyksiä, Silkkitien asiakaspalvelu rat-
kaisee tilanteen.
Silkkitie maksaa palvelun mainostamisesta. Täs-
tä esimerkkejä ovat tarrojen levittäminen kaupun-
geissa, Silkkitien toiminnan jakaminen sosiaalises-
sa mediassa, juttuvinkkien jako lehdistölle ja jo-
pa mainosgrafﬁtin maalaaminen. Myös tietotur-
vahaavoittuvuuksien tiedottamisesta asiakaspalve-
lulle luvataan maksaa 1 000–5 000 euroa.
Kauppapaikassa on myös sisäinen viestintäjär-
jestelmä, jolla voi lähettää viestejä asiakaspalvelul-
le, ylläpidolle ja myyjille.
Testasimme Silkkitien toimintaa monella taval-
la ja toteutus vaikuttaa hyvin suunnitellulta. Eri-
tyisesti palvelu on rakennuttu niin, ettei se ei va-
hingossakaan virhetilanteessa vuoda palvelun olin-
paikkaa valottavia tietoja.
Vaikka Silkkitie suojelee tehokkaasti ostajien ja 
myyjien tietoja muun muassa salaamalla osoitteen 
luovutuksen myyjän julkisella avaimella, keskitet-
ty kauppapaikka on edelleen monessa suhteessa 
riski. Kapteenin henkilöllisyys tai lopulliset motii-
vit eivät ole tiedossa. Maailmalla vastaavat palvelut 
ovat joutuneet yllättävien käänteiden kautta usein 
poliisiviranomaisten haltuun. Syitä on ollut mo-
nia: ylläpitohenkilöt ovat tehneet inhimillisiä vir-
heitä, he ovat joutuneet poliisitutkinnan kohteek-
si muiden rikosepäilyjen takia, palveluissa on ol-
lut vakavia teknisiä toteutusvirheitä ja palveluihin 
on jopa soluttautunut työntekijöiksi Yhdysvaltain 
liittovaltion agentteja (Greenberg 2015).
Myös myyjille saattaa kertyä laaja lista heiltä ti-
lanneiden ihmisten osoitteita. Mikäli myyjä jou-
tuu esimerkiksi itse myyntitavaraa hankkiessaan 
poliisin haaviin, tällainen osoitelista saattaa löytyä 
kotietsinnässä ja todennäköisesti herättää poliisin 
huomion. Useat myyjät lupaavat tosin hävittää os-
tajien osoitteet välittömästi hallustaan.
Alkuvuosi on ollut epäonnen aikaa monelle vanhalle ja 
uudelle silkkitieläiselle. Rahansiirroissa on ollut sekoi-
tuspalvelimen vaihdossa alkaneita ongelmia ja Bitcoi-
nin kurssi on romahtanut alimmaksi pitkästä aikaa. Os-
tajilta on jäänyt tärkeitä tilauksia saamatta ajoissa kun 
talletuksissa on kestänyt ja myyjät ovat menettäneet ra-
haa kurssilaskun aikana hitaiden nostojen takia. Jotkut 
myyjät ovat joutuneet lopettamaan myymisen koko-
naan, siirtymään katukauppaan tai vaihtamaan toisille 
kauppiaille. –Kapteeni 26.1.2014
Palvelu on täysin riippuvainen Kapteeni-nimi-
merkkiä käyttävän henkilön toiminnasta. Tammi-
kuun 2015 toisella viikolla Silkkitien maksujärjes-
telmä hyytyi tuntemattomasta syystä, ja samaan 
aikaan Kapteeni oli asiakaspalvelun mukaan lo-
malla. Seurauksena oli kaupankäynnin pysähty-
minen noin kahdeksi viikoksi.
Palvelu on myös täysin riippuvainen Tor-verkon 
ja bitcoinin toiminnasta. On toki mahdollista kor-
vata nämä teknologiat toisilla, mutta mikäli näis-
sä teknologioissa esiintyisi vakava tietoturvaongel-
ma, myös luottamus lähimpiin korvaaviin järjes-
telmiin, anonyymiverkko I2P:hen ja virtuaaliva-
luutta litecoiniin, kärsisi huomattavasti.
Huumeiden myyntimäärät Silkkitie-
sivustolla
Päihdekaupankäynnin tilastoinnin kannalta Silk-
kitie on mielenkiintoinen. Koska suurin osa kaup-
patavarasta liikkuu rajoja ylittämättä Suomen si-
säisessä postissa, esimerkiksi tullivalvonnan kaut-
ta ei saada käsitystä kaupankäynnin laajuudesta. 
Tähän voidaan kuitenkin käyttää automaattisia 
tiedonlouhinnan keinoja. Lähestymistapaa 
käytettiin jo ulkomaalaisen Silk Road -palvelun 
kaupankäynnin tilastoinnissa (Christin 2013).
Laajasti ajateltuna julkisten tietomassojen lä-
pikäynti on Open Source Intelligence -toimintaa 
(OSINT) (Glassman & al. 2012). Menetelmällä 
voidaan luoda laadukas tilannekuva erilaisista ilmi-
öistä, tässä tapauksessa suomalaisten käymästä huu-
mausainekaupasta internetissä. Muut verkkotiedus-
telun keinot eivät tässä tapauksessa edes toimisi, 
koska Tor-verkon vahva salaus ja anonymiteetti es-
tävät tietojen keräämisen esimerkiksi tietoliikenne-
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tiedustelulla (Dingledine & al. 2004). OSINT-mal-
lin mukainen tiedustelu on tässä tapauksessa edul-
lista, yksinkertaista ja sitä voi laillisesti tehdä kuka 
tahansa siihen teknisesti kykenevä henkilö.
Teimme alustavan kokeilun rakentamalla ohjel-
man, joka käy läpi kaikki tuotesivut ja poimii niis-
tä talteen oleelliset tiedot. Nämä tiedot ovat tuot-
teen otsikko, hinta, kuinka monta myyntiartikke-
lia varastossa on, myyjän nimimerkki, myyjän po-
sitiiviset palautteet, myyjän negatiiviset palautteet, 
lähetysmaa, myyjän sallimat kohdemaat ja tuot-
teen yksilöivä URL-osoite. Tiedot haetaan ker-
ran päivässä ja ne tallennetaan tietokantaan. Ha-
ku kohdistuu vain Silkkitien kategoriaan ”nautin-
toaineet”, joka sisältää palvelussa myytävät päih-
teet. Päihteet muodostavat lähes kaiken kaupan-
käynnin palvelussa: muut tuotteet eivät ole yhtä 
suosittuja ja niitä ei ole niin paljon tarjolla.
Tietokantahakujen avulla voidaan tehdä lasken-
toa kaupankäynnistä. Käytännössä jokaisen tuot-
teen kohdalla voidaan vertailla sitä, miten varas-
tossa olevien myyntiartikkeleiden määrä muuttuu. 
Laskentaan otettiin mukaan vain ne myyjät, joil-
la onnistuneita kauppoja oli 20 enemmän kuin 
epäonnistuneita kauppoja. Siis esimerkiksi vähin-
tään 20 onnistunutta kauppaa ja ei epäonnistunei-
ta kauppoja. Näin otetaan pois laskuista myyjät, 
jotka eivät juuri tee kauppaa tai eivät oikeasti lä-
hetä mitään tuotteita.
Otimme laskentaan mukaan päivät ajalta 5.11.–
5.12.2014 ja saimme tältä kuukauden jaksolta 
seuraavanlaiset tulokset: euromääräinen myynti 
pääkategorioiden mukaan (taulukko 1) ja euro-
määräinen myynti erilaisten tuotteiden mukaan 
(taulukko 2). Lisäksi tarkastelimme yksittäisten 
myyjien liikevaihtoa.
Kategorioina käytettiin Silkkitie-palvelun la-
jittelua eri päihteistä. Empatogeenit on nimitys 
MDMA:sta ja sen kaltaisista stimulanteista, jot-
ka lisäävät empaattisia kokemuksia toisia ihmi-
siä kohtaan. Dissosiaatit sisältävät ketamiinin ja 
DXM:n sekä niiden kaltaiset psykedeelit, jotka ai-
heuttavat voimakkaan kokemuksen tietoisuuden 
erkanemisesta muusta todellisuudesta.
Päihderyhmittäin tarkasteltuna empatogeenien, 
kannabiksen ja stimulanttien myynti oli suurin-
ta. Kannabista myytiin 5 810 eurolla, opiaatteja 
1 932 eurolla, empatogeeneja 7 425 eurolla, dis-
sosiaatteja 794 eurolla, depressantteja 1 120 eu-
rolla, stimulantteja 7 788 eurolla, psykedeelejä 4 
379 eurolla ja muita päihteitä 2 719 eurolla. Yh-
teensä kuukauden aikana myynti oli siis noin 32 
000 euroa. Päihdekohtaisesti tarkasteltaessa eni-
ten myyntiin ekstaasia, sen jälkeen amfetamiinia, 
kukintoa, LSD:tä, hasista, MDMA:ta, rauhoitta-
via reseptilääkkeitä ja kokaiinia. Muiden tuottei-
den myyntimäärät ovat hyvin vähäisiä.
On huomattavaa, että kannabistuotteiden käyt-
töannos maksaa huomattavasti vähemmän kuin 
muiden päihteiden, joten viihdekäytössä käyte-
tyillä käyttöannosmäärillä mitattuna kannabis-
tuotteet ovat kaikista suosituimpia. Stimulanttei-
hin kuuluu myös kallista kokaiinia, joka nostaa 
kategorian myyntimäärää euroissa (taulukko 2). 
Huomattavaa on, että paljon puhuttujen muun-
tohuumeiden myynti on hyvin vähäistä.
Myynnin kokonaismäärä oli vuoden 2014 lo-
pulla noin 1 000 euroa päivässä eli kauppa oli 
suhteellisen pienimuotoista ottaen huomioon, et-
tä myyjiä oli useita. Matalat myyntimäärät kerto-
nevat siitä, että lähes kaikki myyjät myivät päih-
teitä Silkkitie-palvelun kautta harrastuneisuuttaan 
tai oheiskauppana. He eivät saaneet merkittävää 
rahallista voittoa myyntitoiminnasta. Koska pal-
velu ottaa itse noin viiden prosentin välityspalkki-
on, Silkkitien ylläpitäjät tienaavat palvelusta noin 
50 euroa päivässä. Ottaen huomioon työmäärän ja 
ylläpidon pakolliset juoksevat kulut, palvelu ei ol-
lut kaupallisesti kovin kannattava.
Laskimme tietokannasta muutaman yleisen 
tuotteen keskihinnat. Hinnat on pyöristetty koko-
naisiksi euroiksi. Tarkastelimme lisäksi käyttöan-
noksen hintaa. Käyttöannoksen referenssinä käy-
timme Erowid-säätiön tarjoamia viitearvoja (Ero-
wid 1995). Tiedot on esitetty taulukossa 3.
Laskimme käsin LSD:n keskimääräiseeksi hin-
naksi 15 euroa / 100–125 mikrogrammaa, joka on 
tavallinen yksi käyttöannos. Vastaavasti voitaisiin 
Nimike
Stimu-
lantit
Empato-
geenit
Kannabis Psyke-
deelit
Opiaatit Depres-
santit
Dissosia-
tiivit
Muut
Euroa 7 788 7 425 5 810 4 379 1 932 1 120 794 2 719 
Taulukko 1. Myyntimäärät euroissa Silkkitien käyttämien pääkategorioiden mukaisesti.
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Virhelähteet kerätyssä tilastossa
Kerätyssä tietokannassa sekä sen perusteella tapah-
tuvassa laskennassa on tiettyjä virhelähteitä. 
Ensinnäkin itse keräys tapahtui joka päivä hie-
man eri aikaan. Vaihteluväli on jopa 12 tuntia, 
koska toisinaan Silkkitie-palvelu toimii hitaasti tai 
ei vastaa lainkaan tiedonkeruuohjelman pyyntöi-
hin. Tämä ei kuitenkaan vääristä kerättyä tietoa 
pitkällä aikavälillä.
Toisena virhelähteenä on laskentatapa, jossa ke-
rättyjen tietojen muutosta verrataan aina edelliseen 
päivään. Jos kappalemäärä on laskenut, niin muu-
tos tulkitaan myytyjen tuotteiden määräksi. Tässä 
on kaksikin ongelmaa. Jos kauppias myy tuotteita 
ja lisää tuotteita saman vuorokauden aikana, niin 
laskettu muutos edelliseen päivään ei kerro oikeaa 
myynnin määrää. Samoin käy, jos kauppias laskee 
varastossa olevien tuotteiden määrää.
Jotta myynti huomioitiin laskennassa, myyjäl-
lä täytyi olla vähintään 20 onnistunutta kauppaa. 
Toisin sanoen tätä vähemmän myyneet myyjät jäi-
vät huomiotta. Samoin huomioitta jäivät myyjät, 
joiden huono maine viittasi siihen, että he eivät 
oikeasti myyneet mitään. Lisäksi otimme mukaan 
vain ne kaupat, joissa kauppias on Suomen rajo-
jen sisäpuolella. Tämä rajaus tehtiin siksi, että tar-
koituksena oli tarkastella nimenomaan Suomen si-
säistä kauppaa.
Koska kauppiaisiin voi ottaa yhteyttä suoraan 
viestillä, on mahdollista, että kauppoja sovitaan 
Silkkitie-palvelun ohi suoraan ostajan ja myyjän 
Taulukko 2. Päihdekohtaiset myyntimäärät eu-
roissa kuukauden ajalta.
Nimike Euroa
Ekstaasi 5 717 
Amfetamiini 5 418 
Kukinto 4 639 
LSD 2 686 
MDMA 1 603 
Bentsot 1 551 
Kokaiini 1 312 
Buprenorﬁini 911 
GBL 887 
Hasis 753 
DMT 735 
Oksikodoni 532 
Kipulääkkeet 409 
Tramadoli 371 
Synteettiset 366 
25x-NBOMe 333 
Sienet 320 
MDPV 290 
Salvia 290 
Mieskunto 254 
GHB 233 
A-PVP 230 
2-FMA 205 
Ketamiini 170 
ADHD 155 
MXE 155 
Katinonit 140 
Nootroopit 130 
Unilääkkeet 126 
Ayahuasca 120 
Kodeiini 118 
DOx 117 
Metyloni 105 
Leivonnaiset 52 
2C-x 47 
Rauhoittavat 25 
Lihasrelaksantit 22 
DXM 19 
AMT 10 
Nuuska 10 
Muut 401 
Päihteen 
kauppanimi
Hinta
euroa/
gramma
euroa/käyttöannos
Metyloni 79 8 euroa / 100 mg
DMT 113 2 euroa / 20 mg
Sienet 10 10 euroa / gramma
Kukinto 26 3 euroa / 100 mg
Kokaiini 128 13 euroa / 100 mg
MDMA 65 7 euroa / 100 mg
Hasis 25 3 euroa / 100 mg
Amfetamiini 31 3 euroa / 100 mg
Taulukko 3. Taulukossa on kerätystä tietokan-
nasta automaattisesti tunnistetut grammahinnat 
eräille myynnissä oleville päihteille. Taulukossa 
on myös arvio yhden käyttöannoksen hinnasta.
laskea ja vertailla, kuinka paljon erilaisia päihdeai-
neita myydään, kuinka paljon eri myyjät myyvät, 
kuinka monta käyttöannosta on keskimääräinen 
ostoskerta sekä miten ostokäyttäytyminen muut-
tuu ajan mittaan. Lisäksi voitaisiin laskea, kuinka 
monta yksittäistä ostoskertaa tapahtuu.
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välillä. Näin tehdyt kaupat ovat kuitenkin ongel-
mallisia kaupan osapuolille, koska sekä ostaja että 
myyjä koettavat kerätä hyvää mainetta juuri Silk-
kitie-palvelussa tapahtuvien onnistuneiden kaup-
pojen kautta.
Johtopäätökset
Alustuvat tutkimustulokset osoittavat Suomen si-
säisen kaupankäynnin olevan pienimuotoista ja 
harrastuspohjaista. Toisaalta Suomen sisäistä, ver-
kossa tapahtuvaa huumekauppaa käydään muual-
lakin kuin Silkkitiellä, vaikka sivusto on tällä het-
kellä laajin kauppapaikka. Myyjien tulot eivät ole 
suuria. Voidaankin ennemmin puhua laittomista 
päihteistä kiinnostuneiden ihmisten harrastustoi-
minnasta tai oheistoiminnasta kuin liiketoimin-
nasta. Palvelun ylläpitokin vaikuttaa olevan ylläpi-
täjälle ideologista toimintaa, ei niinkään liiketoi-
mintaa. Verrattuna Silkkitien kansainvälisen esi-
kuvan, Silk Road -palvelun toimintaan kaupan-
käynti on häviävän pientä. Silk Roadilla kaupan-
käynti oli vuonna 2012 luokkaa 1,2 miljoonaa 
dollaria joka kuukausi. Palvelun ylläpitäjä tiena-
si 92 000 dollaria kuukaudessa (Christin 2013.)
Silkkitie-palvelun kokonaismyyntimäärä eurois-
sa on varsin pieni, noin 1 000 euroa päivässä. Tä-
mä summa jakautuu kymmenien myyjien kesken; 
vain kahdeksan myyjää ylittää 1 000 euron kuu-
kausimyyntimäärään.
Silkkitie-verkkopalvelu on toteutettu huolelli-
sesti käyttäen uusimpia teknologioita. Kapteeni-
nimimerkkinen henkilö tai ryhmä on toteuttanut 
verkkopalveluita aikaisemminkin ja tuntee Tor-
verkon ja bitcoinin toiminnan tarkkaan. PGP:tä 
hyödyntävän verkkopalvelun toteutus on vaati-
nut aikaa ja huomattavaa suunnittelua. Silti pal-
velun tuoma rahallinen hyöty on keskimäärin 50 
euroa päivässä.
Osalla käyttäjistä tietotekninen osaaminen 
on huomattavan korkea. He hallitsevat Tor-ver-
kon käytön ja hyödyntävät PGP-salausta. Heidän 
kommenteistaan käy selvästi ilmi korkea tietämys 
siitä, miten nämä teknologiat toimivat ja oikein 
käytettyinä suojaavat heitä viranomaisia vastaan. 
Myyjät kertovat muun muassa salaavansa tietoko-
neensa kiintolevyt mahdollisia kotietsintöjä vas-
taan ja näin suojelevansa ostajien osoitetietoja.
Myyjien tietämys erilaisista päihteistä on myös 
täsmällistä. Myyjät kertovat avoimesti kokeilleensa 
itse tuotteitaan ja mitanneensa erilaisilla testeillä 
tuotteiden vahvuuksia. Osa myyjistä varoittaa 
tuotteiden aiheuttavan riippuvuutta ja korostavat 
kohtuukäyttöä. Suurin osa myyjistä jopa varoit-
taa ensi kertaa päihdettä kokeilevia käyttöannos-
rajoista.
Tällaisten tilastojen julkaiseminen lisää tietoi-
suutta Silkkitien toiminnasta. Tämä on eettisesti 
ongelmallista, koska salaus, Tor-verkko ja bitcoin-
virtuaaliraha liitetään julkisuudessa rikolliseen toi-
mintaan. On kuitenkin selvää, että Silkkitien toi-
minta on häviävän pieni osa kaikesta Tor-verkon 
ja bitcoinin käytöstä, josta suurin osa on täysin 
laillista arkipäiväistä toimintaa. Toinen ongelma 
julkisuudessa on, että Silkkitie voi näin saada 
uusia asiakkaita. Laittomia päihteitä internetistä 
etsivät suomalaiset löytävät kuitenkin Silkkitien 
muutenkin. Tutkimustiedosta taas hyötyvät sekä 
päihdepolitiikka että haittojen minimointia suun-
nitteleva tutkimusyhteisö.
Uusien teknologioiden käytön rajoittaminen 
on teknisesti lähes mahdotonta. Rajoituksia olisi 
mahdotonta valvoa ja lakia rikkovat henkilöt oli-
sivat valmiita uhmaamaan rajoituksia. Rajoitukset 
aiheuttaisivat haittaa vain tavallisille netin käyttä-
jille, jotka pyrkisivät parantamaan tietoturvaan-
sa tai tekemään bitcoinilla laillisia ostoksia. Bit-
coin, Tor ja tietoturvateknologiat ovat yleiskäyt-
töisiä teknologioita, vaikka niitä voidaan käyttää 
myös laittomien päihteiden myyntiin.
Tutkimuksen kannalta nykymuotoiset kauppa-
paikat mahdollistavat kaupankäynnin seurannan 
ja tilastoinnin. Saatavilla on aivan uudenlaista tut-
kimustietoa myytyjen aineiden määristä ja myyji-
en saamista tuloista. Lisäksi kaupankäyntimalli on 
sikäli uusi, että myyjä on ostajalle täysin tuntema-
ton ja anonyymi. 
Miten anonymiteetti muuttaa huumekaupan 
luonnetta? Ostajan ei tarvitse tuntea myyjää. Se 
voi vähentää väkivaltaa, tarvetta tuntea tuottajia 
tai olla tekemisissä varsinaisen myyjän kanssa, ja 
tutustumista käyttäjäpiireihin. Samalla tähän si-
sältyy omat riskinsä: aloitteleva ostaja ei opi muilta 
kokeneemmilta käyttäjiltä turvallisia tapoja käyt-
tää aineita.
Huumekaupalle tyypillinen luottamus osta-
jan ja myyjän välillä (Perälä 2011) rakentuu Silk-
kitiellä sille, että ostaja näkee palvelusta myyjän 
maineen ja toteutuneiden kauppojen kommentit. 
Suurimmilla myyjillä on useita satoja toteutunei-
ta kauppoja ja lähes kaikista kaupoista on annettu 
positiivinen palaute. Näin ollen ostaja voi hyvällä 
syyllä luottaa saavansa haluamansa tuotteen. Pa-
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lautejärjestelmä vähentää ostajan riskiä saada eri-
laista tuotetta kuin luulee ostavansa.
Jatkotutkimus
Aineisto vaikuttaa alustavan analyysin perusteella 
käyttökelpoiselta. Tutkimusdataa Silkkitien kau-
pankäynnistä kerätään edelleen päivittäin. Näin 
syntyvästä tietokannasta voidaan selvittää monen-
laisia ilmiöitä sekä seurata pitkittäistutkimuksilla, 
miten kaupankäynti kehittyy. Aikomuksemme on 
julkaista lisää tuloksia tietojen analysoinnin poh-
jalta. Lisäksi julkaisemme tutkimusyhteisölle hyö-
dyllisiä tilastotietopaketteja, joista voidaan varmis-
taa tekemämme tutkimuksen paikkansapitävyys. 
Tilastoinnit ruokkivat jatkotutkimusta ja ovat hel-
posti hyödynnettävissä erilaisissa tutkimusasetel-
missa. Alla esitämme joitakin ajatuksia jatkosta.
Automaattinen tilastointi menetelmänä huume-
kaupan arvioinnissa. Internetissä toimivassa kaup-
papaikassa tuotteet ja kaupankäynti ovat näkyvil-
lä kaikille sivustolla kävijöille. Tätä kaupankäyntiä 
voidaan seurata ja tilastoida. Seurannan voi teh-
dä perinteisesti siten, että joku merkitsee päivit-
täin talteen tiedot siitä, miten tuotteita myydään. 
Tämä tehtävä kannattaa kuitenkin automatisoi-
da tietokoneelle.
Tällainen ohjelmisto käy Silkkitie-sivuston läpi 
joka päivä ja tallentaa kaupankäyntitilanteen. 
Tiedot tallennetaan päiväkohtaisesti tietokan-
taan. Tästä tietokannasta voidaan esimerkiksi las-
kea, paljonko tuotteita on myyty eri viikonpäi-
vinä. Automatisointia voi laajentaa muihin verk-
kolähteisiin ja yhdistellä muihin olemassa oleviin 
tietoihin.
Tällaisilla menetelmillä saadaan mielenkiintoi-
sia ja hyödyllisiä tilannekuvia huumausainekau-
pan nykytilasta internetissä. Erityisesti Suomen 
kohdalla tilastointia ei ole vielä tehty, joten sen 
automaattinen tuottaminen olisi tarkoituksenmu-
kaista ja hyödyllistä.
Kyselytutkimus palvelun käyttäjille. Olisi myös 
mielekästä toteuttaa kysely Silkkitie-palvelun 
käyttäjille. Näin voitaisiin kartoittaa heidän näke-
myksiään Silkkitiestä ja saada tietoa heidän taus-
tastaan ja asemasta yhteiskunnassa sekä päihtei-
den käyttötottumuksia. Kyselyn voisi toteuttaa 
esimerkiksi itse rakennetussa Tor-verkon hidden 
service -palvelussa, jotta vastaajat saisivat parhaan 
mahdollisen anonymiteetin. Samalla menetelmäl-
lä voisi kysyä Kapteenilta anonyymisti hänen mo-
tiiveistaan kehittää ja ylläpitää Silkkitietä.
Silkkitien huumemyynti vuosina 2015–2016. 
Vaikka dataa on tätä kirjoittaessa kerätty vasta 
muutamia kuukausia, vaikuttaa siltä, että huume-
kauppa Silkkitiellä kasvaa. Aikomuksena on kir-
joittaa jatkoartikkeli, jossa kaupankäyntiä seura-
taan pidempi ajanjakso sekä katsotaan trendejä ja 
muutoksia pidemmällä ajanjaksolla.
Silkkitien huumemyynti verrattuna trendeihin ka-
tukaupassa. Silkkitiellä tapahtuvaa myyntiä voisi 
verrata muualta saataviin (Vinkki-pisteet, NOP-
SA-verkosto, hoitopaikat, kyselyt, huumetestaus) 
tietoihin trendeistä suomalaisessa huumeidenkäy-
tössä.
Kansainväliset vertailut. Myyntiä voisi verrata ai-
nakin myytävien tuotteiden laadun suhteen joi-
hinkin muihin maihin, joissa on vastaavia kaup-
papaikkoja. Myydäänkö Suomessa esimerkiksi 
tiettyjä huumeita suhteessa enemmän verrattuna 
muihin Pohjoismaihin? Kauppapaikat eivät edusta 
koko internetissä tapahtuvaa kauppaa, joten mää-
rien vertailun sijaan kannattanee keskittyä siihen, 
mihin aineisiin kauppa keskittyy.
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Juha Nurmi & Teemu Kaskela: Silkkitie. Päihteiden 
suomalaista nappikauppaa
Tietotekniikan ja tietoverkkojen alati kiihtyvä kehi-
tysvauhti on siirtänyt monet palvelut internetiin. Näin 
on käynyt myös päihdyttävien aineiden kaupalle. Tä-
män lisäksi nykyiset teknologiat ja teknologioiden käyt-
täjät ovat entistä paremmin valveutuneita erilaisia tie-
toturvaongelmia, massavakoilua, sensuuria ja ihmis-
oikeusloukkauksia vastaan. Turvallisuutta parantamaan 
valmistettuja teknologioita osaavat hyödyntää myös 
laittomia päihteitä myyvät ja ostavat henkilöt. Keskei-
nen esimerkki tästä on suomalainen Silkkitie-niminen 
Tor-verkossa sijaitseva nettikauppa.
Erityisesti vuonna 2014 kaupankäynti siirtyi Suomen 
rajojen sisäiseksi. Toisin sanoen tilaukset kulkevat Suo-
messa postin välityksellä ja tullivalvonnan kaltaista ris-
kiä ostajalle ei enää ole. Tor, bitcoin sekä laadukkaas-
ti toteutettu verkkokauppa tarjoavat yhdessä saumat-
toman turvallisen tavan ostaa myös laittomia päihteitä. 
Käytännössä viranomaisilla ei ole näköpiirissä keinoja 
puuttua näin toimivaan kaupankäyntiin. Toisaalta, kos-
ka kaupankäynti keskittyy yhteen julkisesti toimivaan 
kauppapaikkaan, kaupankäyntiä voidaan tilastoida au-
tomatisoidusti. Ymmärrys päihteiden käytöstä kasvaa.
Laittomien päihteiden verkkokauppaan on erittäin 
hankala puuttua. Voimme kuitenkin seurata sivusta 
kaupankäynnin laajuutta ja ymmärtää käytettyjä tekno-
logioita. Voimme myös tuottaa lähes reaaliaikaista tilan-
nekuvaa siitä, kuinka paljon ihmiset ostavat ja myyvät 
päihteitä. Näin syntyvä tilastointi valottaa aivan uudella 
tavalla päihteiden kulutustottumuksia Suomessa. Myös 
itse teknologiat, joita ihmiset ovat valjastaneet turvalli-
seen kaupankäyntiin, ovat erittäin kiinnostavia ja uudet 
sosiaaliset käyttökontekstit tutkimattomia. Tässä tut-
kimuksessa tarkastellaan suomalaista Silkkitie-nimistä 
kauppapaikkaa. Tutkimme tällaista kaupankäyntiä niin 
teknisenä ja sosiaalisena ilmiönä.
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Abstract—Tor’s location hidden services (HS) are a tool for
anonymous publishing, with the feature that the sites cannot
be brought down without taking down the whole Tor network.
People run HSs for a multitude of reasons. Some like them to be
public, but others want to keep them their existence as private.
We have run private unannounced HSs to detect whether the HS
directory is spied on. Our results show that the hidden service
directory is monitored for new addresses. This paper details the
observations made from the scanning activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Location Hidden Services (HS) [1] are TCP services offered
over the Tor network. The services are implemented in such a
way that the Internet Protocol address of the publishing server
is not visible to the clients. The clients know the service only
by its pseudonymous identiﬁer. The HS identiﬁers are called
onion addresses because they are under a reserved special use
domain called .onion.
HSs are made for many different purposes. Anyone can
start and operate a hidden service, there are sites for forbidden
content, drug and other illegal item market places, basically
information that would not be tolerated anywhere else. The
most prominent examples of cases where the existence of these
services is beneﬁcial for us all are leak sites that are operated
by journalists. These services need to remain online, and out
of reach of local governments.
The HS operator can decide whether they want to make
their service public – by including it in a search engine, such
as Ahmia [2] – or to keep it as a an unlisted one. Yet, if the
nature of the hidden services is to publish, why would anyone
run a hidden service and not tell anyone about it?
• content is very sensitive
• site is not ﬁnished
• does not want random trafﬁc
• does not know how to password protect the HS
Exclusion from public HS directory as a protection mechanism
does not make much sense, other than to limit trafﬁc coming
to the HS. For instance, SSH management connection can use
a hidden service address.
For instance, Onionshare [3] lets users share ﬁles between
each other. It authenticates the user by a knowledge of a short
string at the end of the URI. Yet, such strings can be easily
brute forced [4], and the ﬁles could end up in the wrong
hands. In addition, the password protection requires the user
to remember two random strings.
Furthermore, password protection using Tor’s inbuilt mech-
anism HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient needs a strong password
against an attacker who can get the HS descriptor. The
password protected HS descriptors include an encrypted list of
introduction points. The encryption uses AES in CTR mode
with 128-bit key, which can be considered to be strong. Yet,
if the password used to derive the encryption key is weak, it
can be dictionary attacked using the directory information.
It is possible to discover descriptors for previously unknown
onion addresses by running a Tor relay [5]. Attacker motives
are many. State actors could be scanning the Tor network, there
could be curious hobbyists, and someone may be trying to ﬁnd
valuable information. This paper sets to ﬁnd out whether this
happens in practice.
The paper is organized as follows. In the background section
we outline the operation of Tor network’s HSDir. In the third
section we present related work on Tor and honeypots. Then
in fourth section we describe our research questions and our
experimental setup. In the ﬁfth section results are presented.
Discussion about our results along with future work and
improvement ideas are presented in the sixth section. Finally,
the seventh section draws the conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
Clients connect to the HS through introduction points that
the service has listed. The HS has Tor circuit open to the
introduction point, over which the introduction point relays
the setup parameters (rendezvous point address and a shared
secret) to the hidden service. The introduction points for a
speciﬁc onion address are listed in a record called the service
descriptor [1]. Tor network stores them in the global HS
directory (HSDir), which is a distributed hash table (DHT).
Originally the HS design included directory authorities, but
in the second version any relay with HSDir ﬂag can hold
directory contents in a circular fashion [1].
Tor implements DHT (Distributed Hash Table) for onion
address information. Every Tor hidden service directory (HS-
Dir) node has a subset of hidden service descriptors. These
are short signed messages created by hidden services. Most
important information in the message is a list of introduction
points, where the client can send a short introduction message.
The hidden service then publishes its descriptor to a set of 6
responsible HSDirs once per hour. The responsible HSDirs are
regular Tor nodes on the Tor network which have been online
longer than 92 hours and which have received the HSDir ﬂag
2016 11th Asia Joint Conference on Information Security
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from the directory authorities. The set of responsible HSDirs
is based on their position of the current descriptor-id in a list
of all current HSDirs ordered by their node ﬁngerprint.
Because the onion address identiﬁes a public key, the
hidden service can prove its ownership of the address for the
connecting client. The service descriptors are signed with the
public key as well. This makes the HSDir’s operation less
critical. Only availability of the HSDir has to be guaranteed.
Regular Tor node may work as HSDir and anyone who deploys
such node can also harvest onion addresses from it. The
attacker may ﬁnd addresses that have not been publicly shared
ever.
The next generation hidden service proposal for Tor [6]
makes it impossible for a HSDir operator to connect to the
HS based on only the HS descriptor. The descriptor contents
are encrypted with a key derived from the hidden service’s
identiﬁer and other parameters such as time. However, this
speciﬁcation is not in the use yet. The new proposal will also
change the hidden service naming to include a 256 bit ECC
public key, instead of the current RSA key truncated hash. The
descriptor-ids will not be predictable to the future either [5],
[6].
Honeypot is a monitored network of decoy computers,
whose purpose is to be attacked [7]. Trafﬁc coming to the
honeypot can be analyzed in order to ﬁnd information about
possible attacks against real systems or to proﬁle the attacker.
Sometimes the honeypot is designed to keep the attacker busy
and away from real systems, particularly if the attack requires
human effort.
The attackers goal is to detect that they are running in a
honeypot, so that they will not reveal information about their
attack tools or waste effort [8]. Low interaction honeypots
[9], such as Kippo, usually seek to understand the behavior
of automated or low sophistication attack trafﬁc, such as
SSH brute force [10]. Such a honeypot only emulates a real
environment, and lets the attacker run different commands,
which are then logged by the honeypot. High interaction
honeypots [9] that are real but controlled systems are more
laborous for the defender, yet, they do not reveal themselves
as easily.
These systems appear either vulnerable or valuable systems,
depending on what the focus of the honeypot is. If the focus
is to gather information about general automated attacks,
appearing vulnerable could be a good strategy. Contrary, if
the idea is to gather information about targeted attacks [11],
the honeypot should be, for example, named to appear very
valuable.
Honeynets, or more speciﬁcally darknets are monitored
network regions [12] that should not receive trafﬁc in normal
circumstances. Any trafﬁc coming to the darknet addresses can
be considered to be either malicious scanning or backscatter
trafﬁc from attacks like SYN-ﬂood.
III. RELATED WORK
Honeypots have been built for special purposes. For exam-
ple, honeypots disguised as IoT devices [13]. Other examples
are honeypots that appear as industrial control systems [14],
[15], [16], [17]. Further, honeypots that target the mobile
malware and attackers are presenting themselves as Android
phones [18].
Yet, there is a distinct lack of HS honeypot research,
even though it can be estimated that many organizations are
actively scanning HSs. The behavior of Tor exit nodes has
been explored with honeypots by Chakravarty et al. [19].
Tor hidden services have been used as part of a Internet
facing setup to bridge trafﬁc towards hosts in the Tor network
[20]. However, trafﬁc coming to HSs has not been under
investigation previously.
Honeypot research in the HS case is complicated because
the hidden service does not see the IP address of the con-
necting client, unless the client uses Tor2Web mode [21].
This makes the attacker attribution hard. Indeed, previous Tor
HS research has revolved around the deanonymization of HS
operators [5], [22] and Tor users [23].
IV. DESCRIPTION
In this section we outline the design choices and rationale
for our experiment.
A. Research Questions
Because there is the possibility of spying the HSDir, we
wanted answers for the following questions:
• Is someone monitoring the HS directory?
• How large parts of HS directory are under the monitor-
ing?
• How frequent is the behavior, and what is the level of
automation?
• What services are targeted?
• What kind of observers visit private HSs?
The ﬁrst question is interesting since, there is a certain
expectation of privacy, when setting up an unlisted hidden
service. It is also considered to be unethical to harvest onion
addresses from the HSDir while acting as a volunteer operator.
We were also interested to know whether all onion addresses
are revealed to the attacker as fast as they are generated. And
if they are scanned only periodically, what kind of interval the
attacker has (i.e. what is the mean time of exposure).
We wanted also information about what kind of services
were targeted. For example, if someone would be port scan-
ning the onion network. Related to this would be information
about automated vulnerability scans.
What can we tell about the headers that the attacker is
sending to us? Even though the attacker can easily change the
protocol headers that their client is using, careless attackers
may reveal information about themselves.
B. Honeynet Setup
In total 100 honeypot onions were set up for the experiment.
All of them had three ports open, port 21 (FTP), port 22 (SSH)
and port 80 (HTTP). The addresses were randomly generated,
and were not told to anyone. The experiment was run for 42
days.
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All requests were logged. Only successful protocol data
was logged. In other words, if an attacker would have sent
an HTTP query to a SSH port, the query would have been
silently discarded. Therefore, pure port scans would not have
been seen.
The used HTTP daemon was Nginx [24]. The conﬁgured
web site was very plain, and contained only a static front page.
Later designs of the same experiment should perhaps contain
more extensive setup.
V. RESULTS
The only port that received any trafﬁc was the HTTP. For
instance, SSH brute forcing attacks, which are common on the
normal Internet were not visible.
From the logs we ﬁrst analyzed the ﬁrst accesses to each
of the onions. These are visualized in the Figure 1. The ﬁrst
access was usually by an automated script, which was not
trying to hide its nature but included the Curl or Wget user
agents.
The second line in the ﬁgure 1 is the time when the ﬁrst
Tor Browser user agent accesses the honeypot. This most
probably means that the site is listed in a service that lists
these unannounced hidden services.
The ﬁrst request came on 12 days after the experiment was
started. This means that the onion address space is either not
under constant scanning, or the scanning is done with very low
resources. The HSDir is distributed which should mean that
the attacker cannot get all the addresses, but only a fraction
of them. In order to know all onion addresses the attacker has
to run a sizable operation.
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Fig. 1. Cumulative accesses of onion addresses as function of time
While the number of probed onions shows an estimate for
the breadth of the activity, we also analyzed the characteristics
of the revealed onions. The Figure 2 shows the logarithmic
numeric value of the revealed onion addresses as a function of
time. It is easy to see from the ﬁgure that most of the revealed
addresses are in two bands. However, the onion addresses
Fig. 2. Onion address high order bits versus time
should be distributed over the HSDir nodes evenly, as the outer
Hash function in equation 1 will mix them [1].
descriptor-id
= H(permanent-id|H(time-period|descriptor-cookie|replica))
(1)
Yet, the seeming discrepancy can be explained. What is not
independent of the onion address, however, is the time period
of the hidden service descriptors validity (equation 2). The
validity time period is divided to 256 intervals over a day, and
these intervals are then indexed by the highest order byte of
the onion address. This is to ensure all the HSs do not upload
new descriptors at the same time.
(2)time-period = {permanent-id}8/256 + unix-time
86400

Indeed, using this interpretation on ﬁgure 2, we note that
actually the connecting feature is that the update time-period
of the onion addresses is the same. This most probably means
that the attacker has been running a HSDir only at a couple
speciﬁc moments. Accessing these gathered onion addresses
is then distributed more evenly over the following days.
The volume of the trafﬁc coming to the honeypot sites is
seen in the ﬁgure 3. The trafﬁc grows exponentially towards
the end of the experiment. If the experiment would have
continued for a longer period, the trafﬁc might have stabilized
to some value. The observation is that the majority of trafﬁc
came after listings in public directories.
The number of people surﬁng with normal browsers was
surprisingly high. In total, 82% of all the requests came from
Mozilla browser user agents. This could also mean that some
of the crawlers are faking their user agents. Many visitors with
normal browsers came to the site with referrer information
http://skunksworkedp2cg.onion.
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VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The conducted study has its limitations. One is the lack of
logging on the connection level. Logging also the connections
would have allowed us to see possible port scans.
We did not have polling for our hidden services, so we
cannot be sure whether they were reachable for the whole
time. The polling was left out as to not interfere with the
experiment itself. However, now that the phenomenon has been
observed independently, the subsequent experiments could
include monitoring.
The HSDir operators are not assumed to be honest. There-
fore, scanning operations like the one seen in this paper are
quite probable. They do not cause major problems for the
protocol, and could even work as an incentive for a relay
operator. However, what is seen in practice is that the relay
operator gives out capacity only temporarily. Any wanting to
be HSDir node has required uptime of 92 hours, this was
increased from the previous 24 hours [5].
We can conclude that the attacker is not very systematic
nor powerful. Out of our 100 HSs, only 30% were revealed to
the attacker. These were highly correlated with time. The main
threat was privacy of the HS, as the attacker added the sites to a
directory that they operate at http://skunksworkedp2cg.onion.
While the scanning was very infrequent, we can interpolate
from our results that half of the hidden services would be
revealed to the attacker observed in our experiment after 80
days. Likewise, a hidden service operational for ﬁve days
should have a ﬁve percent chance of getting listed by our
attacker.
The subject is necessary to talk about, as HSDir manip-
ulation has a related phenomenon, which is the purposeful
deployment of Onion Routers to speciﬁc locations in the DHT,
detailed by Biryukov et al. [5]. Even though, the rate of the
revealed onions was low, it was higher than what would be
expected by a small operation of only one relay. Therefore,
we expect that our attacker was using some of the methods
outlined in the paper.
In the future we plan to look at HSDir attacks in more detail.
For instance, it would be possible to detect whether someone
is generating nodes to be HSDirs for speciﬁc onions [25], [5].
One simple detection mechanism would be to check for HSDir
nodes that have abnormal public keys, i.e. RSA keys that do
not have exponents 3 or 65537. Yet, making indistinguishable
keys is only a computational nuisance. Therefore in the long
run, statistical methods could be more effective.
Another line of future research is to make dictionary
guessable password protected service descriptors, and monitor
trafﬁc coming onto them. If there is trafﬁc, we can conﬁrm that
someone is attacking vulnerable password protected stealth
hidden services.
Improving our honeypots is also a next term target. While
we do not believe that HS honeypots should be the same
as their clear net brethren, our current design has lots to
improve. Therefore, interesting follow up study would be to
build honeypots that have more features and more interesting
content. Both approaches to honeypots could be tried where
some honeypots could pretend to be vulnerable and others to
contain valuable information.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our investigation into private HS publishing revealed some
risks for individuals who may not take into account the
possibility of HSDir monitoring. The knowledge of the HS
address should not be used as an authentication measure.
Neither should the services use low entropy passwords (or
tokens).
We have shown that the Tor HSDir is under monitoring by
parties that operate Tor Relays. Results indicate the operation
is not very large scale. Based on our observations short-lived
onion services should remain unnoticed for a few days with
a high probability. The upcoming move to the newer HS
speciﬁcation will make these attacks impossible altogether
[6]. We hope that our ﬁndings will give motivation for this
transition.
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A B S T R A C T
Aims: This 11-month study analyzed illicit drug sales on the anonymous Tor network, with a focus on in-
vestigating whether a seller’s reputation and capacity increased daily drug sales.
Design and setting: The data were gathered from Silkkitie, the Finnish version of the Silk Road, by web crawling
the site on a daily basis from (November 2014 to September 2015). The data include information on sellers
(n = 260) and products (n = 3823).
Measurements: The measurements include the sellers’ reputation, the sale amounts (in euros), the number of
available products and the types of drugs sold. The sellers’ capacity was measured using their full sales potential
(in euros). Fixed-eﬀects regression models were used to estimate the eﬀects of sellers’ reputation and capacity;
these models were adjusted for the types of drugs sold.
Findings: Overall, illicit drug sales totalled over 2 million euros during the study, but many products were not
sold at all, and sellers were active for only a short time on average (mean = 62.8 days). Among the products
sold, stimulants were most widely purchased, followed by cannabis, MDMA, and psychedelics. A seller’s re-
putation and capacity were both associated with drug sales.
Conclusion: The Tor network has enabled a transformation in drug sales. Due to the network’s anonymity, the
seller’s reputation and capacity both have an impact on sales.
1. Introduction
Illicit online drug sales ﬁrst attracted major media attention with
the rise and fall of the Silk Road in 2011–2013 (Barratt et al., 2014;
Martin, 2014a; Martin, 2014b). The Federal Bureau of Investigation
shut down the Silk Road in October 2013 and its successor, the Silk
Road 2, in November 2014 (Dolliver, 2015). The Silk Road 3 was
launched almost immediately after but was overrun by other sites, such
as Agora and Evolution, which adopted some features of the original
Silk Road (Dolliver and Kenney, 2016; Van Buskirk et al., 2016). The
common feature of all of these websites is that they protect the anon-
ymity of their users; they are hence referred to as “cryptomarkets”
(Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016; Bancroft and Reid, 2017; Demant
et al., 2016; Martin, 2014b; Van Buskirk et al., 2016). This article fo-
cuses particularly on the Finnish online service called Silkkitie.
Silkkitie operates using the Tor network to hide its real location, just
as Agora and various Silk Road versions did. The Tor (which stands for
The Onion Router) network and software are designed to defend human
rights (Dingledine et al., 2004). This network can be used for censorship
circumvention, online anonymity and high-level online privacy. It is
possible to host a website inside the Tor network (a so-called onion
service) and to hide the physical location of the site’s server. Tor pro-
vides anonymity by routing the user’s traﬃc through three separate
relay servers so that it is diﬃcult to reveal the user’s physical location
or IP address. This means that Tor protects users by encryption to en-
sure privacy, authentication between clients and relays and signatures
to ensure that all clients know the same set of relays.
Tor is considered very secure and resilient against surveillance: The
U.S. National Security Agency called Tor “the king of high-secure, low-
latency Internet anonymity” (The Guardian, 2013) in its top-secret
documentation, in which it discusses its futile attempts to spy on Tor
users. Despite this, diﬀerent police operations have targeted sites and
have at least been partially successful in reducing the activity in cryp-
tomarkets (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2017). Also, the identity of the
original Silk Road developer, Ross William Ulbrich, was discovered
after the FBI followed his behaviour pattern and gathered cumulative
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2017.05.018
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critical information for long enough (FBI, 2014).
The anonymity of online drug markets is guaranteed by digital
currencies and payment systems that signiﬁcantly increase the diﬃ-
culty of tracking down buyers and sellers. Bitcoin is one digital currency
and a payment system in one; it was invented by an unknown entity
who calls himself Satoshi Nakamoto (Nakamoto, 2008; Bohannon,
2016; Kristoufek, 2015). Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer application that al-
lows digital money transfers between users. Its monetary system is
decentralised and designed to work without central banks, governments
and regulations. Although Bitcoins are used in multiple legal ways,
these anonymity properties also make Bitcoin attractive to criminals.
The work on illicit cryptomarkets has expanded rapidly since 2015.
Many of the studies have been based on the Silk Road (e.g., Aldridge
and Décary-Hétu, 2016; Barratt and Maddox, 2016) and their succes-
sors, such as the Silk Road 2.0, Agora, Alphabay and Valhalla (e.g., Van
Buskirk et al., 2016 Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2017; Demant et al.,
2016; Dolliver and Kuhns, 2016; Van Hout and Hearne, 2017). Studies
have employed traditional research methods such as surveys and in-
terviews (Barratt et al., 2014; Van Hout and Bingham, 2013a, 2013b)
and newer approaches employing web crawlers (Aldridge and Décary-
Hétu, 2016; Demant et al., 2016; Dolliver, 2015; Dolliver and Kenney,
2016; Christin, 2013; Hardy and Norgaard, 2015; Munksgaard et al.,
2016). Some studies have also investigated the quality of drugs sold in
the cryptomarkets (Caudevilla et al., 2016; Rhumorbarbe et al., 2016).
There is also currently a need to understand that cryptomarkets are also
used very locally, as in our Finnish case. So far country cases have in-
volved, for example, Canada (Broséus et al., 2016) and Switzerland
(Rhumorbarbe et al., 2016), and some studies have involved cross-na-
tional comparison (Van Buskirk et al., 2016).
Studies on the Silk Road indicate that users were typically males in
their 20s and prioritised the Silk Road over street markets for quality
reasons and for personal safety (Barratt et al., 2014; Van Hout and
Bingham 2013b; Barratt et al., 2016a,b). Cryptomarket users have been
characterised as a “technological drug subculture” (Van Hout and
Bingham, 2013b), which also represents a form of online activism un-
derlining individual freedoms based on libertarian ethos (Maddox et al.,
2016; Munksgaard and Demant, 2016). Users’ right to choose is com-
bined with the expressed joy of having the opportunity to choose their
preferred drugs like “kids in a candy store” (Barratt et al., 2016b).
As cryptomarkets are organised to guarantee the full anonymity of
the users, they also bring challenges for the users. Social psychologists
have underlined that anonymous behaviour can be highly regulated on
the Internet (Keipi and Oksanen, 2014; Spears et al., 2002). In cryp-
tomarkets, anonymity is enforced by instability, which may even en-
force the anonymity eﬀects of online behaviour. Instability is one of the
central features of online drug markets, as most items are sold quickly
and the majority of sellers disappear within a few months (Christin,
2013). Hence, there is a need for building “reputation systems”
(Resnick et al., 2000; Houser and Wooders, 2006) or “trust systems”
(Lusthaus, 2012) on cryptomarkets. Public user feedback is one of the
common parts of such reputation or trust systems.
A previous study by Hardy and Norgaard (2015) showed that seller
reputation had a positive impact on cannabis sales. They argue that
users’ feedback is a central feature in cannabis sales on the Silk Road
because sellers and buyers do not know each other. Positive reputation
gives the impression that the seller is trustworthy, which leads to in-
creased sales (Hardy and Norgaard, 2015). It has also been found that
vendors who had poor user ratings were more likely to take the risk of
shipping drugs internationally (Décary-Hétu et al., 2016). Besides user
feedback, it is often important to communicate well with the customer
and create an impression of trustworthiness. According to Décary-Hétu
and Leppänen, successful online criminals have communicative skills
that lead to higher rewards (Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013).
In the absence of visual cues that are typically available in an oﬄine
context, online buyers must rely on what information is available,
which also separates online cryptomarkets from the traditional drug
trade. We argue here, in addition to the seller’s reputation, that seller’s
apacity is another potential factor of successful sales. Seller’s capacity
refers to sellers’ promises regarding the variety and quantity of high-
quality products available. This is part of communication with the
customers. Seller’s capacity or promise of a lot of drugs in stock will
create positive expectations that will lead to higher sales. It is common
for cybercriminals to construct an online identity and create trust-
worthiness to attract criminal partners (Lusthaus, 2012). Seller’s ca-
pacity is part of this communication, but it has not been previously
studied with regard to cryptomarkets. However, economic studies on
advance selling have shown that seller capacity is positively associated
with consumer behaviour (Yu et al., 2015).
In this study, our aim was to research both the seller’s reputation
and capacity in Silkkitie. We will ﬁrst provide descriptive results on the
general drug sales on Silkkitie. The main focus of the article lies,
however, on the reputation and capacity that represent diﬀerent facets
of the seller that are available to buyers. Anonymity directs users’ at-
tention to the available features and typically also enforces group be-
haviour (Keipi and Oksanen, 2014; Spears et al., 2002). Hence, in
cryptomarket, trust system is based on both direct feedback and suc-
cessful communication (Hardy and Norgaard, 2015; Resnick et al.,
2000; Houser and Wooders, 2006; Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013;
Lusthaus, 2012). Our hypotheses were grounded on these premises, and
we expected that a positive seller reputation would be positively asso-
ciated with that entity’s daily sales. In addition, we expected that an
increase in a seller’s capacity would increase that entity’s sales.
2. Methods
2.1. Silkkitie as a marketplace
Silkkitie was opened in the Tor network on 6 January 2014, and it
was originally intended to be used speciﬁcally for illicit drug sales in
Finland. Because both the seller and the buyer are located within
Finland, even detecting the drugs is diﬃcult because there is no cus-
toms process for screening domestic shipments. For these reasons, vir-
tually all of the Finnish sellers mention that the shipments are posted
via domestic mail. As Silkkitie is the main online marketplace for
Finnish drug buyers, it is a useful measure of the overall Finnish online
drug market. In 2015, Silkkitie published the English translation of the
site to attract user space outside Finland. The original Finnish version
(http://silkkitiehdg5mug.onion/) now has an English translation called
Valhalla (http://valhallaxmn3fydu.onion/). Bitcoin currency and the
Bitcoin wallet system are used for payment, and Silkkitie requires
sellers to use PGP encryption (Pretty Good Privacy, see Zimmermann,
1995) and oﬀer their public keys to buyers for encrypted and safe text
communication. Silkkitie shows prices in euros and Bitcoins using the
latest exchange rate. We have collected transaction data in terms of
euros.
After Silkkitie users have created their user accounts on the service,
they may select a role as a seller, which enables them to oﬀer products
on sale. The sellers may then set the price and describe both the product
and the terms of the delivery. The seller’s reputation is a central feature
on Silkkitie (see Fig. 1). Buyers can give feedback by rating the product
and the transaction (good: +or bad: −). Buyers see this feedback, so
sellers have to keep up their reputations. More importantly, Silkkitie
oﬀers escrow service by holding the Bitcoins used for purchase and
returning them to buyers if there is a lot of negative feedback. This
makes it very important for sellers to build good reputations.
2.2. Web-crawling process
We employed automatic web-crawling and web-scraping techniques
to extract information from the Silkkitie site every day between 5
November 2014 and 23 September 2015. This method is similar to the
one that was developed to study the Silk Road’s transactions (Christin,
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2013). From a wider perspective, we are using the Open Source In-
telligence methodology (Glassman and Kang, 2012). Our method is
simple and very precise. Our web-scraping software extracted the
product information from every product page on Silkkitie. The collected
ﬁelds were title, price, number of items in stock, seller’s nickname,
seller’s positive and negative feedback, seller’s country, buyer’s country
and the product page’s unique URL.
We executed the software once a day over a period of almost 11
months (322 days). Once a day is enough to study day-to-day drug
trade. During our data collection period, 36 days are missing due to the
Silkkitie server being oﬄine. Half of these days took place in June and
July 2015. During this period, Silkkitie users raised concern that the
administrator of Silkkitie, who calls himself Kapteeni (“Captain in
English”), had shut down Silkkitie and run oﬀ with the remaining
Bitcoins. The service continued, however, after a short break.
2.3. Measures
For this study we only used sales that took place within Finland by
removing items where the seller's location was abroad or seller was
willing to sell abroad. The full data includes 93 878 observations, and
the data covers 286 days of transactions from 260 sellers oﬀering 3823
products. The data includes information on products’ prices, the
amount in stock and additional details. Drug sales were calculated using
the information on available stock. For analytic purposes, the data was
organised into panel format and included 16 815 daily observations of
sellers, including seller’s daily drug sales, reputation, capacity and the
drugs that the seller had sold during the speciﬁc day.
Seller’s daily drug sales are the total value of all the products sold in a
single day. The median amount of daily sales was 0, but the mean daily
sales were 129 euros/seller. The excess of zero-value days is caused by
the fact that many sellers did not make sales on a daily basis. This value
is used as an outcome variable in the regression models.
Silkkitie sellers have categorized their products as stimulants, can-
nabis, opiates, empathogens, psychedelics, opiates, dissociatives, de-
pressants and other pharmaceuticals (see Table 1 for the speciﬁc in-
formation). We decided to use this categorization, which seems to
represent experiences that buyers try to gain from the drugs, instead of
categorizations based on the chemical formations and legal status.
A seller’s reputation quantiﬁes the seller’s combined positive and
negative feedback (reputation = positive comments − negative com-
ments). The sellers’ reputations ranged from -19 to 3418. However, out
of 16 815 observations, only 101 (0.6%) were under zero. Based on the
16 815 daily observations of sellers, the median capacity was 78 euros.
The seller reputation ﬁgures for diﬀerent types of drugs are provided in
Table 2.
A seller’s capacity is calculated for each day for each seller. It is
based on the total value of the seller’s reported stock in euros in a single
day (capacity=∑
=
price stock
i
n
i i
0
), where n is the total number of products
that the seller is oﬀering. In other words, the seller’s capacity is cal-
culated on the basis of the daily product information of each seller.
Based on the 16 815 daily observations of sellers, the median capacity
was 1602 euros. Capacity ﬁgures for diﬀerent types of drugs are pro-
vided in Table 2.
2.4. Statistical analyses
We ﬁrst ran descriptive statistics using the full data with a total of
93 878 observations. We used Stata 12.0 to run ﬁxed-eﬀects Poisson
regression models to analyse the daily drug sales (in euros). These
models accounted for both the sellers and the day when the data was
gathered, ranging from 1 (5 November 2014) to 268 (23 September
2015).
Poisson regression was selected due to the skewed continuous out-
come variable. Although there are several alternatives for treating such
outcomes (including a linear regression with log-transformed out-
comes), Poisson regression has been argued to provide the best alter-
native (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). We ran the models using
Huber-White standard errors (i.e., robust standard errors) due to over-
dispersion (Palmer et al., 2007). Another option would have been using
a ﬁxed-eﬀects negative binomial regression, but there is risk of in-
cidental parameter bias that does not occur with Poisson regression
models (Allison, 2012).
The models ﬁrst report the unadjusted eﬀects of both reputation and
availability. We used a square-root transformation for the seller’s re-
putation and a natural logarithmic transformation for the seller’s ca-
pacity to correct the skewness of these variables. The ﬁnal models in-
clude drug categories as dummy variables (0 = no sales in that
category, 1 = at least one sale in that category). Models were checked
for multicollinearity; no problems were found in this respect, and
sellers’ reputations and capacities are both clear and distinct predictors
of their daily sales. The results section also reports the daily sales based
on the percentiles of the seller’s reputation and capacity.
3. Results
The total value of the illegal drugs sold on Silkkitie during the 11
months of the study was 2 171 387 euros, and 41 131 items were sold
during this period (see Table 2). Stimulants were the most valuable
class of drug (538 354 euros), followed by cannabis products (487 111
euros) and empathogens (mostly MDMA; 396 127 euros). Depressants
Fig. 1. Example screenshot from Silkkitie, with the seller’s positive
and negative feedback in parentheses following the seller’s name.
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were the least sold, with only 4975 euros of sales. Fig. 2 shows the sales
values of diﬀerent substances during the study. We can see that sti-
mulants, cannabis and empathogens combine to make up over half of
all sales during each month.
Out of 3823 products listed, only 51% were sold. Psychedelics had
the highest proportion of sold products (64%), and opiates had the
lowest (38%). The mean price of the sold products was 84 euros, and
the mean daily sales amount per seller was 129 euros, but the largest
daily sale by a seller was 85 000 euros. High ﬁgures in daily sales were,
however, very unusual, as 5000 euros/day were exceeded only 10
times, and by only 7 sellers out of a total of 260 sellers. Considering all
the sales taking place during the follow-up period of the study, almost
15% of the sellers did not have sales at all, while the highest selling
15% were responsible for 82% of the total sales in Silkkitie.
We used ﬁxed-eﬀects regression models to analyse the associations
between a seller’s daily sales and his/her reputation and capacity
(Table 3). Model 0 reports the unadjusted eﬀects on daily sales due to a
seller’s reputation and capacity. The models were run separately for
both reputation and capacity, which were both positively associated
with sales. Model 1 includes both the seller’s reputation and capacity in
the same model. Model 2 adds the daily sold substances as dummy
variables. None of these dummy variables were statistically signiﬁcant
in the model at the level of p < 0.05; hence, they were not included in
Table 3. Model 2 included 222 sellers and 16 243 observations in total,
for an average of 72.9 daily observations per seller. The model is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant; both seller reputation and capacity were positively
associated with daily sales.
Fig. 3 shows the changes in daily sales on Silkkitie based on the
percentile values of the seller’s reputation and capacity (adjusted based
on a ﬁxed-eﬀects regression model). The model includes the seller’s
reputation and capacity as predictors; it is adjusted for the daily sales of
diﬀerent substances. We can see that the (lowest) 10th-percentile group
in terms of reputation has daily sales of only 62 euros on average and
that the (highest) 90th-percentile group has sales of 222 euros on
average. A similar linear increase is seen for seller’s capacity. We can
also see that the sales are especially high for the 80th and 90th per-
centile in terms of reputation.
4. Discussion
Our results showed that the illicit drug sales on Silkkitie were worth
over 2 million euros within Finland during the 11-month study. Our
main goal in this study was to analyse the impact of the seller’s re-
putation and capacity on daily drug sales. Theoretically, the article was
grounded on previous work done on trust systems (Houser and
Wooders, 2006; Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013; Lusthaus, 2012) and
previous research showing that the seller’s reputation has a positive
impact on sales in drug markets (Hardy and Norgaard, 2015). We also
consider the seller’s daily capacity (i.e., the reported sales potential),
which has been shown to have an interaction with consumer behaviour
(Yu et al., 2015), but this eﬀect has not previously been studied in a
cryptomarket setting.
Our Silkkitie ﬁndings provide further empirical evidence on the
importance of trust systems on cryptomarkets. Higher reputations and
capacities indicated higher daily sales. Reputation and capacity re-
present diﬀerent facets of information available for the cryptomarket
consumers, and they both can be considered an integral part of the trust
system in the cryptomarket. The most successful sellers have both a
high reputation and a high capacity. Speciﬁcally, the capacity ﬁgures
are dependent on what the sellers have reported as the available stock
and we consider them as part of communication with the buyers. It has
been also indicated in previous studies that cybercriminals are expected
to attract companions in crime through successful communication
(Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013).
It is possible that a seller’s reputation and capacity have become
even more important due to the instability of cryptomarkets. Within our
data, we could see that daily drug sales varied considerably during the
study period, many products were not sold at all and that many sellers
remained active for only a short period of time. Speciﬁcally, risk-averse
online consumers might avoid such sellers. At least in our data, this was
Table 1
Drug categories in Silkkitie.
Drug category in Silkkitie Drugs included
Stimulants Amphetamine, cocaine, metamphetamine, A-PVP, cathinones, crack, MDPV, 2-FMA/4-FA, 4-MePPP, phenidates, nicotine, coﬀeine, snuﬀ
Cannabis Weed, hash, edibles, concentrates, leaf, synthetics
Emphatogens Ecstasy, MDMA, MDA/MDAI, methylone
Psychedelics LSD, DMT/AMT, mushrooms, 25x-NBOMe, ayahuasca, mescaline, 2C-x, 2C-T-x, 5-MeO-DiPT, 5-MeO-MiPT, bromo-dragonﬂy, LSA/LSZ, AL-LAD,
Ibogaine, Dox
Other pharmaceutics Benzodiazepines, erectile dysfunction drugs, sleeping pills, ADHD medication, pain, sedatives, muscle relaxants, MAOIs, nootropics
Opiates Heroin, buprenorphine, oxycodone, fentanyl, tramadol, codeine, morphine, opium, metadon
Dissociatives Ketamine, salvia, MXE/MXP, datura
Depressants GHB/GBL, alcohol
Table 2
Descriptive information about sales on Silkkitie during the 11-month study period.
Total
sales (€)
Items sold Diﬀerent
products on
sale
% of sold
products
Median
product
price
Median price of
products sold
Median seller
reputation
Median seller reputation
(during the day the sale
took place)
Median seller
capacity per
product
Stimulants 538 354 7 242 529 52 80 48 153 203 1 165
Cannabis 487 111 8 878 807 62 70 55 116 131 648
Emphatogens 396 127 8 424 236 53 99 70 368 476 3 645
Psychedelics 336 010 5 826 261 64 50 40 537 617 900
Other pharmaceuticals 180 728 6 244 1 113 50 32 23 63 67 140
Opiates 181 316 3 734 804 38 70 43 368 476 388
Dissociatives 46 766 632 38 47 70 68 1732 1778 1 878
Depressants 4 975 151 35 49 85 60 156 539 630
Total 2 171
387
41 131 3 823 51 55 39 120 139 488
Note: ﬁgures are based on 93 878 observations.
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shown as a concentration of sales towards those sellers who had higher
reputations and capacity. Results on reputation and capacity are,
however, also valid for the smaller sellers and sales of a variety of
drugs.
Silkkitie also provides a very interesting national case that drug
markets are changed by the cryptomarkets. Although stimulants, can-
nabis products and empathogens (e.g., MDMA) were among the most
sold products during the study, a wide variety of substances were sold.
This follows the general user pattern in Finland. The drug use problem
in Finland is characterised by the absence of heroin and by the high
prevalence of amphetamine and buprenorphine use (EMCDDA, 2016).
Cannabis, amphetamines and MDMA are the most widely used illegal
substances in Finland (Hakkarainen et al., 2015). Compared to other
widely popular drugs, these substances are more associated with re-
creational use; opioids and depressants are more popular among
marginalised drug users (Pitkänen et al., 2016).
Based on the wastewater analyses, there is an estimate that the size
of the Finnish drug market for stimulants (amphetamine, cocaine and
methamphetamine) was around 80 million euros in 2014 (Kankaanpää
et al., 2016). The cannabis market can be estimated to be somewhere
between 20 million and 100 million based on estimations of cannabis
use (c.f. Hakkarainen et al., 2006), and there are markets for bupre-
norphine and benzodiazepines, used most frequently but not only by
disadvantaged drug users (Tammi et al., 2011). Considering this, Silk-
kitie is a major marketplace in Finland. However, most of the drugs in
Finland are sold through traditional routes. It is also possible that
Silkkitie provides a forum for new types of drug users who would not
necessarily buy their drugs from the normal oﬄine markets (Barratt
et al., 2016a, 2016b).
According to the Finnish law enforcement, the largest vendor of
Silkkitie, called Douppikauppa, was caught in April 2016 when a
Finnish Customs unit intercepted a vehicle that was smuggling drugs
between the Netherlands and Finland (Finnish Customs, 2016). The car
contained several kilos of illegal drugs, including ecstasy tablets, LSD
tabs, amphetamine and methamphetamine (Finnish Customs, 2016).
This did not disrupt the drug sales on Silkkitie and Valhalla, and hence
the Silkkitie case demonstrates how diﬃcult it is to control and prevent
sales in cryptomarkets. Although law enforcement could successfully
capture some of the key actors involved, the markets are quickly re-
established (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2017).
Despite the fact that we were able to collect data for almost 11
months, we would like to mention some limitations of our study. We
performed data extraction once a day, but on some occasions, we failed
to get this data because the Silkkitie server was oﬄine. In addition, we
Fig. 2. Sales of diﬀerent substances on Silkkitie between 5 November 2014 and 26 September 2015.
Table 3
Reputation and availability explaining daily sales on Silkkitie (based on ﬁxed-eﬀects
Poisson regression models).
Reputation Capacity
Model Coeﬀ. Robust SE Z P Coeﬀ. Robust SE Z P
0 0.029 0.012 2.51 0.012 0.209 0.047 4.49 < 0.001
1 0.024 0.011 2.27 0.023 0.199 0.043 4.65 < 0.001
2 0.025 0.010 2.52 0.012 0.120 0.055 2.18 0.029
Note: Model 0 shows unadjusted eﬀects for both reputation and capacity separately.
Model 1 includes reputation and capacity in the same model, and Model 2 adds the daily
sold substances as controls. The ﬁnal model 2 included 222 sellers and 16 243 observa-
tions (observations per seller: minimum 2, maximum 267, mean 72.9).
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might have missed some information if a seller removed a product from
the marketplace between the measurements. Similarly, it is possible
that an old product could be registered as new because the seller
changed the product title. We believe, however, that these limitations
are not critical for our main analyses, which concentrated on seller
reputation and capacity. Furthermore, our data is extensive, so the
missing data is unlikely to have an impact on the analyses. To our
knowledge, our data set is one of the largest one that has been collected
from the cryptomarkets. Furthermore, our data set is not vulnerable to
the challenges concerning the collection of online data from other
platforms, such as the Silk Road. In the Silk Road, for example, in-
complete crawls may lead to misleading results (Munksgaard et al.,
2016).
In this study, we were able to follow the extent of trading and
produce almost real-time statistics about how people buy and sell illegal
drugs. Our method is highly reliable, and the long period of data col-
lection guarantees this reliability. Hence, this study contributes to the
increasing body of literature studying cryptomarkets with web crawlers
(e.g., Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016; Christin, 2013; Demant et al.,
2016; Hardy and Norgaard, 2015). Most important, our results help
reveal the consumer interactions between sellers and buyers on online
cryptomarkets, and our ﬁndings underline the relevance of both re-
putation and capacity as parts of the cryptomarket trust system. Future
studies should continue to collect longitudinal data sets.
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Abstract. Tor oﬀers a censorship-resistant and distributed platform
that can provide easy-to-implement anonymity to web users, websites,
and other web services. Tor enables web servers to hide their location, and
Tor users can connect to these authenticated hidden services while the
server and the user both stay anonymous. However, throughout the years
of Tor’s existence, some users have lost their anonymity. This paper dis-
cusses the technical limitations of anonymity and the operational security
challenges that Tor users will encounter. We present a hands-on demon-
stration of anonymity exposures that leverage traﬃc correlation attacks,
electronic ﬁngerprinting, operational security failures, and remote code
execution. Based on published research and our experience with these
methods, we will discuss what they are and how some of them can be
exploited. Also, open problems, solutions, and future plans are discussed.
1 Introduction
Anonymity is considered an important right for supporting freedom of speech and
defending human rights. An Internet user can use various tools to hide his or her
identity [1].Among these, themost popular tool isTor. It is usedby twomillion peo-
ple every day, including ordinary citizens concerned about their privacy, corpora-
tions who do not want to reveal information to their competitors, and law enforce-
ment and government intelligence agencies who need to carry out operations on
the Internet without being noticed [2]. Furthermore, human rights activists and
journalists communicate anonymously using Tor to protect their lives [3].
Tor provides anonymity by routing the user’s traﬃc through three sepa-
rate relay servers so that it is hard to reveal the user’s physical location or IP
address. This technique is called onion routing [4]; it means that Tor protects
users through encryption to ensure privacy, authentication between clients and
relays, and signatures to ensure that all clients know the same set of relays.
The Tor network is considered to be a well-studied and very secure commu-
nication network [2]. According to top secret National Security Agency (NSA)
documents disclosed by whistleblower Edward Snowden, a former Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) employee and a former NSA contractor, the Tor network
has been too diﬃcult for the NSA and CIA to spy on. The NSA even wrote
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in their top secret documents that Tor is “the King of high-secure, low latency
Internet anonymity” [5].
However, these documents also reveal that some users can sometimes be de-
anonymised. “We will never be able to de-anonymize all Tor users all the time.
With manual analysis we can de-anonymize a very small fraction of Tor users,
however no success de-anonymizing a user in response to a TOPI request/on
demand.” This means that when this document was written in June 2012, the
NSA had not been able to discover the identity of Tor users that it wanted to
speciﬁcally target.
In addition, using special networks such as the Tor network, it is possible to
run web servers anonymously and without fear of censorship [4]. Servers con-
ﬁgured to receive inbound connections through Tor are called hidden services
(HSs); rather than revealing the real IP address of the server, an HS is accessed
through the Tor network by means of the virtual top-level domain .onion [4].
As a result, the published content is diverse [6,7]. Undoubtedly, some HSs share
pictures of child abuse or operate as marketplaces for illegal drugs, including
the widely known black market Silk Road. These few services are obviously con-
troversial and often pointed out by critics of Tor and anonymity, but a vast
number of HSs are devoted to human rights, freedom of speech, journalism, and
information prohibited by oppressive governments.
The Tor Browser is as easy to use as any common web browser and uses a
Mozilla Firefox Extended Support Release (ESR). Similarly, deploying a hidden
website is simple. Tor oﬀers a censorship-resistant and distributed platform that
can provide easy-to-implement anonymity to web users, websites, and other web
services.
2 Background
In this chapter, we give a basic overview of how Tor protects anonymity and
what the known design ﬂaws of these techniques are. In particular, we study
what research reveals to us about the design of Tor and applications on top
of Tor.
2.1 Onion Routing
Onion routing was patented by U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
researchers Paul Syverson, Michael G. Reed, and David Goldschlag (US patent
6266704 2001-07-24) [1,7]. The ﬁrst version of onion routing was deployed by
researchers at the NRL in the 1990s to protect online intelligence activity;
it developed further under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) [2,4]. The source code of Tor software was released under a so-called
BSD open-source license, and a non-proﬁt organization, the Tor Project, was
founded in 2006. Since then, Tor has been freely available for everyone [3].
The Tor Project, along with Tor design papers [4], warns that onion routing
is not protected against an attacker who can follow both traﬃc going into and
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coming out of the Tor network [8–11]. In this case, the research community
knows no practical low-latency design that prevents traﬃc and timing correlation
attacks [10,12–14].
2.2 Privacy-Aware Applications on Top of Tor
Exploiting network protocols is not a very common way to attack modern sys-
tems. After all, for instance, it is fairly easy to ﬁnd exploits against web frame-
works and applications but extremely hard to ﬁnd an exploit against a TCP/IP
stack. Similarly, it is hard to attack a Tor application or networking protocol.
However, on top of Tor, people use applications that are likely to be targeted by
an attacker [10,12].
The Tor Project oﬀers applications on top of Tor, such as a special web
browser and a messenger application [3]. Tor Messenger is a cross-platform chat
program that aims to be secure by default and sends all of its traﬃc over Tor.
Tor Browser is the main privacy-aware application produced by the Tor Project.
Tor Browser is a modiﬁed Mozilla Firefox browser with best-practice default
settings and extensions, such as NoScript and HTTPS Everywhere. Tor Browser
automatically starts Tor background processes and routes all traﬃc through the
Tor network. In addition, this browser takes a lot of eﬀort to remove all possible
ﬁngerprinting methods; it fakes the information about operating system and
hardware. Tor Browser does not save privacy-sensitive data, such as the browsing
history, cache, or cookies.
According to security professional Bruce Schneier’s analysis of the leaked
NSA documents, the NSA seems to be individually targeting Tor users, by
exploiting vulnerabilities in their Firefox-based Tor Browser, and not the Tor
application directly [15]. Exploiting Tor Browser is diﬃcult but much more
straight forward than exploiting Tor itself. Web browsers are complex combi-
nations of features and software libraries. Firefox has security ﬂaws and rapid
application development that reﬂects to Tor Browser. As a result, the NSA uses
a series of native Firefox vulnerabilities to attack users of Tor Browser [15].
According to the training presentation provided by Snowden, the so-called Ego-
tisticalGiraﬀe (The NSA code name) exploits an XML extension for JavaScript.
This vulnerability existed in Firefox 11.0 (year 2012) [15]. According to another
document, the vulnerability exploited by EgotisticalGiraﬀe was inadvertently
ﬁxed, but the NSA was conﬁdent that they would be able to ﬁnd new exploits
against the Firefox and Tor Browsers [15]. It is clear that the applications on
top of Tor are under attack.
2.3 Pseudonyms and Operational Security
Operational security (OPSEC) is the process of protecting individual pieces of
non-critical data that could be grouped together to reveal critical data. Over
time, it is diﬃcult to understand how much one’s cumulative online behavior
reveals through the eyes of an adversary. Tor users should follow a strict OPSEC
process by protecting all information that could be used against their anonymity.
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Sun Tzu wrote, “The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the
enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance
of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position
unassailable.”1
We are our own worst enemy. It is too easy to give away the advantage of
perfect technical anonymity by sharing a combination of identifying information.
Any information a Tor user shares in the public domain is also vulnerable to
de-anonymisation. The attacker may follow a Tor user’s behavior pattern and
gather cumulative information. The user may think that it looks like he/she
merely reads some random news and writes some random comments under a
pseudonym, but, of course, this behavior is not random and could be linked to
the real identity. Shared information may reveal language, probable time zone,
interests, knowledge, and – as we will show later – clear links between the real
name of the user and the user’s pseudonym identity.
3 Tor De-anonymisation Techniques
In this chapter, we give a basic overview of how, throughout the years of Tor’s
existence, some users have lost their anonymity.
There is controversial content published using Tor – for instance, dark mar-
kets and child abuse material. As a result, law enforcement agencies have been
using a range of state-of-the-art exploits to remove the cover from some users
of the Tor network. These methods include exploitation of human errors as well
as highly sophisticated mathematical methods that exploit software ﬂaws. In
addition, operational security failures have led to de-anonymisation.
3.1 Operational Security is Diﬃcult
Here, we present the most famous example in which an attacker followed a Tor
user’s behavior pattern and gathered critical cumulative information. In this
case, the OPSEC process failed to protect individual pieces of non-critical data.
These data were grouped together to reveal the identity of Ross William Ulbricht,
who was known under the pseudonyms “Dread Pirate Roberts” (DPR), “frosty”,
and “altoid” [16]. He was convicted of creating and running the Silk Road dark
market onion site until his arrest in October 2013.
On 11 October 2011, a user called altoid posted publicly on the Bitcoin Talk
forum [17]. The message, titled “a venture backed Bitcoin startup company”,
asked for help to build a Bitcoin startup company. Altoid asked people to contact
rossulbricht@gmail.com. Moreover, altoid talked about the new market service
Silk Road. Simultaneously, a user also going by the name of altoid advertised
Silk Road on a forum at shroomery.org, which is a magic mushroom discussion
board.
Ulbricht’s Google Plus page and his YouTube proﬁle both make multi-
ple references to the Austrian economic theory site called the Mises Institute.
1 The Annotated Art of War, Parts 8.3-11: Advantages.
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On the Silk Road forums, DPR shared links to the Mises Institute. DPR cited
Austrian economic theory and shared the Mises Institute’s material. Further-
more, DPR mentioned that he is in the Paciﬁc time zone.
Ulbricht posted the question “How can I connect to a Tor hidden service
using curl in php?” to a popular site called stackoverﬂow.com. According to the
criminal complaint, Ulbricht posted the question using his own real name. Less
than one minute later, he changed his username to frosty [16].
Finally, on top of everything else, Ulbricht purchased nine counterfeit iden-
tiﬁcation documents with his face but with diﬀerent names. The package trav-
eled from Canada to the US, and it was intercepted by US border customs.
The package was addressed to Ulbricht’s San Francisco apartment. Obviously,
law enforcement suspected criminal activity. Simultaneously, technical investiga-
tions of Silk Road gathered evidence that DPR lives in San Francisco. We have
gathered these events into one timeline in Table 1.
Table 1. The main OPSEC-related events that linked Ulbricht to Silk Road through
the pseudonyms altoid, frosty, and DPR.
Date OPSEC: leak of critical information
01/2011 Silk Road HS http://tydgccykixpbu6uz.onion is created
01/2011 Silk Road portal silkroad420.wordpress.com is created
01/2011 Silk Road portal starts to advertise Silk Road HS
01/2011 altoid advertises Silk Road on shroomery.org forum
01/2011 altoid advertises Silk Road on Bitcointalk forum
10/2011 altoid posts a job oﬀer on Bitcointalk, rossulbricht email
03/2013 Question about Tor and PHP is posted on stackoverﬂow.com
03/2013 Ulbricht changes his real name on Stack Overﬂow to “frosty”
07/2013 A routine border search intercepts a package of fake IDs
Eventually, the FBI closed in on the suspect Ross Ulbricht. Using warrants
and technical investigation and by following Ulbricht, the FBI arrested him and
seized his open laptop in a public library. Access to this open laptop provided
plenty of evidence to convict Ulbricht as the creator of Silk Road market place.
3.2 Attacks Against Tor Network-Aﬃliated Systems
Tor protocol is just one service that a client or server might be running. Tor net-
work aﬃliated systems are still vulnerable to conventional cyberattacks. Depend-
ing on the conﬁguration and exposure of the system, several techniques might be
used to reveal the true identity of a server or actor operating in Tor. Actual de-
anonymisation takes place after the attacker acquires relevant data from or takes
full control of the target system. Depending on the information available, any
identiﬁer or the conﬁguration ﬁles of the system can be used to de-anonymise.
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Any visible service increases the exposure of the system and therefore the
probability of a cyberattack. At the application level, typical attacks are input
validation, session handling and access control attacks. At the operating system
level, attacks generally target misconﬁguration. System performance can also be
compromised with denial-of-service attacks that can lead to system failure or
crash. The purpose of performance attacks is to cause a change in the system’s
state that either reveals the details of the system or allows access because of a
safe mode or other recovery measure.
Typical input validation attacks are based on injection and include cross-site
scripting (XSS), buﬀer overﬂows and malicious ﬁle uploads [18].
Session handling attacks, which target tokens that are exchanged during
communication to ensure a correct state in both endpoints, include token value
eavesdropping, token value guessing and session ﬁxation [19].
Access control attacks focus on privilege escalation, where a normal user will
be upgraded to an administrator-level user or a user with other privileges [20].
Operating system-level attacks focus on misconﬁguration using default user
credentials, administrator interface disclosure and direct object reference [21].
Performance attacks use denial-of-service techniques and distributed denial-
of-service techniques where more than one host participates to take down the
target [22].
In August 2013, the FBI exploited a memory-management vulnerability in
the Firefox/Tor Browser to turn Freedom Hosting sites into malware-spreading
trackers [23]. A hosting operator, Freedom Hosting facilitated child abuse HS
websites on a massive scale. The FBI accessed the servers of Freedom Hosting
and injected a malicious JavaScript exploit code. The JavaScript code looks for
a MAC address and hostname and sends them back as HTTP requests to the
Virginia server to expose the user’s real IP address [23]. Later, Firefox developer
Mozilla patched the underlying vulnerability [24].
On 29 November 2016, an anonymous writer sent a warning to the popular
tor-talk mailing list [25]. This email published ﬁndings from a Tor HS that
was sharing child abuse material. A piece of malicious JavaScript code found
from the site exposed the user’s real IP address. This exploit was similar to
the one that was used in 2013. It was able to call kernel32.dll on Windows
operating systems and execute the attacker’s commands. Mozilla quickly ﬁxed
this vulnerability [26].
Another option is to oﬀer a ﬁle to the user to be opened outside Tor Browser.
Web browsers are not able to open all types of ﬁles, and the server can oﬀer
malicious ﬁles to be downloaded. In this case, Tor Browser clearly warns that
some types of ﬁles can cause applications to connect to the Internet without Tor.
The attacker does not need to ﬁnd new exploits against software; instead, the
attacker can use the features of applications that are not designed for protecting
privacy. For instance, many document viewers make connections to online sources
to, for example, download images or stylesheets from the web.
Nevertheless, it is not clear which ﬁle formats and applications have no eﬀect
on Tor users’ privacy. For example, a simple folder of mp3 ﬁles may include
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a popular m3u ﬁle, which enables many major media players to look up the
album image from the online source pointed to from inside the m3u ﬁle. The
attacker can share this kind of music album with targets and can see the incoming
connections from their real IP addresses. The most popular free media players,
such as VLC player, have been suﬀering from this kind of unintentional privacy
leak [27].
3.3 Attacks on Hidden Services
In this section, we examine a few common mistakes and ﬂaws that may reveal
critical information about a hidden service. It is possible to deploy any TCP
service on Tor using and onion address. We concentrate on websites and secure
shell (SSH) services.
First, let us examine the SSH service that works through the Tor network
using an onion address. An SSH service is a typical way to oﬀer remote login to
Linux or Unix machines. An SSH shows an unique ﬁngerprint of the service
before login. This makes it possible to check that the SSH service really is the
one it should be and that there is no man-in-the-middle attack on the network.
However, if the user oﬀers the same SSH service on a public IP address and
through an onion address, this reveals the IP address of the hidden service. Here
is a demonstration of this de-anonymisation technique:
# torsocks ssh root@msydqstlz2kzerdg.onion
RSA key fingerprint a7:93:84:a6:97:fa:25:65:77:c9:58:bb:fe:8e:e2:2f
# ssh root@ahmia.fi
RSA key fingerprint a7:93:84:a6:97:fa:25:65:77:c9:58:bb:fe:8e:e2:2f
As a result, we can be sure that the SSH server on ahmia.ﬁ and on
msydqstlz2kzerdg.onion are the same. We have just revealed the real address
of the hidden service. It is fairly easy to make this unintentional conﬁguration
and share the same service simultaneously through a public IP address and an
onion address.
It is important to understand that Tor is listening to SOCKS connections
on a localhost port. This means that any software that uses Tor is connect-
ing to localhost. Because the software thinks that the connections are coming
from localhost, a new danger for anonymity is exposed: many web frameworks
treat localhost as a safe zone. A typical example is the very popular Apache
HTTP Server with the Apache Server Status module, which comes activated by
default to localhost connections http://127.0.0.1/server-status/. Normally, this
is a safe conﬁguration because localhost is usually a safe zone, and only the
users with login access to the server can access this server-status page. How-
ever, with Tor and an onion address, the connection to this page through Tor
comes in to Apache from the localhost, and Apache displays the page http://
someHSaddress.onion/server-status/ publicly. These kinds of services can lead
to de-anonymisation of the hidden service.
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In addition, it is possible to exploit unintentional features of popular web
frameworks that are not designed to be installed on Tor. A tiny mistake or soft-
ware error may lead to a critical information leak. This happened to the notorious
Silk Road marketplace. It leaked its real IP address in an error situation.
It is extremely hard to test every possible error situation and anticipate how
web software may perform under malfunction circumstances. Tor adds an extra
layer of complexity to web application security.
3.4 Traﬃc and Timing Correlation Attacks
Tor does not provide protection against end-to-end timing attacks. An attacker
observing traﬃc to the ﬁrst relay (entry guard) and traﬃc to the destination
(onion site, exit relay) can use statistical analysis to discover that they are part
of the same circuit. In this scenario, Tor does not provide absolute anonymity; the
client address and destination address of the traﬃc are known to the adversary
who, through correlation attacks, eﬀectively de-anonymises the client [14]. Note
that the attacker does not necessarily need to control the ﬁrst and the last router
in a Tor circuit to correlate streams observed at those relays. It is enough that
the attacker is able to observe the traﬃc.
Sometimes, the de-anonymisation does not require sophisticated statistical
analysis. For example, a 20-year-old Harvard University student was arrested
and charged with allegedly sending hoax bomb threats using Tor to get out of
a ﬁnal exam [28]. According to the FBI aﬃdavit [29], the investigators found
that these emails came from Guerrilla Mail, a free email service that creates
temporary email addresses. Guerrilla Mail embeds the sending IP address in
every outgoing email, and in this case, this was the IP address of one of the
Tor exit nodes. The FBI noted that one student had been using Tor from the
university wireless network shortly before and while the emails were being sent.
The correlation led the FBI to interrogate the student, who confessed and was
arrested.
As we can see, a traﬃc and timing correlation attack is easy when the
anonymity set (number of clients) is small. Several research papers have con-
cluded that the degree of anonymity is small if the number of clients in the
anonymity system is small [30,31]. The content or context of an anonymous
message may reveal background information and reasons to suspect that the
Tor user is using a certain network. If there are only few people using Tor (the
anonymity set is small) on that network, then it is possible to suspect one of
them. However, in the case of Tor, there is still plausible deniability, and common
police work is needed to investigate the suspects.
More complex attacks require sophisticated statistical analysis of traﬃc and
timing. Research shows that these methods may reveal some Tor users and
HSs [10,12–14].
Finally, we demonstrate an example of a traﬃc correlation attack that can be
executed on a real Tor network. To do this, we have created a set of onion services
and selected the entry guards for them. For ethical reasons, these guard relays
were installed just for us, and they are not real guard relays for anyone else.
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Each onion service is serving a website to make normal HTTP traﬃc between
the HS and Tor users possible.
We observe the network traﬃc of 10 Tor relays, which our test set of 100 HSs
are using as the ﬁrst hop to the Tor network. Simultaneously, we are shaping a
distinguishable HTTP traﬃc pattern to the HSs. As expected, we can clearly see
the traﬃc pattern between the HS and the entry guard traﬃc, and this reveals
to us the real IP address of the HS. Figure 1 shows our test with the onions, the
entry guards, and the point of passive traﬃc analysis.
Fig. 1. The attacker sends a distinguishable traﬃc pattern to a hidden service. Simul-
taneously, the attacker is able to monitor the network between the hidden service’s
ﬁrst hop to the Tor network, the so-called entry guard. As a result, it is possible to
reveal the real IP address of the hidden service.
As a result, we detected without special eﬀort the traﬃc pattern to the real
IP address of the hidden service. This kind of traﬃc correlation is a known
problem for the Tor network. The attacker does not need to operate the entry
guard itself; only the traﬃc is relevant. Furthermore, the mechanisms of the
connection, such as the length of the circuits and hidden service protocol, are
not relevant to this attack. If any anonymity network provides TCP connectivity,
there is always the possibility of this type of attack. This type of attack can be
weaponized against HSs. It is reasonably possible that some intelligence services
are already auditing connections to the Tor network. For instance, according
to classiﬁed documents leaked by Edward Snowden, The British Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) extracts data from major ﬁbre-optic
cables to be processed and searched at a later time [31].
Obviously, intelligence agencies can catch only a fraction of the Tor entry
traﬃc, and there are no technical limitations for monitoring. An intelligence
service might monitor guard traﬃc and simultaneously send shaped traﬃc to all
known HSs. As a result, an intelligence service would be able to de-anonymise a
small random fraction of HSs.
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Fortunately for the security of Tor, there are over two million Tor users every
moment and almost 60 000HSs. This large anonymity set makes it extremely
hard to target a certain HS, because the attacker cannot know if the targeted
HSs are connected to the entry guards that the attacker is able to monitor [14].
4 Results
In this paper, we have presented hands-on demonstrations of anonymity expo-
sures that leverage traﬃc correlation attacks, electronic ﬁngerprinting, opera-
tional security failures, and remote code executions. Based on published research
and our experience with these methods, we showed how some of the security lim-
itations of the Tor network can be exploited. Finally, we present analysis of these
realistic de-anonymisation techniques. We recognize four diﬀerent ﬁelds of secu-
rity. Figure 2 shows a 22 matrix of these ﬁelds of security and their technical
dimensions and responsibilities.
I. It is the responsibility of the Tor Project to deploy secure software,
II. and oﬀer clear tutorial material with examples.
III. It is the responsibility of the user to read and follow these guidelines,
IV. and understand basic operation security principles.
I. We demonstrated anonymity exposures that leverage traﬃc and timing
correlation attacks. The Tor Project tries to decrease the probability of this kind
of technical de-anonymisation. Fortunately for anonymity, The Tor network has
a large number of varied users, and possible correlation attacks usually require
global network piercing monitoring for every major network.
II. We showed that enabling JavaScript or downloading ﬁles can cause Tor
Browser or related software to leak identifying information about the user. The
Tor Project should make it as easy as possible to follow safe usage of privacy-
aware applications. In many cases, these are not technical but practical features
for instance, clear user interface and notiﬁcations.
III. We demonstrated cases of oﬀ-hand usage of Tor that have led to de-
anonymisation of hidden services and users. In particular, a user who installs
services on an HS should carefully follow guidelines and understand the technical
details of the setup. For instance, the same SSH service should not be available
on a public IP address and through an onion address. Otherwise, technical de-
anonymisation is possible.
IV. We presented operational security failures; in particular, the founder of
Silk Road, Ross Ulbricht, did not have a clear OPSEC process to protect his
real identity. This type of de-anonymisation is a non-technical process, and the
user could have followed clear guidelines to separate his pseudonymous identities
from his real identity.
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Fig. 2. The Tor Project develops software, including Tor and Tor Browser, and provides
user-friendly applications for free. Tutorial materials help the user to protect privacy
and anonymity. However, the Tor user must understand how Tor should be used and
understand operational security.
5 Conclusion
Providing a usable anonymising network on the Internet today is an ongoing
challenge for Tor. Fortunately for Tor’s anonymity, the network has a great
deal of various users: two million client users, 60 000 hidden services, and 7000
voluntary Tor relays creates a massive anonymity set and degree of anonymity.
If any type of anonymity network provides TCP connectivity, there is always
the possibility of weaponized traﬃc and timing correlation attacks. There is
no attempt in onion routing to remove the correlation between incoming and
outgoing messages. However, this type of targeted attack (in which the attacker
can select the user or hidden service) would require global piercing network
monitoring for every major network. There is no hint that even the largest
intelligence services have this capability.
Unintentional conﬁgurations and leaky web software are problematic. Most
web frameworks are not tested or designed to be used as a hidden service. This
may result in the leak of the real IP address of the server.
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The weakest link of anonymity is the user. The Tor Project oﬀers extensive
tutorials and guidelines for online anonymity. However, we have seen that even
technically talented users sometimes fail to follow obvious OPSEC rules or simply
make mistakes and leak their real identity.
6 Discussion
Tor Browser is not the only method for using Tor; there are other security
options. These tools could become very popular too, although they are more dif-
ﬁcult to install and more complex to understand. Instead of using Tor Browser, a
user can use Linux-based security-focused operating systems. Anonymous oper-
ating systems are signiﬁcantly safer to use because the attacker cannot de-
anonymise the user by exploiting the browser. All traﬃc of the operating system
is routed through the Tor network.
The Amnesic Incognito Live System (Tails) is a security-focused Linux dis-
tribution aimed at preserving privacy and anonymity [32]. All of its outgoing
traﬃc is forced through the Tor network, and non-anonymous connections are
blocked. By default, Tails is designed to be booted as a live USB and does not
save data to the computer hard disk.
Another security-focused Linux distribution is Whonix [33]. This operating
system consists of two separated virtual machines, a desktop installation, and a
Tor gateway; all desktop traﬃc is forced through the Tor gateway. As a result,
even if the attacker is able to obtain root access to the desktop operation system,
the attacker is unable to de-anonymise the user because the information about
the real host IP address is not available inside the desktop machine.
7 Future Work
The Tor network and the diversity of the Tor users and hidden services are
increasing steadily. It is possible that the use of Tor will become widespread and
popular and, like the Internet itself, become a regular communication network
for people. Beyond privacy, Tor supports many desirable, general, and versatile
features, including unique network addressing (onion), connectivity behind ﬁre-
walls or NAT, and end-to-end encryption by default. We believe that the global
Tor user base is growing, and this opens up several new research questions.
Strong anonymity can be obtained in many ways. There are other anonymity
software programs, such as I2P, Freenet, GNUNet, and many more; English
Wikipedia’s category of Anonymous ﬁle sharing networks lists 24 diﬀerent
anonymity networks [34]. We focused on Tor because it is the most popular
online anonymity system.
We certainly need more research about anonymity systems. Needless to say,
people will use Tor as long as it is easy to use and provides strong privacy fea-
tures. If there are unﬁxable security problems on Tor, people will switch to other
anonymity systems. For instance, an anonymous marketplace can be deployed
without full real-time TCP requirements between the receiver and sender. As a
Tor De-anonymisation Techniques 669
result, a traditional mix of network architecture and an end-to-end encrypted
messaging application could be used to sell illegal products anonymously. This
kind of anonymity system is highly resilient against traﬃc and timing correlation
attacks [35]. It appears that online anonymity will be a considerable part of the
future digital world.
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Abstract. A political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, environ-
ment and legal (PESTEL) analysis is a framework or tool used to anal-
yse and monitor the macro-environmental factors that have an impact
on an organisation. The results identify threats and weaknesses which
are used in a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT)
analysis. In this paper the PESTEL framework was utilized to categorize
hacktivism motivations for attack campaigns against certain companies,
governments or industries. Our study is based on empirical evidence:
of thirty-three hacktivism attack campaigns in manifesto level. Then,
the targets of these campaigns were analysed and studied accordingly.
As a result, we claim that connecting cyberattacks to motivations per-
mits organizations to determine their external cyberattack risks, allowing
them to perform more accurate risk-modeling.
Keywords: PESTEL analysis · Security
Online anonymity · Hacktivism · Cyberattack · Political activism
Strategic management · Risk modeling
1 Introduction
In May 2007, the European Commission published a report “...towards a general
policy on the ﬁght against cyber crime...” where cybercrime is deﬁned as “...crim-
inal acts committed using electronic communications networks and information
systems or against such networks and systems...” [4]. Furthermore, the report
pointed out that cyber attacks are increasing and becoming more sophisticated
and internationalised.
The motivations are not always economical. Instead, hacktivism is a way of
protesting and it is motivated by ideology, religion, social causes or political
opinions [18]. Even many local protests have an aspect of global cyber hack-
tivism [18]. For example, in 2012, the hacker collective, Anonymous, drew atten-
tion to the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in Uganda and attacked several government
websites [18]. These protests had signiﬁcant economical implications [18].
c© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018
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Fig. 1. The Anonymous hacktivist campaign manifesto (2010), source https://www.
undernews.fr/hacking-hacktivisme/avenge-assange-les-anonymous-s%E2%80%99app-
retent-a-venger-julian-assange.html. Response to the ﬁnancial companies which
shutdown Wikileaks’ accounts and froze personal assets of Julian Assange (the founder
of Wikileaks).
Anonymous is a loosely-associated international hacktivist group, which only
exists online [9]. The group launched activism operations or campaigns, through
a series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on the government organ-
isations and corporate online systems [9]. A study of these campaigns suggests
that eighty-two percent were motivated by a defense of free speech or political
causes [9].
For instance, in November 2010, Wikileaks (an international non-proﬁt organ-
isation that publishes secret information) released over 251,287 documents (the
United States (U.S.) diplomatic cables leak) [13]. These classiﬁed documents
had been sent to the U.S. State Department by its diplomatic consulates and
embassies around the world [13].
In December, ﬁnancial companies terminated Wikileaks donations [14]. Pay-
pal closed the Wikileaks donation account, the Swiss bank, PostFinance, froze
the assets of Julian Assange (the founder of Wikileaks), and MasterCard and
Visa stopped payments to the organisation [14].
To protest this, the Anonymous group campaigned to assist WikiLeaks in
their quest to release classiﬁed government documents. Each Anonymous cam-
paign is accompanied by a manifesto. Figure 1 shows a part of the “Operation
Avenge Assange” manifesto.
As a result, the Anonymous campaign produced DDoS attacks which dis-
abled the PayPal website and disrupted the sites of Visa and MasterCard [12].
According to PayPal, the damage cost the company ﬁve million USD [12].
After a number of Anonymous protest attacks, hacktivism was weaponised
by national states [2] and is no longer driven by well-meaning amateurs. Instead,
it is increasingly militarised for geopolitical causes, such as to aﬀect the United
Kingdom European Union membership referendum (2016) and the United States
presidential election (2016) [15]. These attackers are supported by government
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institutions to conduct highly specialized attacks with clear a strategy. Hillary
Clinton, after losing the presidential election of 2016, even claimed that Vladimir
Putin has been conducting a “cyber cold war” against the west [15].
2 Background
In this chapter, a basic overview of a PESTEL analysis framework is provided
and a typical hacktivist campaign, manifesto and target list are described.
2.1 PESTEL
In this paper the political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, environment
and legal (PESTEL) framework is employed to categorize hacktivism motivations
for attack campaigns. PESTEL is a framework for strategic analysis [24], which
is also known as PEST analysis [5] and STEPE analysis [16]. Figure 2 represents
possible examples of factors under the PESTEL framework, which inﬂuences the
strategy of analysis.
For governments and companies, PESTEL analysis oﬀers two basic functions:
ﬁrst, it permits the identiﬁcation of the operational environment and, second, it
provides data and information that will enable the company to predict future
situations and circumstances [24]. The factors examined in current literature are
described.
Political factors indicate the methods through which a government inter-
venes in the economy, for example, through government policy, political stabil-
ity, foreign trade policy, tax policy, labour law, environmental law and trade
restrictions. Accordingly, these political factors impact business performance.
Organizations must respond to the current and anticipated future legislation,
and adjust their operations accordingly.
Fig. 2. Political: A government might inﬂuence the economy or a certain industry.
Economic: Performance and patterns of the economy have direct long-term impact.
Social: These factors are cultural trends, demographics and population analytics.
Technological: Innovations in technology inﬂuence the operations of the industry.
Environmental: Factors are determined by the surrounding natural environment.
Legal: This includes regulations that aﬀect the business environment and the market.
326 J. Nurmi and M. S. Niemela¨
Economic factors include economic growth, interest rates, exchange rates,
inﬂation, disposable income of consumers and businesses. On occasion, the fac-
tors are categorised into macro-economical and micro-economical factors. Macro-
economical factors involve with the management of demand in a given economy
and micro-economical factors involve, for instance, the amount of money that
customers are able to spend. An economical environment impacts the business
performance of an organisation.
Social factors, also known as socio-cultural factors, are the areas that involve
shared beliefs and attitudes of the population. These factors include population
growth, age distribution, health consciousness, and career attitudes. These fac-
tors are of interest as they permit the marketers to understand the motivational
forces of their customers.
Technological factors change quickly and inﬂuence the markets and the man-
agement in three distinct avenues: ﬁrstly, in methods of producing services and
products; secondly, in methods of service and product distribution; thirdly, in
methods of communicating with the target markets.
Environmental factors have become important as a result of the increasing
scarcity of raw materials, pollution target requirements, ethical and sustainable
company practices and carbon footprint targets determined by governments.
These are only a few of the issues the marketers face with respect to this factor.
Increasingly, the consumers demand that the products are sourced ethically, and
if possible, from a sustainable source.
Legal factors include health and safety, equal opportunities, advertising stan-
dards, consumer rights and laws, product labeling and product safety. Companies
must be cautious of what is legally permissible in order to trade successfully. If
an organization trades globally, this can become a very complex factor, as each
country possesses its own rules and regulations.
Factors can be classiﬁed under multiple categories at the same time. For
instance, carbon footprint targets are considered both political and environmen-
tal factors.
PESTEL has been applied to investigate factors of emergence of cloud com-
puting and similar technologies [1]. Strategic analysis has been proposed as a
method to follow macro-economic and social trends from online data sources
in order to identify and monitor early indicators of security threats [7]. The
United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime The SOCTA Handbook - Guidance
on the preparation and use of serious and organized crime threat assessments
recommends PESTEL analysis for criminal activities [21].
For any organization, PESTEL analysis provides macro-environmental pre-
dictions and risk analysis, which is utilized in strategic management [5,16]. Cur-
rently, however, there is no data available to calculate the risk of hacktivism
against an organization. Without this data, it is diﬃcult to perform accurate risk
management and formulate a risk-based approach to strategy execution [17].
In the U.S., the average cost of cyber attack is estimated to be two million
USD per organization and it is proposed that insurance be utilized as a tool
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for cyber-risk management related to information security [8]. It is important to
understand and estimate the risks associated with this proposal.
We selected the PESTEL framework because organizations are already per-
forming PESTEL analyses and PESTEL is already utilized as a tool to assess
organized crime threats. The discussion of this framework will be extended by
mapping cyber attack risks by hacktivist campaigns under the PESTEL frame-
work. This will be completed by compiling research regarding the motivations
of these attacks and identify whether they ﬁt under PESTEL. In addition, we
will validate the identities of the targets selected according to the manifesto and
discuss the impact of the attacks on the targets.
2.2 Hacktivist Campaign Manifestos and Target Lists
The ﬁrst step of a hacktivist campaign is to publish a manifesto. A manifesto
is a declaration of the intentions and motives of the campaign. Hacktivists pub-
lish their manifestos online and share them on social media. They explain their
motives and intentions to achieve public acceptance for the protest. For instance,
Fig. 3 demonstrates how Anonymous seeks public attention and followers to their
causes to prevent Japan’s whaling program in the Southern Ocean.
The second step of the campaign is to target online services with cyber and
DDoS attacks. After these attacks interfere the online services, Anonymous pub-
lishes new targets. For example, after attacking online services in Japan they
attacked online services in Iceland as well, for selling whale meat. For instance,
the target list of the “OpWhales” attack is shown in Fig. 4.
The target list contains HTTP server domain names, HTTP software names,
port numbers and IP addresses. The list is publicly available and shared on social
media. Anonymous provided DDoS tools for others to participate in the DDoS
Fig. 3. A part of the hacktivist campaign manifesto for “OpWhales”, an operation
in response to the hunting of whales for their meat. Anonymous commands people to
participate in the attack against Japan for lifting the ban on whale hunting.
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Fig. 4. A target list of an Anonymous hacktivist campaign. Anonymous published a
list of online targets as a part of “OpWhales”. There were multiple similar target lists
during the operation. After targeting online services in Japan, Anonymous targeted
companies in Iceland for selling whale meat.
attack. As a result, an overwhelming amount of HTTP traﬃc overwhelmed the
sites and prevented these online services from operating normally.
Anonymous shared existing network stress-testing tools which could be uti-
lized to perform a DDoS attack on a target site by overwhelming the server
with HTTP traﬃc. Web-based tools can be utilized without installation as
they involve a website that executes the attack through a JavaScript code that
launches a ﬂood of traﬃc from the user’s machine.
People voluntary visited the attack tool site and selected targets from the
target list, despite the fact that in many countries it is illegal to participate in
DDoS attacks. These attacks caused a signiﬁcant amount of web traﬃc to the
targeted online services and resulted in an interruption for them.
Declaring participation illegal does not prevent these attacks [22]. There are
multiple techniques available to hide the origin of the attack. Anonymity net-
works, such as the Tor network, hide the IP address of the machine of the user
who participates to the DDoS attack [6,20]. Furthermore, there are anonymous
discussion channels, including the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) program channels
inside the Tor network. These anonymous communication channels are utilized to
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coordinate DDoS attacks against the targets. De-anonymisation of these users
or communication channels is technically very diﬃcult [11]. See Fig. 7 in the
Appendix A as an example of an anonymous onion website that shares a tuto-
rial to connect IRC channels that operate inside the Tor network.
3 PESTEL Analysis for Hacktivism Campaign
Motivations
In this chapter, the motivations of hacktivist campaigns are studied and are
classiﬁed according to the PESTEL framework.
3.1 Motivations of Hacktivist Campaigns
Hacktivist campaign manifestos and target list data were assembled and studied.
Here, we present thirty-three campaigns between 2011–2018. The motivations of
the campaigns were examined, and we validated the selected targets according
to the motivations. We have gathered these events into one timeline in Table 1
of Appendix B.
Motivations are commonly clearly stated in the manifestos and other pub-
lications of the hacktivist groups [19]. An example of this is the “OpBahrain”
manifesto in Fig. 8 of Appendix C.
We validated that the targets that were selected according to these motiva-
tions. This indicates that campaigns follow their stated motives: the target lists
contains online services of industries, organization and governments which are,
in the hacktivist world view, involved with operations that the they are against.
As a result, we can claim that campaigns have a clear motivation as dictated
in the manifesto and that the campaigns follow their manifestos. The targets
are selected according to manifesto motivation. Hactivism is motivation driven,
indicating that it is reasonable to examine how these motivations are classiﬁed
with the PESTEL model.
3.2 Fitting the Motivations to the PESTEL Framework
In Fig. 5, the motivations are placed under political, economical, social, techno-
logical, environmental and legal categories. We selected the most suitable cat-
egory according to the campaign motivations, although, there is no absolute
methodology to perform categorisation and a campaign might ﬁt under more
than one category.
For example, “OpSaveGaza” was against the Israeli bombing of Gaza (polit-
ical), “OpIcarus” was against the dominance of the ﬁnancial sector (economic),
“OpNoDAPL” was regarding solidarity with Native American protests against
the Dakota Access Pipeline (social), “OpWhales” protested against whale hunt-
ing (environmental), and “OpAbdiMohamed” protested against police violence
in the U.S. (legal).
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Fig. 5. Hacktivist follow their campaign motives and select targets that are, from their
point of view, involved in unethical activities. These motives can be categorized under
PESTEL: political, economical, social, technological, environmental and legal.
Fig. 6. We ﬁt the motivations under political, economical, social, technological, envi-
ronmental and legal categories. Political motivation is the most popular category.
The motivations of hacktivists targets cover all PESTEL categories, however,
it appears as if technology is not often targeted by hacktivists. Instead, they are
more motivated by political, economical, social, technological, environmental and
legal causes (Pie diagram 6).
This does not indicate that there are no technological motivations for cyber
attacks. Many operations have a distinct technological aspect. Anonymous
published “OpSingleGateway” against Thailand after the passing of technical
surveillance methods, which permitted the government to censor websites and
intercept private communications without a court order or warrant. Notably
there was a “Operation Monsanto” against carcinogenic chemicals in food, which
are produced by Monsanto.
4 Results
In this paper, we have presented how attack campaigns ﬁt under PESTEL at
the level of manifestos. Moreover, we validated that the targets are selected
according to motivations. Finally, we present analysis of these realistic cyber
attack threads to diﬀerent industries.
I. Political. We demonstrated that hacktivist groups target governments and
companies if they provoke political activism against them. This is the most
frequent cause of the attack.
II. Economical. We indicated that economical decisions and circumstances
can cause hacktivist groups to attack companies and governments.
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III. Social. We demonstrated that cases of social causes can result in a swift
hacktivist response against companies and governments.
IV. Technological. We detected that technology itself is seldom the main
reason for attacks.
V. Environmental. We found that environmental causes are common reasons
to launch hacktivist campaigns.
VI. Legal. Our results indicate that a legal atmosphere has activated several
hacktivism campaigns.
Our results demonstrate that governments and companies are able to consider
the risk of cyber attacks when the PESTEL framework is employed in analysis.
For instance, if a company provides services to a whaling industry, they should
prepare to be targeted by hacktivist organisations. There is a signiﬁcant price
attached to a cyber attack that disturbs their online services [10]. Or, if their
data is stolen during an attack [23].
5 Conclusion
Providing a usable framework to analyse the risk of cyber attack on the Internet
is an ongoing challenge for any organization. Fortunately, because of strategical
analysis, we are able to study the motivations of hacktivism. This permits a
company to forecast whether it is doing something that could motivate attacks
against its online systems.
Because organizations are already applying PESTEL analysis their to macro-
environmental predictions and risk analysis, they could look their organization
from the hacktivism point of view. Strategic management should ask two ques-
tions:
(1) What could cause our organization being targeted by hacktivists?
(2) What is the price of this risk?
After this, the strategic management is able to react accordingly.
6 Discussion
A PESTEL framework is not the only method to analyse risks and opportu-
nities. There are other frameworks available. These tools could be extended
to map cyber security risks. Also, hacktivism is not the only cause of cyber
attacks. Instead, hackers are increasingly supported by government institutions
and conduct highly-specialised attacks. These attacks have strategic and geopo-
litical causes. Previously the actors have been analyzed by Intel which developed
threat agent library (TAL) which describes the human agents that pose threats
to IT systems [3].
The number of eﬀective cyber attacks is increasing steadily. It is possible that
new motivations for these attacks arise and these motivations could be organ-
ised under PESTEL. Clear limitation in our paper is that there is no absolute
methodology for the categorisation of the motivations. Human motivations are
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various and complex. We need more research to improve understanding of the
motivations to predict hacktivism.
We believe that the price of cyber attacks should be calculated and this
leads to new research questions. More research is needed regarding the eﬀects of
cyber crime and hacktivism. In addition, novel methods to estimate what is the
risk of being targeted by hacktivist groups and how to mitigate these risks are
necessary.
A Discussion Channels Within the Tor Anonymity
Network Are Used to Coordinate DDoS Attacks
Fig. 7. An example of anonymous onion website that shares a tutorial to connect IRC
channels. These services operate inside the Tor anonymity network.
B Hacktivist Campaigns, Motivations and Targets
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C OpBahrain Manifesto by the Anonymous Hacktivist
Group
Fig. 8. A manifesto of a hacktivist campaign. Anonymous published this manifesto
before it launched “OpBahrain” attacks against the Bahrainian government. The man-
ifesto describes clear motivation for the attacks.
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